UNIVERSITY OF ST. MICHAEL'S COLLEGE
3 1761 01878794 5

EX LIBRIS
Jacobus Carolus Carberry

THE SADLIER-O'KEEFE CO.
TORONTO AND MONTREAL

MISCELLANIES.

LONDON:
ROBSON AND SONS, PRINTERS, PANCRAS ROAD, N.W.

MISCELLANIES.

BY

HENRY EDWARD,

CARDINAL ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER.

VOL. II.



LONDON: BURNS AND OATES.

1877.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

I. PAGE

DR. NICHOLSON'S ACCUSATION OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER 1

SEPTEMBER 1873.

II.

THE DIGNITY AND RIGHTS OF LABOUR . . . 65

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE MECHANICS' INSTITUTION, LEEDS, ON THE 28TH JANUARY 1874.

III.

THE CHURCH OF ROME 101

WRITTEN BY REQUEST FOR THE 'DAILY TELEGRAPH' NEWSPAPER, 1873.

IV.

CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM 115

READ BEFORE THE ACADEMIA OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION, DECEMBER 23, 1873.

V.

ULTRAMONTANISM AND CHRISTIANITY 163

VI.

CHRISTIANITY AND ANTICHRISTIANISM 201

VII.

THE POPE AND MAGNA CHARTA 249

VIII.

PAGE

INAUGURAL ADDRESS 285

Delivered at the Academia of the Catholic Religion, Manchester, January 10, 1876.

IX.

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT ASSUMPTIONS 311

X.

FREDERIC OZANAM 359

I.

DR. NICHOLSON'S ACCUSATION OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER.

The following pages contain five articles reprinted from the *Tablet* newspaper.

To explain their purport it will be enough to say that the *Guardian* newspaper of September 17 published a correspondence between the Rev. Dr. Nicholson, a clergyman of the Church of England, and the Rev. F. Guiron, Secretary to the Archbishop of Westminster.

Dr. Nicholson charged the Archbishop with heresy; and so far as his letters are comprehensible, the charge ranges over the following heads:

1. That the Archbishop had declared the Sacred Humanity to be deified; *i.e.* changed into God; or made 'God.'
2. That he had separated it from the Divinity and set it up as a deified object of separate worship: a 'quasi God,' as Dr. Nicholson calls it.
3. That he had thereby taught at one and the same time two heresies, namely, Nestorianism, which makes two Persons in Christ, and that thereby he fell under the anathema of the Fifth General Council, and Eutychianism, which taught that the human nature was so absorbed into the Divine, that there were no longer *two* natures but *one* only in Christ.

It may seem wonderful that Dr. Nicholson as a Christian should have thought the first proposition to be a possible error in a human mind, even of a Romanist. That he should have accused anybody of two heresies which mutually and by necessity exclude each other, and cannot possibly be found in the same mind, howsoever heretical, would be wonderful to any one who has not read Dr. Nicholson's letters. But perhaps even they will wonder no longer after they have read the following pages.

October 25, 1873.

DR. NICHOLSON'S ACCUSATION OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER.

SEPTEMBER 1873.

'Improbatio hæreticorum facit eminere quid Ecclesia Tua sentiat, et quid habeat sana doctrina.' S. AUG. *Conf.* lib. vii. c. xix.

FIRST ARTICLE.

THE RASHNESS OF THE 'GUARDIAN.'

THE *Guardian* is beside itself with joy in the belief, that the Archbishop of Westminster has been trapped in a theological error condemned by an Œcumenical Council. The *Guardian* has been deceived by Dr. Nicholson, an Anglican minister, who appears to be the first to rake this moon out of the pond. The Archbishop, in preaching at the Pro-Cathedral, had stated two things: first, that the human heart of Jesus was deified by union with His Godhead; and, secondly, that it is therefore an object of divine worship. On this Mr. Nicholson, unconsciously perhaps, following the Jansenists, affirmed that by this doctrine the Archbishop introduced two adorations to the two natures separately, and had thereby fallen under the condemnation of the Fifth Œcumenical Council.

We would therefore propose to the *Guardian* and to its theologian the following question: The Sacred

Heart of Jesus, is it or is it not an object of divine worship? If the answer be, It is: then the Archbishop is justified out of the mouth of the *Guardian*. If the answer be, It is not: then the *Guardian* and its theology fall into the very pit which it dug for the Archbishop of Westminster.

If the Sacred Heart of Jesus be not an object of divine worship, such divine worship can only be denied to it by asserting one or more of the following heresies:

First, that the Sacred Humanity had a human personality of its own; which is the heresy of Nestorius, condemned by this same Fifth Œcumenical Council; or,

Secondly, that the personality of the Son is inferior to the Father, which is the heresy of Arius; or,

Thirdly, that the Sacred Heart of Jesus is not hypostatically and indissolubly united to the Person of the Eternal Word, and that it is not the Heart of the Incarnate Word in such wise as to entitle it to a communication and participation of the divine worship due to the Word as God.

Now, even if this were true, the *Guardian* and its teachers will not say that the Sacred Humanity is not worthy of some honour, even if inferior to divine worship, of whatsoever degree and kind it may be. And this is precisely the heresy which the Fifth Council anathematises. This is precisely the bringing in of 'two natures, to be honoured separately, with two adorations.' How was it that the *Guardian*, in its haste to assail a Catholic Bishop, did not at least see that it was

running straight into the pit which it had been digging for the Archbishop?

It was for this reason, that he had been so careful to affirm,

1. That the human Heart by union with the Godhead of the Eternal Son was 'deified,' as S. Cyril of Alexandria teaches of the whole human nature of Christ; that is to say, it became the Heart of God.

2. That it is for ever indissolubly united with the Godhead of the Son.

3. That it therefore partakes of the divine worship due to the Divine Person whose human Heart it is.

4. That this indissoluble hypostatic union excludes the heretical notion of two natures to be separately adored with two adorations.

5. That the unity of the Person of the Incarnate Word excludes not only two adorations but any worship less than the divine.

6. That the Sacred Heart is the Heart of God, in which the uncreated and created love of God to man are indissolubly united; and that it is therefore to be adored in one act of divine worship now and to all eternity.

To put this in the simplest theological terms:

First: The Humanity of Christ is to be adored by one and the same divine worship which is due to the Eternal Word with whom it is hypostatically united. This is matter of faith; and its contradictory is condemned under anathema.

Secondly: The *objectum materiale* of the divine worship is Christ, God and Man.

Thirdly: The *objectum formale* or *motive* of the divine worship is the Divine Person of the Son.

This divine worship, one and the same, is due to Christ, God and Man: to His Godhead 'in se et propter se,' *in* and *for itself;* to His Manhood, 'in se, non tamen propter se,' *in itself*, but not *for itself*. The Sacred Humanity is to be adored with divine worship, because it is the Humanity of God, and every part of it is adorable for the same reason; therefore the Sacred Heart is an object of divine worship.

We cannot refrain from adding two observations.

The naked and explicit heresies which have been put forth on the subject of the Sacred Heart prove to demonstration a profound and heretical ignorance on the whole subject of the Incarnation. The subject of the Sacred Heart seems to have been providentially used at this time that 'the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed.' We have been hitherto altogether unconscious, and could not have believed that so much formal Nestorianism and Semi-Arianism could lie hid in the Anglican Church. And when we remember that the *Guardian* is, by privilege, the paper of the Anglican clergy, and to be found in a large number of their homes, we feel a profound disappointment. We had hoped better things. We have no pleasure in the errors even of our antagonists. Hitherto we have believed that in the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation at least the Anglican clergy were faithful and well instructed. We are much shaken in this hope by these revelations.

The other reflection is hardly less grave. Charity

'thinketh no evil' and 'rejoiceth with the truth.' We cannot understand the outburst of delighted exultation with which the *Guardian* published to the world that it had heard and believed that a Catholic Bishop had erred from the truth. The *Guardian* must hate the Catholic Church a great deal more than it loves the Christian Faith. This spirit is not of God, but of the Evil One, and is an ill omen for Anglican Christianity.

Second Article.

nicholson *v.* guiron.

Dr. Nicholson, having attacked the Archbishop by letter, was answered by the Rev. F. Guiron. A long correspondence followed. We know nothing like it except the Tichborne Case. If we wrong Dr. Nicholson he must thank himself for it. We know nothing of him but by his letters. If he be better than his letters we are glad of it, for his sake. Anything more shallow, pretentious, impertinent, and to all appearance insincere, we have seldom read. We will justify this severe sentence by his own words.

I. Dr. Nicholson states that he heard the Archbishop say: 'The humanity of our Blessed Redeemer is deified in consequence of its having been assumed by the Divine Son.' This statement is perfectly Catholic and orthodox. It affirms two things, the assumption of humanity by the Son of God; and that the humanity thereby became 'Caro Dei,' or 'Humanitas Dei;' and secondly, that

the Sacred Humanity was thereby indissolubly united to the Person of the Son, and therefore 'deified.' The Archbishop states that he said: 'The Sacred Heart of our Lord, being united with the Divinity is deified, and is therefore an object of divine worship.' The terms of these propositions are different: the doctrine is the same. Both affirm the indissoluble union of humanity with the Son of God by the hypostatic union; and that the Sacred Humanity is therefore an object of divine worship. Will it be believed that upon this Dr. Nicholson founds the following charges:

1. That the Archbishop *separates* the Sacred Humanity from the Godhead.

2. That he teaches *two* adorations.

3. That he therefore falls under the anathema of the Fifth Œcumenical Council.

It is impossible for falsification to be more direct, formal, and, we do not know how to refrain from adding, conscious. But we shall see as we go on the process of this juggle upon plain words.

II. F. Guiron, who answered Dr. Nicholson's charge, brought to his knowledge the following passage of Perrone: 'Quamvis hæc Caro (*i.e.* Caro propria Verbi, or Caro Dei) adoretur in se, non adoratur tamen propter se, quod est proprium solius Dei.'

In these words Perrone affirms:

1. That divine worship is due to God alone, 'Dei solius.'

2. That both natures receive divine worship in the unity of the Person of the Word Incarnate.

3. That the Divine nature is worshipped *in se et*

propter se, in and *for itself*, the Human Nature *in se* but not *propter se*, in itself but *not for itself;* because it is worshipped with divine worship by reason of the Godhead of the Word, whose humanity it is.

This is a Godsend for Dr. Nicholson, who begins with new courage as follows: Perrone says that divine worship belongs to God alone, 'proprium Dei solius.' Therefore Perrone *does not extend it to the human nature, because it is not God.* With Dr. Nicholson, to affirm and to deny are one and the same thing. What he did with the Archbishop's words he now does with Perrone's. He adds, 'Perrone did not teach the deification of the Sacred Humanity.' Now it so happens that in the immediate context from which F. Guiron quoted, Perrone does teach it in the following words: 'Nonnulli Patres humanum Christi velle dixere *deificatum*, quatenus intime conjunctum erat cum velle divino, *uti ipsa humana natura cum divina*.'[1] But of this we hope Dr. Nicholson was in his accustomed ignorance; for if not, we must charge him not with ignorance but with something worse.

F. Guiron most truly says, Perrone did teach the deification of the Sacred Humanity, or else he could not without error have taught that the Sacred Humanity partakes of the divine worship of the Incarnate Word. This is so true that to do so would be blasphemy.

Dr. Nicholson denies that Perrone taught the deification of the Sacred Humanity. But it is undeniable that he taught that the Sacred Humanity partakes of the divine worship of the Word. Therefore, accord-

[1] *Tract. de Incar.* pars ii. c. iii. tom. iii. 131.

ing to Dr. Nicholson, Perrone taught blasphemy. So, of course, F. Guiron, for he teaches what Perrone taught.

III. But the recoil of this on Dr. Nicholson is instant and fatal. If Perrone did not teach blasphemy, he taught that the Sacred Humanity is worshipped with divine worship, because of the hypostatic union with the Word; by which union it is 'deified.' If so, the Sacred Humanity is to be worshipped 'una adoratione,' according to the teaching of the Fifth Œcumenical Council, quoted by Perrone in the same context,[2] but Dr. Nicholson knows nothing about it; at least so we hope for the sake of his sincerity.

Here, then, we have a dilemma.

Perrone either taught that the Sacred Humanity is to be worshipped with divine worship by reason of the hypostatic union; or he did not so teach. If he did, Perrone and F. Guiron are sheltered from Dr. Nicholson, and from the anathema of the Fifth Œcumenical Council.

If he did not so teach, then Dr. Nicholson charges not only F. Guiron and the Archbishop, but Perrone also, with introducing two adorations to two separate natures.

But Dr. Nicholson has destroyed himself; for in one of his letters he affirms that Perrone taught that the Sacred Humanity is to be adored, not because it is deified, but because it 'Verbo Divino hypostatice unita.' We will assume, then, that Dr. Nicholson admits that Perrone taught that the Sacred Humanity partakes of divine worship by reason of the hypostatic union. But

[2] Pars ii. c. iv. tom. iii. 141.

why not say so? Because, we fear, Dr. Nicholson began to have a nervous instinct that if he were to say so, his whole case would be ruined. As we shall next show.

IV. F. Guiron very truly says, in perfect conformity with the fathers and theologians of the Church, that the word 'deify' ordinarily signifies 'to be exalted to an object of worship.' Now nothing can be worshipped with *divine* worship but God alone—'est *Dei solius*,' as Dr. Nicholson learns from Perrone. Therefore nothing which is separate from God, or out of God, can be an object of divine worship. But the Sacred Humanity, which by hypostatic union was assumed by the Eternal Word, is made 'Caro Dei,' and therefore *eo ipso deified*. Dr. Nicholson calls the hypostatic union a 'possessive relation:' of which more before we have done. We affirm that the 'Caro Dei,' hypostatically, indissolubly, and eternally united to the Son, partakes of the divine worship due to His Godhead alone *in se, et propter se*, because Totus Christus, *Deus et Homo*, is worshipped *una eademque divini cultus adoratione. Iniquitas mentita est sibi*, which may be rendered, Ill-will is caught in its own trap.

Dr. Nicholson's affirmation that Perrone taught that the Sacred Humanity partakes of divine worship because it is hypostatically united to the Divine Word, proves also that Perrone held that the Sacred Humanity was elevated by assumption to be 'Caro Dei,' or deified. But these are the *ipsissima verba* of F. Guiron; therefore Perrone and F. Guiron alike teach the same Catholic doctrine of the deification and divine worship

of the Humanity of the Incarnate Word; or they are alike blasphemous. But Dr. Nicholson either does not see what he is saying, which is a crime in an accuser, or he sees and knows that his accusation is false. We leave him to take his choice.

V. We will now go one step onward into Dr. Nicholson's labyrinth, or, as Lord Bacon would call it, his 'maze.' Rising to the occasion, he finally delivers himself of the following sentence: 'The Chief Pastor of the Roman Church in England, from the principal pulpit of his charge, delivers himself dogmatically of a heresy which has been condemned under Catholic anathema.'

If this means anything it means:

1. That the Archbishop taught that the two natures in Christ are to be adored *separately*.

2. That these two adorations are not one and the same. For if they were one and the same they could not be two.

But we have no need to argue and deduce. Dr. Nicholson has asserted all this in words. He writes: 'Compare with this the dogmatic statement of Archbishop Manning conveyed in your letter:

'"The Divine Person is adored and the Humanity which He assumed is adored.

'"The two natures of Christ are both the objects of divine worship, but in a different degree."'

We hope to prove that Dr. Nicholson has deliberately falsified the Archbishop's words, and foisted in his own. There is not a syllable of the Archbishop's or of F. Guiron's, as we shall show, even susceptible of this per-

version. It is a pure, gratuitous, and very culpable imputation. This we shall show in due time.

Now we have Dr. Nicholson's report of the Archbishop's words before us. 'The human nature of the Blessed Redeemer is deified in consequence of its having been assumed by the Divine Son.' The Archbishop was speaking of the divine worship of the Sacred Heart, and only incidentally of the doctrine of the Sacred Humanity as a whole. He therefore restated his words as follows: 'The Sacred Heart of our Lord, being united with the Divinity, was deified, and therefore an object of divine worship.' What is true of the Sacred Humanity as a whole is true of every part of the same. Now the word 'hypostatically' is indeed not used here, because few who hear a preacher understand the terminology of the schools. But both these formulæ contain and fully enunciate the hypostatic union as the motive of the divine worship of which the Sacred Humanity partakes.

By '*assumed by the Divine Son*,' as in the first formula, or by '*united with the Divinity*' of our Lord, as in the second, the hypostatic union is completely enunciated. The human nature is thereby declared to be '*Caro Dei*:' therefore *eo ipso* it was deified, and therefore it partakes in the divine worship due to the Eternal Word. Deification and divine worship are inseparable from the hypostatic union.

Where, then, are the 'two natures to be worshipped *separately*' and the '*two* adorations' condemned by the Fifth Œcumenical Council? There is not a shadow of two adorations in either the Archbishop's or F. Guiron's

words. It is Dr. Nicholson who, by the juggle on Perrone's words '*Dei solius*' has foisted in the notion of separation; and then argues thus: The Archbishop says the Sacred Humanity is to be worshipped. But Perrone says divine worship belongs to God alone, therefore the Sacred Humanity is not to be worshipped with divine worship. And this with the word '*deified*' before him. But F. Guiron asserts, as Dr. Nicholson says, 'the two natures of Christ are both *the objects* of divine worship, but in a different degree.' Dr. Nicholson repeats the words and changes *object* into *objects*, and on his own falsification founds a charge of two separate adorations. F. Guiron expressly says that Christ is the *objectum*, one and indivisible. His meaning by 'degree' is that the Divine nature is worshipped for its own sake, the Human is not. The worship is one and the same. If he had said, 'With this difference' he would have more effectually shut out Dr. Nicholson's cavils. Therefore the heresies condemned by the Fifth Council are taught, not by the Archbishop, not by F. Guiron, not by Perrone, but profoundly and explicitly by Dr. Nicholson, unless in dissimulation he be prevaricating like the Pharisees when they answered the dilemma of our Lord as to the Baptism of John: 'If we shall say from heaven, He will say to us: Why, then, did you not believe him? but if we shall say from men, we are afraid of the multitude, for all held John as a prophet.'

VI. We will now proceed to deal with Dr. Nicholson's own theology. If it be as he states, it is bad enough. If it be better than his statements, so much

the worse for him, for then we cannot clear him of dissimulation. But we reserve our estimate of Dr. Nicholson's conduct as he has exhibited himself to us for the end. Now for his theology. If Dr. Nicholson's notion of 'deification' can be ascertained from his words at all, it would seem to be this, that the human nature ceased to be *created* and *finite*, and became *infinite* and *uncreated:* that is to say, it ceased to be *Human* nature and became *Divine* nature. This is portentous: but unless Dr. Nicholson means this, we can in no way discover what he means. He says in one place, 'No one denies that the Divine Word holds a possessive relation in respect to *Caro:* what the precise modus of that possession is, the Catholic faith defines in the doctrine of the hypostatic union.' We will hope that Dr. Nicholson does not mean the Nestorian 'habitudo σχετική.' Well, what is the hypostatic union? Dr. Nicholson does not tell us. He could not do so without saying that it is 'the assumption of Humanity by the Son or by the Eternal Word into the unity of His Divine Person.' But if he had said this, he would have repeated the Archbishop's and F. Guiron's statements, and destroyed his own.

VII. He then quotes as applicable to the pending question the words of S. Proclus in the Council of Ephesus, 'neque hominem deificatum prædicamus, sed Deum incarnatum confitemur;' that is, 'we do not preach *a Deified Man*, but the Incarnate God.' What has this ostentatious parade to do with the question? But we will leave this point for a future article. The Exucontians and Nestorians, indeed, taught that Jesus

had a created and human personality, and, in condemning them, the Council of Ephesus gave to Mary the title of 'Mother of God.' This title is a test of faith in the sole and divine personality of Jesus. Will Dr. Nicholson call her Mother of God? If so, he will then understand S. Proclus: and not before. But this is, we trust, simple blundering. We go on to something worse. Dr. Nicholson proceeds to quote the following passages to prove that divine worship is not to be given to the Sacred Humanity of Christ. Theologians, says Bellarmine, attribute hyperdulia 'Soli Humanitati Christi et Matri ejus.' He next quotes Dens as saying 'Humanitas Christi *concepta per mentem ut separata* a Persona Verbi non sit colenda cultu latriæ sed hyperduliæ.'

And yet with this before him, with '*soli*,' and '*separata*,' and '*per mentem concepta*,' Dr. Nicholson is either incapable of seeing, or unwilling to see, that both Bellarmine and Dens, as S. Thomas did before them, are contemplating, not the question of the Adoration of the Sacred Humanity 'assumed' by, or 'united' to, the Person of the Son, with which the Archbishop and F. Guiron are all through and exclusively occupied, but *in se*, and *as mentally separated* from the Person of the Eternal Word. If Dr. Nicholson will take the trouble to read what S. Thomas says in P. iii. *Quæst. XXV.* articles 1 and 2, of which we hope he was ignorant, he will see that it has nothing to do with the question.

The Archbishop and F. Guiron, Perrone and Franzelin, with every Catholic theologian, affirm that

the Sacred Humanity of Christ is deified by assumption and by *union* with the Person of the Divine Word.

And yet Dr. Nicholson has, we must say, the effrontery to write as follows: 'Archbishop Manning abstracts the Humanity and separates the human Heart *per se* of the Blessed Redeemer as the *objectum materiale* of divine worship.'

This is precisely what the Archbishop and F. Guiron exclude and render impossible for any truthful mind to imagine.

Their position all along is that the human Heart is the Sacred Heart, and it is sacred because of the hypostatic union, by which it is deified and is indivisibly united to the Person of the Incarnate Word, who is, both as God and Man, the *objectum materiale* of divine worship.

VIII. Further, to draw the accusation closer around the Archbishop, Dr. Nicholson quotes the ninth canon of the Fifth Council. He gives it as follows: 'Si quis in duabus naturis adorari dicit Christum' (which Archbishop Manning does say), &c. We hope the Archbishop does say so, for it is the Catholic faith, without which no man can be saved. Indeed the same canon of the same Council says so. It declares that Christ is to be adored *unâ adoratione; 'Deum Verbum Incarnatum cum propriâ ipsius carne,'* that is to say, He is to be adored in two natures with one adoration, namely, with divine worship. Dr. Nicholson does not perceive that the point of the Canon is in the words which follow: '*ex quo duas adorationes introducunt.*' If we understand him, Dr. Nicholson explicitly does

this, for he restricts *latria* 'Deo Soli,' and gives *hyperdulia* 'soli Humanitati Christi.'

Dr. Nicholson is therefore by his own confession pointedly under the anathema of the Fifth Œcumenical Council, and there, as a theologian of immense pretence and of equal incapacity, for the present we leave him.

We will next deal with Dr. Nicholson's assertion that the Roman Church 'distinctly teaches that the Humanity of Christ is not an object of latria.'

Third Article.

Is the sacred Humanity to be worshipped with latria?

It is impossible to guess what Dr. Nicholson does believe as to the doctrine of the Incarnation; but he has at length committed himself to a statement of what he does not believe. Here, then, we have something positive; and with this we can deal.

He says the Roman Church 'distinctly teaches that the Humanity of Christ is *not* (*sic*) an object of latria.'

We will therefore prove that the Roman Church does distinctly teach that the Humanity of Christ is an object of latria. To preclude all misunderstanding or cavil we will begin by the following assertions:

1. That the Humanity of Christ was so assumed by the Eternal Word that it never for a moment of time existed apart from the Person of the Son.

2. That the Humanity so assumed by hypostatic union is indissolubly united to the Person of the Son.

The supposition that it ever in reality existed apart from the Person of the Son is Nestorianism.

The supposition that it can or ever will exist apart from the Person of the Son is a heresy without a name.

S. John makes such heresies the sign of Antichrist: 'Every spirit that dissolveth Jesus is not of God; and this is Antichrist.'[3]

The Sacred Humanity is the Humanity of Christ 'in concreto.'

To abstract it 'per mentis conceptionem' is to create a mental idea which has not, never had, and never can have a real existence.

The Humanity, therefore, of which the Archbishop spoke, and of which we treat, is the Sacred Humanity as it exists by hypostatic union in the Incarnate Word at the right hand of God, and in the Blessed Sacrament.

Before we prove this point it will be well to point out a mishap which has befallen Dr. Nicholson. He was evidently not aware that there are among scholastic theologians two questions bearing on the Adoration due to the Sacred Humanity perfectly distinct from each other.

1. The one is, What adoration or cultus is due to the Sacred Humanity *in concreto*, that is as subsisting in the Person of the Incarnate Word.

[3] 1 S. John iv. 3.

2. The other is, What adoration or cultus is due to the Humanity of our Lord *in abstracto*, that is 'per mentem concepta tanquam separata a Persona Verbi;' or, as they say, 'præcisione facta ab unione hypostatica.'

The former of these two questions is resolved by every Catholic authority, by fathers, councils, schoolmen, and theologians, in one and the same sentence: namely, that the Sacred Humanity *in concreto*—that is, as subsisting by hypostatic union in the Person of Christ—is to be worshipped with one and the same adoration; namely, with Latria. This was the affirmation of the Archbishop and of F. Guiron, and with this solely and exclusively they had to do.

The other scholastic question was brought in by Dr. Nicholson, and imputed without shadow of reason to the Archbishop. And it is evident that he picked up this notion out of Dens, altogether misunderstanding its meaning. At page 39, vol. v. *De Incarnatione* (Dublin, 1832), Dens says that the Humanity of Christ, 'concepta per mentem *ut separata a Persona Verbi*' is to be adored, not with latria, but with hyperdulia.

Now this question is both treated and resolved by a line of scholastics and theologians from S. Thomas downwards. All who have commented on the twenty-fifth Question of the Third Part of S. Thomas have more or less treated of it.

But Dr. Nicholson did not know, at least so we hope, that this question has nothing whatever to do with the Adoration of the Sacred Humanity *as subsist-*

ing in the Incarnate Word. And this alone is the Adoration of the Sacred Heart.

The meaning of this scholastic question as to the Humanity *in abstracto* is as follows: Treating of the cultus due to persons or objects separate from the Divine Nature, theologians say: The Humanity of Christ is the most perfect Humanity in and by itself. It was conceived of the Holy Ghost. It was born of the Virgin Mary, who by special privilege was exempt from original sin. It was, in its origin and in its perfections natural and supernatural, of a greater excellence than the Humanity of His Blessed Mother, who, though without stain of original sin, was born in the order of nature. It is more excellent than the Humanity of the first Adam made of the earth, and is therefore of the highest excellence among the works of God; and, as such, is an object of veneration or cultus proportioned to that excellence. Now its excellence transcends that of all Saints, and it is therefore to be worshipped with hyperdulia.

Bellarmine holds this opinion. Suarez maintains the same. Vasquez maintains that it is impossible to conceive the thought, and that if it were possible, it is not right to do so. De Lugo holds the balance between them, agreeing partially with both, but treats the question as a pure speculation. Nobody ever dreamed of bringing S. Thomas and all the Scholastics under the anathema of the Fifth Œcumenical Council, which condemns two adorations to the two natures God and Man separately *in* Christ. The question is one of mere intellectual abstraction. All alike affirm, as a

matter of faith, that the Sacred Humanity *in concreto*, that is, as subsisting in the Incarnate Word, is to be adored *una eademque Divini Cultus adoratione*.

But Dr. Nicholson, it appears, knows nothing of this scholastic question, and in his haste to accuse Archbishops and priests has fallen into his own snare. He denies that the Sacred Humanity *as it subsists in the Incarnate Word* is an object of latria.

He thus falls directly under the anathema condemning two adorations, because he thereby separates the natures in Christ.

We say we hope he was ignorant, though such ignorance in an accuser is very culpable. And yet we do not know how to believe that he could be ignorant of it, for in the paragraph immediately going before his quotation, Dens says: 'Q. Quo cultu adoratur Christus Homo? R. *Cultu Latriæ* . . . . . Adoratur enim Humanitas ut subsistens in Verbo.'

We will now give the evidence to show that the Catholic Church distinctly teaches, and has always distinctly taught, that the Sacred Humanity, as subsisting in the Incarnate Word, is an object of latria.

We will proceed to prove this as follows:

I. First by Scripture. The three following passages have been from the earliest ages quoted to prove that the Humanity of Christ is an object of latria:

1. 'When He bringeth in the first-begotten into the world He saith: And let all the angels of God adore Him'—that is, the Incarnate Son.[4]

2. 'For which cause God also hath exalted Him,

[4] Heb. i. 6.

and hath given Him a name which is above all names: that at the Name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth: and that every tongue shall confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father'—that is Jesus, God and Man.[5]

Now in both these texts the object of divine worship in heaven and earth, that is of angels and men, is Christ, God and Man.

But to preclude cavil we add a third text:

3. 'Adore the footstool of His feet, for it is holy.'[6] S. Ambrose, S. Augustin, and others quote these words, and explain them thus: 'Itaque per scabellum terra intelligitur: per terram autem *Caro Christi*, quam hodie quoque in mysterio adoramus, et quam Apostoli in Domino Jesu, ut supra diximus, adorarunt; neque enim divisus est Christus, sed unus.'[7] 'Therefore by the word footstool the earth is to be understood, and by the earth the Flesh of Christ, which to-day also we adore in a mystery, and which the Apostles worshipped in the Lord Jesus as we before said. For Christ is not divided, but is one.'

In like manner S. Augustin: 'Suscepit enim de terra terram, quia caro de terra est: et de carne Mariæ carnem accepit . . . nemo autem illam carnem manducat nisi prius adoraverit, inventum est quemadmo-

[5] Phil. ii. 9-11.

[6] Ps. xcviii. 5.

[7] S. Ambros. *De Spiritu Sancto*, lib. iii. 79. For greater convenience, we refer to the reprint of the *Dogmata Theologica* of Thomassinus (Vivès, Paris, 1872) for this and the following quotations. See *De Incarnatione*, lib. xi. tom. iv. p. 500.

dum adoretur tale scabellum pedum Domini, et non solum non peccamus adorando, sed peccamus non adorando.'[8] 'For He took earth from the earth, because flesh is of earth, and He received flesh from the flesh of Mary . . . but no one eats that flesh except he has first adored it, and so we have shown how such a footstool of the Lord's feet is adored, and not only do we not sin in adoring it, but we sin in not adoring it.'

These quotations serve two purposes. They prove that latria is due to the Sacred Humanity, and to Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament; but we confine ourselves to our thesis.

II. Secondly, the same is proved by tradition, of which the following passages are sufficient evidence. S. Athanasius writes: 'We do not adore a creature, God forbid. Such madness belongs to heathens and to Arians. But we adore the Lord of things created, the Incarnate Word of God. For though the flesh itself, by itself, be a part of things created, yet it is made *the body of God*. Neither do we adore His body divided and apart from the Word; nor when we adore the Word do we separate the Word from the flesh: for inasmuch as we know that the Word was made flesh, we acknowledge God the Word dwelling in the flesh.'[9]

S. John Damascene says: 'Christ therefore is one, perfect God and perfect Man, whom we adore

[8] S. August. *Enarr. in Ps.* xcviii. 9.

[9] S. Athan. *Epist. ad Adelphium*, sect. 3.

with the Father and the Holy Ghost in one adoration, with His immaculate flesh.'[10]

So also S. Ildephonsus of Toledo: 'As to which mystery, Cyril, answering Nestorius, declares Christ to be so one, that is God and Man; not as if we adore a man with the Word, lest by this a certain division be introduced; but adoring one and the same (object) in the unity of the Person: for the body (of the Word) is not apart from the Word; nor diverse, because the Word was made flesh; and Manhood is so united and assumed into God as to be one God.'[11]

We have already given the evidence of S. Ambrose and S. Augustin. If we were writing a book instead of an article, we could add proofs from S. Jerome, S. Cyril, S. Epiphanius, and many more, but we refer the reader to the Dogmata Theologica of Thomassinus, *De Incarnatione Verbi Dei*, lib. xi. c. ii. tom. iv. p. 499, in which he profusely proves from the Fathers the following proposition: 'That the Word made Flesh is worshipped with the one Adoration of latria; and that thus the Humanity also is encompassed in the worship of latria.'

III. The same doctrine is taught by Petavius, *De Incarnatione Verbi*, lib. xv. c. iii. His thesis is that Christ, God and Man, is to be adored with one adoration. This he proves by the same texts of Holy Scripture quoted above, and by the same and other Fathers, and by the Decrees of Councils. We have

[10] S. John Damas. *De Fide Orthodoxa.*
[11] S. Ildeph. *Fragm. de Partu Virginis.*

sufficiently given the two first classes of evidence and will give only the last.

The Synod of Alexandria under S. Cyril addressed to Nestorius a Synodal Epistle with twelve anathematisms. Nestorius was required under anathema to subscribe to the following Canon: 'If any one shall dare to say that the Humanity assumed is to be adored *together* with God the Word and to be glorified together with Him, *as one thing with another* (*i.e.* as two things), and not that Emmanuel should rather be adored with one adoration, . . . let him be anathema.'

This Epistle and the anathematisms were inserted in the Definition of Faith by the Council of Chalcedon. The Fifth Œcumenical Council also confirmed the same by a new, that is, its ninth Canon. So also the Lateran Council, under Martin I., confirmed all these previous acts. It gives the ninth Canon of the Fifth Council as follows: 'If any man shall say that Christ is to be adored in two natures, *by which they bring in two adorations*, to God the Word *separately* and to the Humanity *separately;* or if any man so adore Christ, affirming the nature or essence of the two that are united to be one, so as to destroy the flesh or to confound the Godhead and the Manhood; and shall not adore with one adoration God the Word Incarnate with His flesh according to the tradition of the Church of God from the beginning, let him be anathema.' On this Petavius continues: 'Hence it is evident from the consent and tradition of the Church as a fixed and established truth, that the flesh or

the Human Nature of the Word is to be worshipped with one only, and that the divine and supreme adoration.'[12] He proves the same also in lib. vi. c. xvi.

IV. It can hardly be necessary to proceed further; and yet it may be well to show the rigorous precision with which the Catholic Church teaches by all its authorities that the Sacred Humanity is to be adored with the worship of latria.

We will begin, then, with the Scholastics; and we will take one who may stand for all, though it would be easy to multiply authorities without number. S. Thomas, p. iii. art. xxv. a. 1, proposes the following thesis: 'Utrum una et eadem adoratione sit adoranda Divinitas Christi et ejus Humanitas?' He answers, quoting the same Epistle and anathematisms of S. Cyril, that Christ, God and Man, is to be adored with one and the same adoration. He next asks (2), 'Utrum Humanitas Christi adoranda sit adoratione latriæ?' He answers affimatively, 'the adoration of the Humanity is the adoration of latria.' The whole school of Summistæ, that is those who have expounded the Summa of S. Thomas, repeat the same doctrine.

V. We will, however, add certain more recent theologians. Dr. Nicholson does not know what weight is to be given to Perrone or to Franzelin. We do not know what weight he may ascribe to Tournely, or whether he has ever heard of him. We select Tournely because of his great and widespread and mature authority as a Catholic theologian representing the theology of the Church of France. In

[12] Petavius, *De Incarnatione*, lib. xv. c. iii. 6.

his chapter headed, 'De Adoratione Christi Hominis,' he begins at once by affirming 'Humana Christi natura hypostatice Verbo conjuncta, eadem et unica cum Divinitate Verbi adoratione colenda est:' that is 'the Human Nature of Christ hypostatically joined to the Word is to be worshipped with one and the same adoration as the Divine Word.' This he proves by the same Scriptures and Fathers adduced above. He then adds what Dr. Nicholson will do well to weigh: 'Atqui hinc facilis est solutio communis ac tritæ hujus objectionis: soli Deo latriæ cultus debetur; humanitas vero Christi Deus non est; ergo Latriæ cultus illi non debetur. Distinguenda minor propositio: Humanitas seu homo non est Deus, separatus et sejunctus a Verbo, *concedo;* hypostatice unitus cum Verbo, *nego.*' 'Hence we may easily solve the following common and trite objection: viz. the worship of latria is due to God alone; the Humanity of Christ is not God; therefore the worship of latria is not due to it. We must distinguish the minor proposition: the Humanity is not God separated and apart from the Word: granted; but hypostatically united with the Word, I deny it,' *i.e.* it is God.

We shall return upon this, when we speak hereafter of the Deification of the Humanity of the Word. We must not be deterred by Dr. Nicholson's want of appreciation of Perrone and Franzelin from giving their evidence.

Perrone places at the head of the chapter distorted by Dr. Nicholson, who did not even know Perrone by name, the following thesis: 'The Human Nature of

Christ is to be adored with one and the same worship of latria in the Divine Word, with whom it is hypostatically united.' He adds, 'De fide est propositio, cujus contradictoria proscripta est in Concilio Gen. V., Con. IV.'[13]

Franzelin says, 'Christ is to be adored, both regarded as to His Divine Nature, and regarded as to His Human Nature, with one and the same supreme worship of latria.'[14]

We give only one more quotation, because it will represent the whole Society of Jesus in its theological tradition. In the *Theologia Wirceburgensis*[15] we read, 'Quæritur nunc: utrum Christus, non qua Deus tantum, ut per se patet, sed et qua homo, religionis cultu adorari debeat? Dico. Christus homo, in utraque natura, divina et humana subsistens, hoc est homo Deus, sive humana Christi natura verbo hypostatice conjuncta, uno eodemque latriæ actu absolute adorari debet quo Verbi Divinitas.'

Question. Is Christ to be worshipped with religious worship, not only as God, which is self-evident, but also as Man?

Answer. 'Christ as Man, subsisting in both divine and human nature, that is the Man-God, or the human nature of Christ hypostatically united to the Word, is to be worshipped absolutely with one and the same act of latria as the Divine Word.'

From all these proofs it is evident that the Catholic

[13] *De Incarn.* p. ii. c. iv. art. ii.

[14] *De Verbo Incarn.* p. 458, cap. vi. th. xlv.

[15] P. ii. *De Incarnatione*, diss. v. sect. iii. art. 1.

Church teaches as a doctrine revealed by God and defined by the Church 'that the Humanity of Christ is an object of latria.' This is *de fide;* and to be held as of divine and Catholic faith.

Dr. Nicholson's assertion therefore that the Roman Church 'distinctly teaches that the Humanity of Christ is *not* (*sic*) an object of latria,' is heretical. A material heretic he certainly is; a formal heretic, 'sciens et prudens,' we hope he may not be, because the abundant proof he has given of ignorance, culpable as it is, demonstrates that he does not know what he is saying.

Fourth Article.

THE DEIFICATION OF THE SACRED HUMANITY.

Dr. Nicholson affirms that 'Perrone does not teach the deification of the Sacred Humanity.' This proposition must also mean that the Catholic Church does not teach that doctrine; for he does not surely intend, that Perrone does not teach it, but that the Church does. This would destroy his own argument and prove F. Guiron's. We therefore assume that Dr. Nicholson means that the Roman Church, as he calls it, does not teach the Deification of the Sacred Humanity.

We shall now go on to prove that the Catholic Church does teach the Deification of the Sacred Humanity: and in doing so we shall show what is the true meaning of this mode of speech.

We will begin by affirming that the 'assumptio

humanitatis in Deum,' or 'the assumption of manhood into God,' and the 'deificatio humanitatis,' or 'the making of humanity to be God's humanity,' are in effect one and the same thing. Whatever distinction of thought can be conceived, the action and the effect are identical.

We will first give evidence from the Fathers, secondly from the scholastic theology, and lastly from theologians of unquestioned authority.

And first for the evidence of the Fathers.

The fourth book of Petavius's great work on the Incarnation is amply sufficient to prove our assertion. He begins thus: 'Of the two natures which subsist in the one Person of Christ, it has been thus far shown that one of them, namely the Divine, has been made incarnate: that is, the Word Himself was made flesh and man. Now, on the other hand, we must inquire whether it ought to be said that man has been made God.'

S. Gregory of Nazianzum writes: 'What greater thing could befall the humility of manhood than that it should be joined to God, and from that union become God?' And again: 'For both these natures by union are one (suppositum), God indeed made man, and man deified.'

'For when,' as he says, 'the humanity assumed by the Word is said θεοῦσθαι, it is the same as to be and to be called God.'

In another place S. Gregory says, 'God was manifest with that which He assumed, One in two natures opposed to each other, flesh and spirit: one of which

deified, the other was deified.' And again, 'That which deifies and that which is deified is one God.'

S. John Damascene also writes as follows: 'The Word Himself was made flesh, conceived of a Virgin and manifested to be God with the nature He assumed, which was already deified by Him in the moment when it began to exist. So that there were three things simultaneous: Assumption, Existence, Deification.' He then calls the Blessed Virgin Mother of God, 'propter deificationem humanitatis.'

Euthymius in like manner speaks of 'Deus inhumatus,' and 'homo deificatus,' and of 'inhumatio' and 'deificatio;' and finally says, 'That which was assumed, by the fact of union, was deified.'

S. Augustin says, 'Such was that assumption which made God man, and man God.'

In the Lateran Council against the Monothelites, Maximus of Aquileia declared the 'human will to be deified.'

After many other quotations from the Fathers, Petavius adds, 'Atqui hominem assumi a Deo, nihil aliud est quam fieri Deum.' 'But, that Humanity is assumed by God is nothing else but that it is deified.'[16]

Though these proofs are enough, we will yet add one or two more because of their special clearness and weight.

S. Athanasius says, 'God Himself was made Flesh, that His Flesh might be made God the Word.'[17]

'Therefore He assumed a human and ingenerate

[16] 1 Petav. *De Incarn.* lib. iv. ix. 5, 1-5.

[17] *Lib. de Human. Natura Suscepta*, sect. 3, tom. ii. p. 873, ed. Ben.

body that, having renewed it as its maker, He might make it God,' *i.e.* 'deify it.'[18]

'Though the Flesh regarded in itself be a part of things created, yet it has been made the Body of God.'[19]

'He deified that which He put on.'[20]

'The Lord when made man for us, and bearing a body, was no less God, . . . but (He) rather deified it.'[21]

'For He received it as far as man's nature was exalted; which exaltation was its being deified.'[22]

'Being God, He has taken to Him the flesh; and, being in the flesh, makes the flesh God, θεοποιεῖ; *i.e.* He deifies it.'[23]

S. Cyril of Alexandria says: 'We never say that the flesh of the Word was made divinity, but divine, forasmuch as it was His own (flesh). For if the flesh of man is called human, what hinders our calling that (flesh) divine which is the flesh of God the Word? Why, then, mock and revile the apotheosis of that holy flesh which we rightly understand to be deification?'

We will add only one more passage: 'Therefore we assert the Body of Christ to be divine; since it is the Body of God, adorned with ineffable glory, incorruptible, holy, life-giving; but that it has been changed into the

[18] *Orat. II. contra Arianos*, 70, tom. ii. p. 537.
[19] *Ep. ad Adelphium*, sect. 3; *S. Ath. Opp.* tom. ii. p. 912.
[20] *Orat. contra Arianos*, i. sect. 7.
[21] *Ep. in Defence of the Nicene Creed*, sect. 3.
[22] *Orat. I. contra Arianos*, sect. 45.
[23] *Orat III. contra Arianos*, sect. 38. See also *Petav. de Incarn.* lib. iv. cap. ix. sect. 1, and lib. ix.

nature of deity neither any of the Holy Fathers either thought or said; nor do we so think.'[24]

So much for the evidence of the Fathers. Next for the scholastic theology; but that we may not overload a mere article we will confine ourselves to S. Thomas alone. He says in Part III. q. ii. art. 1:

'As S. John Damascene says, "The Divine Nature is said to be *incarnate* because it is personally (*hypostatice*) united to the flesh, not that it is converted into flesh. In like manner the flesh is said to be *deified* (as he also says), not by conversion, but by union with the Word, without change in its natural properties; so that the flesh is understood to be deified *because it is made the flesh of* God *the Word*, not because it is made (to be) God."'

Also in q. xvi. art. 3, S. Thomas says:

'And in this manner the human nature is not called *essentially* God (Deus), but deified; not indeed by conversion of it into the divine nature, but *by union* with the divine nature in one Person, as is evident from Damascene.'[25]

And again, q. xvi. art. 5, S. Thomas says: 'Both natures in Christ are united to each other in the Person, by reason of which union the divine nature is said to be incarnate, and the human nature to be deified.'

This same tradition of doctrine and of terminology runs through the schoolmen and the theologians of the Church. We will pass over Bellarmine, Vasquez, Petavius, and Thomassinus, who all use it, and give only

[24] *Apud Franzelin*, pp. 319, 321.
[25] *De Fide Orthod.* lib. iii. cap. xi. xiii.

two examples, which will be abundant, and then sum up the evidence.

De Lugo, whose name alone will suffice for all who know what theology is, writes as follows:

'Though,' he says, 'the Deity be not united immediately with the humanity, but only mediately (*i.e.* mediante Persona), yet this is enough, that it should truly deify the humanity. For the Deity alone, and not the Personality, is (forma deificans) that which deifies the humanity.'[26]

'The Deity is the same in the Father and the Son: yet it is not the Father that formally deifies or sanctifies the humanity, but the Son; because the Deity as it is in the Son, and not as it is in the Father, has the *condition* necessary for that effect, that is to say, the subsistence (hypostasis) of the Son, *by means of which it is united* to the humanity.'[27]

De Lugo continues: 'The Personality is not (forma deificans) that which deifies, nevertheless the Deity formally deifies the humanity by means of the Personality (mediante personalitate); not that this is that which deifies, but because it is the *condition necessary to this effect*, namely, that the Deity may deify (the humanity).'[28] The Humanity subsisting in the hypostatic union, *i.e.* with the Person, is therefore *eo ipso* deified, but it is deified by union with the Divine Nature.

In treating of the abstract question discussed by Suarez and Vasquez as to the adoration of the Humanity *per mentem concepta tanquam separata*, De Lugo

[26] *De Incarn.* disp. xvi. sect. 1, 39. [27] Ibid. [28] Ibid. 48.

uses throughout the word 'deified' as the recognised terminology.

He says that the Humanity of Christ has not its sanctity from itself, but partakes of the sanctity of God : 'Sicut enim participat deificationem, sic etiam participat sanctificationem.'[29]

Suarez had said that the Humanity may be adored for the excellence of the union which it has with the Word, without at the same time adoring the Word also. De Lugo answers, 'You will say with Vasquez that the Humanity cannot be adored, as united with the Word, without adoring the Word, because the Humanity as it is united is the Humanity deified, and the Humanity deified includes the Deity itself.'[30]

We will add one quotation from the Sixth Œcumenical Council: 'As His most holy spotless animate flesh (*i.e.* flesh with the soul) was not destroyed by being deified, but remained in its own state and nature, so also His human will being deified was not destroyed.' This use, then, of the term. '*deify*' is consecrated in a definition of faith by an Œcumenical Council.

We may now sum up this part of the subject.

The Humanity assumed into God is not united immediately with the Divine Nature, for the Divine Nature is common to the Three Persons of the Ever-Blessed Trinity; but the Son alone is Incarnate. Nevertheless the action whereby the Incarnation was accomplished, being an action of God *ad extra*, was an action of the Three Persons of the Ever-Blessed Trinity.

[29] *De Incarn.* disp. xvi. sect. iii. 56.
[30] Ibid. disp. xxxv. sect. ii. 40.

But the Son alone assumed our humanity in the unity of His Person, and by this hypostatic act it became the Humanity of the Eternal Son; so that S. Cyril says, 'As we have each one our own body, so in like manner the body of the Only Begotten was His own and not another's.'[31] So the Sixth Council teaches: 'His flesh is called and is the flesh of God the Word.'

But the Humanity which is united immediately with the Person of the Son is united in the Person of the Son with the Divine Nature; and is thereby deified. 'Nam propria ipsius erat illa Caro.' It was therefore 'Caro facta Dei.' S. Thomas writes, 'The union of human nature with the Word of God is made in the Person, not in the Nature;'[32] that is, as Rusticus says, 'Non Deus Verbum per Divinam Naturam, sed Divina Natura per Dei Verbi Personam unita dicitur carne.'[33]

Franzelin says, 'In the human nature Incarnation is the being so united that the humanity subsists not in itself, but as a nature of the Word in the Word; and this is properly that which the Fathers call the Deification of the Human Nature.'[34]

It may not be amiss to restate here the propositions which gave rise to the correspondence of Dr. Nicholson and F. Guiron.

The Archbishop of Westminster had said, according to Dr. Nicholson, that 'the Humanity of our Blessed Redeemer is deified in consequence of its having been assumed by the Divine Son.'

[31] Franzelin, *De Verbo Incarn.* p. 287.
[32] S. Thom. p. iii. sect. 2, art. 2.
[33] Franzelin, p. 288. [34] Ibid. p. 290.

That is to say: The Sacred Humanity being united immediately with the Person of the Divine Son, and in His Person with the Divine Nature, it was thereby, *i.e.* by that union, deified.

This proposition is to the letter Catholic and precise; and in the very terms of the Councils, Fathers, and Theologians of the Catholic Church. The Archbishop stated his words as follows: 'The Sacred Heart of our Lord being united with the Divinity, is deified, and is therefore an object of Divine Worship.'

That is, the Human Heart immediately united with the Person of our Lord is united with the Divine Nature, and thereby deified. Therefore it shares in the Divine Worship.

Such, then, is the *ratio formalis* of deification, namely, union with the Person of the Son, and in Him, with the Divine Nature: and such is the hypostatic union of the two Natures in the One Person of our Lord.

What shall we say, then, of Dr. Nicholson's—we will not call it theology, but Christianity, as exhibited in the following words?—'From the phrase *Caro Verbi* you infer .... the Deification of the Caro. This surely is particularly feeble. Every Catholic theologian knows the interpretation of such phrases.'

Most assuredly, as we have shown above; but also most assuredly Dr. Nicholson does not.

We need only quote one sentence in proof. 'If the Archbishop means to reason thus "Deus mortuus est," ergo *the Humanity is Deity*, it would not be difficult to classify this sophism.'

We confess ourselves conquered. To us it would be difficult to qualify this comic impertinence. Has Dr. Nicholson ever read S. John's words?—'In this we have known the charity of God, because He hath laid down His life for us.'[35] Does he believe Christ to be God? Does he believe that Christ died for us? Let us advise him to leave off lecturing Catholic theologians till he has learned his Catechism.

Moreover he says: '"by *facere Deum,* I presume is meant to deify as *Verus Deus;*" by *Dei facere,* to deify in some sense which is less than *Verus Deus.* The *facere Deum* is *facere Deum qui est Deus:* the "*Dei facere*" is "*facere Deum qui post hoc non est Deus.*"' This he calls a '*Deus non Deus,*' and adds sapiently, 'This distinction is surely nothing less than a *red. ad absurdum.*' Beyond doubt. But to whose absurdity?

Fifth Article.

Final estimate of Dr. Nicholson's theology.

Our readers must be as weary as we are of Dr. Nicholson. But in our second article we made a promise which we must redeem; and then we hope to have done with him. We promised that we would take account of his conduct in this correspondence with F. Guiron. This we will now do under two heads; the first shall be what manner of Theologian, and the second what manner of man, he is.

Now in estimating the former we will confine our-

[35] 1 S. John iii. 16.

selves to the quotations which he has either interpreted or adduced. They are about fourteen in number, and of these we will give a brief account.

I. First, Perrone was quoted by F. Guiron to show that divine worship is given to the Person of the Word, 'in itself and for itself:' and to the Humanity subsisting in Him, 'in itself but not for itself.' Dr. Nicholson starts by calling Perrone 'Du Perron,' knowing as little of the man as of his meaning. Perhaps he took him for Cardinal Du Perron, who lived in the seventeenth century, as a French traveller, at Moscow, took Plato the patriarch for Plato the philosopher. We note this because before we have done we shall show Dr. Nicholson as setting up for a grave authority about Catholic theologians.

Now for Perrone's words. Dr. Nicholson interprets them as follows:

1. That divine worship is due to God *alone;* therefore,

2. That it is not to be given to the Sacred Humanity.

Perrone expressly says that it is to be given 'in itself but not for itself,' which Dr. Nicholson plainly did not so much as understand; for, if he did, his flat contradiction of Perrone's statement is a worse fault.

II. F. Guiron next referred Dr. Nicholson to S. Athanasius for the use of the word Deify. We gave in our fourth article seven quotations from his works: four from the *Orations against the Arians*, and three from his other writings.

Dr. Nicholson answers, 'As regards the reference to S. Athanasius, I can find nothing in the *Orations*

c. Ar. (*sic*), or elsewhere in the works of that Catholic Father, which can support the proposition.'

Dr. Nicholson pretends to know, or to have read, or to have searched S. Athanasius, especially the Orations. Why not honestly tell the truth? He knew nothing about S. Athanasius.

III. F. Guiron next quoted Franzelin, proving by direct words the divine worship of the Sacred Humanity: and especially of the Sacred Heart, as the special organ of the 'operationes deiviriles' of the Incarnate Word.

Dr. Nicholson knew, if possible, less who Franzelin is than he did who Perrone is.

But he answers, 'Allowing any weight you may claim for it, the thesis lends no support to the error.' What error? Franzelin makes the very same two assertions which F. Guiron and the Archbishop had made.

The passage quoted explicitly asserts the Divine Adoration, and implicitly the Deification, of the Sacred Humanity. But Dr. Nicholson was incapable of understanding the very terminology.

IV. Next F. Guiron gave Dr. Nicholson a scent of the Fifth Œcumenical Council. This was new life to him; but it has been his ruin.

Dr. Nicholson's incredible blunder about the two Adorations we have exposed both in the first and the second article of this series. We will say no more now, because we have something more of the same kind in store for him.

V. F. Guiron then quoted the Constitution of Pius VI., 'Auctorem Fidei,' by which the errors renewed by Dr. Nicholson were condemned in the Synod of Pistoia.

He evidently knew nothing about it. He says, 'You quote no part of it, and I might not unreasonably wait until you do.' From this it is certain that he was ignorant that the 61, 62, and 63 Propositions condemned by the 'Auctorem Fidei' relate to the devotion of the Sacred Heart by name. Yet he pretends to be ready to discuss it. 'I am not unwilling to discuss it *on occasion*.' On what occasion, if not on this? But Dr. Nicholson was evidently once more concealing his ignorance under a pretence of superior knowledge.

VI. Now we come to an event in this correspondence. Down to this point Dr. Nicholson had literally done nothing but misinterpret quotations given to him by F. Guiron.

It so happened that by a strange chance we heard of Dr. Nicholson at this date in great activity, searching for Catholic books, in Bath. His next letter is dated 'Bath.' And there he has found 'Doctor *Peter Dens*,' of whom he says with a tone of patronage to F. Guiron, 'with whose works you are no doubt familiar.' We can imagine F. Guiron may indeed have heard of Dens; but we will engage that he has drawn his theology out of deeper wells.

However, now for Dens:

'Non recte enim dicitur de Christo (ut docet S. Thomas, Art. 7) Homo factus est Deus.'

'Obj.-Vera est hæc propositio, &c.'

Now, will it be believed that this scrap, which Dr. Nicholson gives as a continuous quotation, without sign of garbling, is completely garbled and its sense changed?

Dr. Nicholson *has omitted the whole of Dens' assertion.* Between the sentences quoted by him are these words. He says, We cannot rightly say, 'Homo factus est Deus: Significaretur enim quod *Persona* Verbi facta esset *in tempore* Deus: vel quod *aliquis homo præexistens* factus esset Deus.'

Does Dr. Nicholson mean that F. Guiron ever asserted that the '*Word became God in time*,' or that '*Some man already in existence* was made God'?

If he dares to say this, let him put his finger on the words.

If he cannot do so, he is convicted of either a patent false accusation, or once more of a pretence at knowledge in which he is evidently and culpably wanting.

After this he has, we cannot refrain from saying, the effrontery to write as follows: 'Any proposition coordinate with this Respons. (*sic*) I am free to grant.' We are bound to confess that he is beyond us here. Unless we have lost our senses, these words are absolutely without meaning.

He then goes on:

'Thus the dogmatic theologian Dens shows the fallacy on which your reasoning rests.' F. Guiron had affirmed that it is true and Catholic to say, 'Deus mortuus est.' Dr. Nicholson, in refutation, quotes this scrap of Dens. And yet Dens himself just before, that is on the fourth page before this quotation, says: 'Recte dicitur, Deus, sive filius Dei, natus est ex Virgine, passus, *mortuus*.'[36] We do not quote Dens to show that it is right to say, 'Deus mortuus est;' for the

[36] Reg. i. ii. *De Com. Idiom.* tom. v. p. 21.

whole Catholic theology proves it. We quote Dens, which he had in his hand, to convict Dr. Nicholson of want of knowledge or want of sincerity.

VII. But we have not yet done with Dens, who was found by Dr. Nicholson at Bath, to his own undoing. Whoever gave it to him gave him indeed a δῶρον ἄδωρον. He then quotes the passage we treated in our third article in the following way. 'Dr. Dens[37] speaks thus: Interim cum S. Thoma observandum quod Humanitas Christi *concepta per mentem ut separata* a Persona Verbi, non sit colenda cultu Latriæ, sed Hyperduliæ, quia sic Humanitas *abstracta*, et omnis perfectio quæ ei inest, est creata.'

We have already abundantly proved:

1. That S. Thomas and all theologians teach that the Sacred Humanity never *in reality* existed separate from the Person of the Word, nor, to all eternity, ever can.

2. That to the Sacred Humanity, so indissolubly united to the Word, the divine worship of latria is due.

3. That the Humanity of Christ *separate* from the Word, *non-existent* except by mental abstraction, would be only a *res creata;* and therefore an object at most of hyperdulia.

We have demonstrated in our last article but one, that this has no more to do with the question than the 37th Problem of the First Book of Euclid.

But we quote it here again to convict Dr. Nicholson once more. He takes this from Dens, tom. i. p. 39. His quotation is the four last lines of the page. No-

[37] *Tractatus de Incar.* No. 23.

body would believe that the whole paragraph going before affirms what F. Guiron had said, and refutes what Dr. Nicholson was saying. Deus says: 'Adoratur enim Humanitas ut subsistens in Verbo; et sic subsistentia, sive Persona, Verbi simul adoratur ut causa adorationis,' *i.e. cultu Latriæ.*

VIII. We have already dealt in former articles with the Fifth Œcumenical Council. If Dr. Nicholson knows or means what he says, he is under its anathema, for he has declared:

1. That divine worship is due to the Divine Nature in Christ.

2. That to the Human Nature in Christ is due only hyperdulia.

Therefore he thus introduces two Adorations of the two natures *separatim:* which denies the unity of the Incarnate Word; and is condemned under anathema by the Fifth Council.

IX. But books are fatal to Dr. Nicholson. He next quotes the homily of S. Proclus in the Council of Ephesus: 'Neque hominem deificatum prædicamus, sed Deum Incarnatum confitemur.' This, he says, condemns the dogma that the Sacred Humanity is deified and worshipped with latria. Will it be believed that the words preceding this quotation are as follows?—

'He who by nature was impassible, through pity became full of suffering. Christ did not *become* God by *increase* (of merit, ἐκ προκοπῆς); God forbid the thought: but through pity He became man. We do not preach *a* deified *man,* but the Incarnate God.'[38]

[38] *S. Procli Hom.* sect. iv.; Labbe, *Concil.* tom. iii. p. 580.

Now, did Dr. Nicholson, or did he not, know this context? If he did not, what might we not justly say of this ignorance, coupled with his daring to accuse Catholic teachers of heresy? If he did know it, we leave him to the judgment of all honest men.

S. Proclus was refuting the Nestorians, who affirmed Christ to be a human Person; the Son of Mary, but not the Eternal Son of God.

X. But, if possible, we have worse coming. Dr. Nicholson quotes the Epistle of S. Cyril, read in the Fifth Œcumenical Council, as condemning F. Guiron's assertion that the Sacred Humanity is deified and worshipped as subsisting in the Word.

S. Cyril's words are these: 'We guard against saying of Christ, "for *His* sake who puts on (humanity) I venerate *him* who is put on" (*διὰ τὸν φοροῦντα τὸν φορούμενον*); "for *His* sake who is invisible I worship *him* who is visible," . . . "*he* who is assumed co-exists as God with *Him* that assumes (*him*)." He who says these things cuts asunder (Christ) into two Christs, and makes a man apart by himself, and God likewise apart by Himself.'[39]

Is it possible that Dr. Nicholson did not see that S. Cyril is refuting the Nestorian doctrine of two *Persons* in Christ? We have inserted the original in one place as a sample, because the article which runs all through shows, if possible, more clearly what he was asserting. Dr. Nicholson might have been warned by the 'eum' and 'eum,' and 'qui,' and 'ille,' and 'ei,' which he prints in capitals. But he was so full of the

[39] *Epist. S. Cyril*, &c. s. vi.; Labbe, *Concil.* tom. iii. p. 950.

desire to assail F. Guiron, that even the 'in duos' did not open his eyes. The whole is simply irrelevant. What has all this to do with the Sacred Humanity in, or even *separate mentally* from, the one Person of the Word? Does Dr. Nicholson accuse F. Guiron of denying that Mary is Mother of God? If not, how can he accuse him of making two Persons in Christ? The fact is Dr. Nicholson did not understand what he was saying, how much less what he was quoting.

XI. We now come to Dr. Nicholson's quotations from Bellarmine, which are, if possible, more fatal to him than those from Dens. He quotes Bellarmine to prove that 'the Humanity of Christ is *not* (*sic*) an object of Latria.' For this he quotes '*Lib. de Rel. et Imag. Sanct.*,' without number of book, chapter, or section. We can, however, help him to them.

The passage he quotes *does not exist at all* in the *Lib. de Reliquiis*, &c. It is to be found in lib. i. c. xii. *De Beatitudine, &c. Sanctorum.*

Here is Dr. Nicholson's first blunder. His second is the old story over again: that hyperdulia is to be given 'soli Humanitati Christi et Matri ejus.' This we have answered ten times already.

Now if Dr. Nicholson had really known the Book *de Reliquiis*, he would have found an answer to his perversion of Bellarmine's words. In ch. xxiv. s. 14, Bellarmine says, 'Ambrose means to say that Christ is One, as God, and as crucified: and therefore, when Christ is adored as God, *the humanity is not separated from Him;* and when Christ is adored as crucified, the Divinity is not separated.'

And immediately after he says :

'True latria belongs to Christ when He is adored as He is in Himself, not, however, when He is adored (how does Dr. Nicholson think? in the *sola humanitas separata*, &c.?)—when He is adored *as He is in an Image by participation*.' Is the Sacred Humanity an Image?

Now, as we have fallen on this point again, it may be as well to give Dr. Nicholson one more quotation from Bellarmine. He says: 'What Gregory of Nazianzum says to Chelidonius, that the Flesh by the Incarnation is *deified*, has this sense, that it is made the *Flesh of God* by union with the Word, not made God by conversion into the Divinity.'[40]

Finally, we come to his quotation from the 20th chap. of this book, in which he expresses his surprise that, not F. Guiron, but that the Archbishop of Westminster, should 'either dissent from, or not be aware of, the doctrine of Cultus in the Roman Church.' There is in this an exquisite impertinence. Let us see the result.

Dr. Nicholson proceeds: 'You did me the favour in the first letter to call my attention to a passage of Perrone;' *i.e.* F. Guiron quoted the words, 'in se, et propter se,' and 'in se, non tamen propter se.' This, he says, refutes F. Guiron's position, namely, that the Sacred Humanity is to be adored with latria, 'not for itself,' but for the divinity of the Incarnate Word. He proves this assertion in the following way: 'It appears to me strange that a difficulty should be raised as to

[40] Lib. iii. c. iv. 2.

the significance and application of phrases so familiar to Roman theologians as *adoratio propter se* and *adoratio in se*.' The difficulty was altogether of his own making. F. Guiron never made it. Bellarmine, Dr. Nicholson says, explains the expressions clearly enough. Let us hear the explanation. The 'adoratio propter se' is paid to that object which has in itself the essential reason of the worship, depending on itself, and not on any other thing; 'quod habet in se rationis vim, non dependentem aliunde.' This is what F. Guiron and Perrone put more concisely 'in se et propter se,' and affirm of adoration as given to the divinity of the Incarnate Word. Dr. Nicholson then adds, 'The *adoratio in se*, the full expression of which is *adoratio in se propter aliud*, is the adoration of an object which contains within itself the cause or *motivum* (Perrone) of the worship; which cause, however, altogether depends on some other thing—quod habet in se causam honoris, sed illa causa tota pendet ab alio.'[41]

Now will it be believed that the passage from which these words are garbled is the following?—'Potest aliquid honorari propter se, vel propter aliud. Id honoratur propter se, quod habet in se rationem venerationis non dependentem aliunde; et hoc modo *sola natura rationalis* est venerabilis. Propter aliud honoratur id, quod habet quidem in se causam honoris, sed illa causa tota pendet ab alio: et hoc modo *signa rerum sacrarum* sunt venerabilia; habent enim in se *relationem similitudinis* sive *representationem rei sacræ*, et proinde quandam excellentiam, sed illa tota pendet ab ipsa re

[41] See Bellarmine, *Lib. de Rel.* xx. 14.

sacra.' Is the Sacred Humanity a similitude or a representation? Bellarmine, after laying down these principles as to the worship—not of the Incarnate Word with His Humanity, as Dr. Nicholson evidently thinks, but of IMAGES—proceeds in this way to apply them.

In c. xxv. 1, he says: 'Neither Latria, nor Hyperdulia, nor Dulia, can properly be given to images: nor any other such worship as *is paid to an intelligent nature*.'

What, then, has this to do with the adoration of the Sacred Humanity?

Is it not an intelligent nature?

Did not Dr. Nicholson affirm 'with Bellarmine' that hyperdulia is to be paid to it?

The fact is, that Dr. Nicholson did not know that Bellarmine, in the whole of this book, is treating of the *relative* worship due to *images*, not of the *absolute* worship due to the Incarnate Word.

Yet Dr. Nicholson had before his eyes these words: 'True latria is due to Christ when He is adored *as He is in Himself* (*i.e.* God and Man), but not when He is adored as He is in *an image by participation*.'[42]

And again: 'The *image* of Christ *represents* Christ, that is, *the Divine Person clothed in human flesh*. . . . Otherwise the Apostles, when they saw Christ in the flesh, ought not to have adored Him with latria: nor ought Thomas to have said, My Lord and my God. For they did not see Christ as God, but *as man*.'[43]

These words are in the very column next to Dr. Nicholson's quotation.

According to Dr. Nicholson, Bellarmine's argument

[42] C. xxiv. 21. [43] C. xxi. 2.

is, The image of Christ is not adored in itself, but as a representation of Christ.

Therefore the Sacred Humanity is not to be adored in itself.

Does Dr. Nicholson mean that the Sacred Humanity is a *representation?* If so, of what? If not, what does all this pomp of quotation of the *Lib. de Rel.*, and of 'the phrases so familiar to Roman theologians,' mean? Certainly they are familiar to a Catholic child: but not in any way familiar to Dr. Nicholson. In the *Penny Catechism* our children learn to say and to understand as follows:

Q. Is it allowable to honour relics, crucifixes, and holy pictures?

A. Yes: with an inferior and *relative* honour: as they *relate* to Christ and His saints, and are *memorials* of them.

Q. May we not pray to relics or images?

A. No, by no means: for they have no *life* or *sense* to help us.

Here are Bellarmine's very words. But what has this to do with the *absolute and divine* worship of the Incarnate Word?

XII. Dr. Nicholson quotes the eighth of S. Cyril's Twelve Anathematisms. We have fully answered this amazing ignorance already, and have shown that the 'alterum cum altero adorari,' that is 'one (Person) with another' (Person), is a condemnation of the Nestorian adoration of two Persons in Christ, and has no shadow of bearing upon the question between Dr. Nicholson and F. Guiron. The man who can think so shows

that he does not understand either the Nestorian heresy or the doctrine of the Incarnation.

And here we will redeem the promise made in our second article.

Dr. Nicholson says that the Divine Word 'holds a possessive *relation* in respect to Caro; what the precise modus of that possession is, the Catholic faith defines in the Doctrine of the Hypostatic union.'

On this we have to say that the doctrine of the hypostatic union is defined by the Church, not as 'a possessive *relation* in *respect* to Caro,' which is simple Nestorianism, but, as Dens will tell Dr. Nicholson, 'est *unio* qua natura humana, *realiter* et *substantialiter* sic est *unita* Personæ Divinæ Verbi, ut in illa habeat suam *subsistentiam*.' The Church uses the word '*unio*' expressly to exclude all equivocal terms, such as 'relation,' or 'inhabitation,' or 'conjunction,' or 'operation,' and the like.

Therefore the fourth Canon of the Fifth Council says: 'If any man say that the union of God the Word with Humanity was made according to grace, or according to operation, or according to equality of honour, or according to *relation* (σχεσιν), &c., and shall not confess that the union of God the Word was made with the flesh, with the life and soul rational and intellectual, that is, according to hypostatic union (as the holy Fathers have taught), and that therefore His Person is one, who is the Lord Jesus Christ, one (Person) of the Holy Trinity, let such man be anathema.' We do not say that Dr. Nicholson is under the anathema, for he knows nothing about it; but we advise him to learn the

terminology of the Church, and not to invent senseless verbiage on doctrines defined by it.

Dr. Nicholson comes back once more with Dens.

'It seems strange,' he says, 'that Archbishop Manning should not be aware of the common dictum, "*Non omne illud quod coadoratur cultu Latriæ debet esse ipse Deus.*"' Now this 'common dictum' is no dictum at all; it is half a premiss made for the occasion. But let that pass. Will it be believed that Dens' next words are, '*sed sufficit quod sit Personæ Divinæ substantialiter conjunctum:*' which half of the premiss Dr. Nicholson deliberately suppresses? Dens is actually and expressly proving what Dr. Nicholson is actually and expressly denying; namely, that the Sacred Humanity, though it be not *ipse Deus, i.e.* the Person of God, is to be worshipped with latria. Dr. Nicholson, as his wont is, carefully mutilates the words of Dens, and uses them to deny that the Sacred Humanity is to be worshipped at all with latria, because it is not 'God,' *i.e.* the Divine Nature. Dens here affirms that it is to be so worshipped because it is united with God. We are beginning to believe that Dr. Nicholson does not know black from white.

XIV. We now come to the last quotation; and to the end of our task. Dr. Nicholson writes:

'The error of literally predicating Divine attributes of the Humanity, and *vice versâ*, is well rebuked by the Augustinian Thad. Perusini (*sic*) preaching before the Council of Trent.'

The words of F. Thaddeus, of Perugia, are: 'They who endeavour to meditate piously and without error

on the wonderful and Divine works of Christ,' must keep before their minds the two natures, Divine and Human, which still retained their own operations and fulfilled their own offices. For, he adds, 'Those things which are proper (*conveniunt*) to Christ as God, no way are proper (*conveniunt*) to Him as Man. And those things which are proper to Him as Man, it would be a sin to ascribe to Him as God.'

That is to say, you cannot say of Christ that He died as God, nor can you say of Christ that He is Omnipresent as Man. You can say of Christ, God and Man, both that He died, and that He is Omnipresent.

Very sound doctrine, but very irrelevant. You cannot say of Christ, as God, that He hungered. You cannot say of Christ, as Man, that before Abraham was He was.

But we have no need to interpret F. Thaddeus's words. He does it himself; but, as before, Dr. Nicholson puts his hand over 'Perusini's' mouth in the midst of his sentence.

Our readers will hardly believe what we now add. Dr. Nicholson breaks off his quotation at a colon, and puts a full stop. F. Thaddeus's next words are: 'but inasmuch as they are joined together, as we have said, by an indissoluble and inexplicable link in one and the same Hypostasis, most frequently what things are of (*i.e.* belong to) the Divine Nature are ascribed to (Him as) Man, what things are of (or belong to) the Human Nature are ascribed to (Him as) God.'[44]

[44] Le Plat, *Hist. Con. Trid.* tom. i. p. 399.

Dr. Nicholson not only cannot understand his quotations, but he cannot extract them faithfully.

F. Thaddeus's assertions are nothing more than the *communicatio idiomatum*, not *in abstracto* to the Natures, but *in concreto*, *i.e.* in the Person. This Dr. Nicholson in his grand way calls, 'The commonplace *Communicatio idiomatum* is a *forma loquendi*, well understood.' By whom?

F. Thaddeus then goes on to say that the Ascension, on which festival he was preaching, cannot be ascribed to the Divinity, for He was in heaven already. Also, he adds, Christ did not forsake the earth even as Man (quemadmodum impii quidam senserunt hæretici), because He has left us His Body, 'sub Divini Sacramenti tegumento obtectum,' hid under the veil of the Divine Sacrament.

We have now done with Dr. Nicholson's quotations.

It remains for us now to sum up the case against Dr. Nicholson, and then to take an estimate of what manner of Theologian he is:

1. We have shown that he did not even know the name of Perrone; that he did not understand his words; and that he made him say the direct contradictory of his own proposition, and of the doctrine of the Catholic Church.

2. That he pretended to know, or to have searched, the works of S. Athanasius: and denied, contrary to fact as we have shown, that they contain the Deification of the Humanity of Christ.

3. That without so much as understanding Fran-

zelin's words, or ever having seen the outside of his book, he denies his plain and explicit teaching.

4. That he applies the condemnation of Nestorianism, by the Fifth Œcumenical Council, to the Catholic doctrine that Christ is to be adored in His two natures with latria.

5. That he did not even know the condemnations of the Constitution 'Auctorem Fidei;' and yet, pretending to know it all, professed his readiness 'to discuss it on occasion.'

6. That he represents Dens as denying latria to the Sacred Humanity, *Verbo unita*, because he had fallen upon the assertion that *a Persona Verbi, per mentis conceptionem, separata*, it is to be worshipped with hyperdulia.

7. That he either did not know that Dens in the very same treatise affirmed the doctrine of the Archbishop; or, knowing it, he suppressed it.

8. That he distinctly affirms that two Adorations are to be given to the two Natures subsisting in Christ, latria and hyperdulia respectively.

9. That he suppresses half of the statement of S. Proclus and altogether perverts his meaning. This we are ready to believe was from utter incapacity.

10. That with S. Cyril's letter before him, and the Nestorian doctrine of two Persons plainly expressed in it, even in the Latin translation, by '*eum*,' '*eum*,' and '*ille*,' &c., showing the *two persons* of the Nestorians, he pretended that it applies to the adoration of the Sacred Humanity subsisting in the One Person of the Incarnate Word.

11. That he quotes as from the *Liber de Reliquiis* of Bellarmine a passage which does not exist in it. And where it does exist, in the *Liber de Sanctorum Beatificatione*, its meaning is perverted by Dr. Nicholson in direct contradiction of Bellarmine's explicit teaching. Moreover, through complete want of elementary knowledge, he mixes up the distinct questions of Absolute and Relative worship; and applies what Bellarmine says of the worship of images to the worship of the Sacred Humanity subsisting in the Incarnate Word.

12. That he again mistakes S. Cyril's anathematism against Nestorius as applicable to the devotion of the Sacred Heart.

13. That he has directly inverted the argument of Dens, who was affirming that latria is due to the Sacred Humanity, and converted it into a denial of that doctrine by a suppression, which we do not know how to believe to have been unconscious, of one half of a premiss, mutilating words and sense, and changing an affirmative into a negative proposition.

14. That in like manner he suppressed one half of a sentence of F. Thaddeus, making him to say the direct reverse of what he was saying, and thereby suppressing the fact that F. Thaddeus precisely confirms F. Guiron's argument from the doctrine of the *Communicatio idiomatum:* with which Dr. Nicholson pretends to be so familiar as to pity the Archbishop for his ignorance of it.

So great a mass of pretentious and supercilious

blundering, and so many distinct mutilations of the words pretended as the text of authors, and as their *ipsissima verba*, we have never seen in so small a compass as in Dr. Nicholson's seven letters.

And so we will leave him, adding only two quotations of his words.

'In respect to the distinction now proposed: by *facere Deum* I presume is meant, "to deify as Verus Deus;" by *Dei facere*, to deify in some sense which is less than Verus Deus. The "facere Deum" is "facere Deum qui est Deus:" the "Dei facere" is facere Deum qui post hoc non est Deus.'

It would be cruel to criticise the Latin. We will only ask, Is this the man to call S. Athanasius a Catholic Father in whose works is to be found nothing to support the proposition that the 'Caro facta Dei is deified'?

To pretend learning which we have not in medicine is a moral obliquity. What is it, then, to pretend learning which we have not in theology?

Once more: in his parting letter Dr. Nicholson says: 'I have had no controversy whatever with Roman Theologians; but simply with certain interpretations of them, which are obviously untenable.'

That is to say: You did not know your own theologians till I arose with Dens to expound them.

But does he sincerely mean that he will accept what Roman theologians teach? If so, he will soon be a wiser man. If he will not accept it, then it is not F. Guiron's interpretation but the Holy Catholic Faith which he reviles and rejects.

Let him rest in peace. No Roman theologians will contend with him till they see that he can understand them. Then he will be worth answering, but not till then. He will therefore long remain in peace.

We have only one more office to discharge. We have seen what manner of theologian Dr. Nicholson is. It only remains to see also what manner of man. We do not trust our own appreciations: and he might think them unjust. We will therefore learn it of himself.

For this purpose, having analysed the argument of this correspondence, we will now collect its flowers.

'You declared,' he says to the Archbishop in his first letter, 'that the Human Nature of the Blessed Redeemer is deified in consequence of its having been assumed by the Divine Son. Immediately after the service I addressed a Roman ecclesiastic. He had noticed the same statement of the preacher; he sought by qualification to reduce it to some conformity with the Catholic faith; but failing to do so to my satisfaction, and evidently labouring under a confusion of thought and an incapability of which he did not seem wholly unconscious, he finally referred me for an explanation to his Archbishop.'

'It is due to the attention which Archbishop Manning has given to the subject, &c.'

'The Archbishop essays to change his position.'

'Such propositions or illustrations tend to a mere verbal confusion, and are instances of a well-known fallacy.'

'I must take leave to say that you misinterpret your author.'

'The heresy here is patent.'

'The reasoning is an ordinary fallacy, and the thing assumed is against the Catholic faith.'

'Archbishop Manning has misapprehended the teaching of Perrone.'

'You change your position for a second time.'

'It is only possible to answer this reckless assertion by a direct contradiction—the Roman Church does not teach any such thing.'

'I certainly cannot conceal my surprise that you (the Archbishop) either dissent from, or cannot be aware of, the doctrine of *Cultus* in the Roman Church.'

'It serves no purpose to iterate references to the doctrines and practice of the Church, while both are rejected and ignored,' *i.e.* by the Archbishop.

'I would now beg of you once more to study a passage adduced by yourself.'

'Nothing in the course of this correspondence has affected me with more surprise than the imperfect knowledge of the rudiments of Roman dogmatic theology which it betrays.'

'I should have supposed that the least acquaintance with such dogmatic works as those of Dens or of Cardinal Bellarmine would have rendered such blunders impossible.'

'To produce a document and to confess ignorance as to its validity' (*i.e.* a Pontifical Constitution *ex cathedrâ*) 'discovers remarkable weakness and perplexity.'

'The chief Pastor of the Roman Church in England,' &c. &c., as quoted before.

'When asked for an explanation, the preacher quotes authorities which are proved to be fresh heresies, and which are incompatible with the rudiments of the theology of his Church.'

'Finally, the whole correspondence is no ordinary instance of confusion of thought and language.'

'In this grave matter I have no alternative but to bring the charge of heresy against your teaching.'

'Unless you fully retract the heresy, I reserve to myself the right of publishing this correspondence.'

'If, as you consider, you have in the present case answered all reasonable inquiries, the force of the reasoning might have been left to assert itself *without the present plea ad misericordiam*.'

Ne respondeas stulto juxta stultitiam suam, ne efficiaris ei similis.

Responde stulto juxta stultitiam suam, ne sibi sapiens esse videatur.

Vidisti hominem sapientem sibi videri? magis illo spem habebit insipiens.[45]

In reading these utterances of lofty wisdom and compassionate authority, we have been at times inclined to believe that the whole of the correspondence was an elaborate hoax. Its pompous absurdity and exquisite nonsense reminded us of Swift's prophecy and condolence with Mr. Isaac Bickerstaff on the mournful event of his own death. But one thing in it seemed to us to be real: namely, the intense desire to wither up the Archbishop with scornful commiseration, and patronise him with condescending enlightenment. F.

[45] Prov. xxvi. 4, 5, 12.

Guiron, who was face to face with Dr. Nicholson, utterly disappears. It is the Archbishop who 'bestows attention,' and 'cannot but know,' and 'is ignorant of rudiments,' and is not aware of the Roman doctrine of 'cultus,' aliaque pœne innumerabilia.

This amusing and irrepressible determination to get at the Archbishop, and to hold him up sky-high as a heretic, reveals itself at once in the first letter, and betrays the intention to lay a trap. What if it should turn out after all that Dr. Nicholson's trap, when opened, will be found empty: or that the trapper is trapped himself?

We say this because the Rev. F. Guiron has given us leave to print the following letter:

'S. Michael's, Hereford, Sept. 28, 1873.

'My dear F. Guiron,—On Wednesday last, as I was coming in the train from Manchester to Worcester, I read for the first time your correspondence with Dr. Nicholson in the *Guardian*.

'Until then my knowledge of the whole affair was confined to his first letter, which I read when I gave it to you to answer, and his last, which, as the correspondence was closed, I put, without reading it, into the basket. Of all his intermediate letters I knew nothing, and with your answers my only contact was that I suggested to you certain books and references for your first letter. I remember that I heard you read a paragraph or two of your second; and when I afterwards found that, unknown to me, it was still going on, I told you to waste no more time upon it, and also in what terms to close the correspondence.

'Having now read your letters, I think it due to you to say that they are perfectly sound, Catholic, and unanswerable. If you had made any slip in doctrine, I should have taken upon myself the full responsibility; on the just rule, *quod facit per alium facit per se*. I take now the full responsibility of saying that you have not only made no such slip, but have done your work thoroughly well.

'It is a just retribution that Dr. Nicholson, who began by accusing me and one of my clergy as either ignorant or unable to defend my words, should after all fall into your hands, and learn to his cost that he had better leave Catholic priests alone.

'His solemn appeals to me all through, and my excommunication as a heretic at last, are very amusing.

'I cannot end this letter without saying that I admire in your letters nothing more than the calm, grave, respectful tone with which you bore with an assailant very unlike yourself. It is a sign of the love of truth and of souls. I hope Dr. Nicholson is a young man; for if he be an old one, you, at the outset of your priesthood, have read him a sharp lesson on the manner which befits the treatment of sacred things. He will have learned also that Catholic priests know their theology better than he can teach them, and that it is not safe to accuse even an Archbishop. May every blessing be with you and your work.

'Believe me always yours affectionately in Jesus Christ,

'✠ Henry Edward,
'*Archbishop of Westminster.*'

II.

THE DIGNITY AND RIGHTS OF LABOUR.

THE DIGNITY AND RIGHTS OF LABOUR.

A Lecture delivered at the Mechanics' Institution, Leeds, on the 28th January 1874.

Mr. Mayor,

When I received from your Secretary the invitation of the President and Committee of the Leeds Mechanics' Institute, I had great hesitation in accepting it; not that I doubted the kindness with which it was tendered, nor that I doubted my own entire will to do the utmost that I could to meet your wish: but I felt that the invitation called me to launch upon a venture so far beyond my ordinary navigation, and into a deep that I had not sounded, that prudence would have counselled me to decline the honour that you offered. Nevertheless I had rather do what I am about to attempt feebly, and I must say very imperfectly, than seem to be wanting to you in respect and good-will, and in the desire which I truly have to promote, if it be in my power, not only the good, but even the recreation, of my neighbour. And when I was assured that we meet upon what your President has called the neutral platform, it so entirely fell in with what I conceive to be a high dictate of our duty that I could no longer hesitate: I mean this—that in everything of private life, and everything of domestic

and civil and political life, we have but one common interest—the welfare of our common country. If there be divergencies, as there must be, as always have been, and as I fear there always will be, it seems to me that it is the duty of every one of us to strive that they should be suspended at least in every region of our public and private life wheresoever it is possible.

When therefore I had ventured to accept your invitation, I was asked what subject should be put upon your programme, and thinking to choose an easy matter, I found I had taken myself in a snare. I thought that the 'Dignity and the Rights of Labour' would be a subject common to us all; one in which you and I are united, though in a different way; and that, as our interest is common, the subject would not be difficult. But I confess, when I began to examine what I had done, I felt that I had imposed upon myself a task of no ordinary difficulty; for the plainer and commoner a subject is, the harder it is to treat it in any other than a familiar and a commonplace way. And easy as it would be to heap up mountains of truisms and to spread out continents of platitudes on the subject of labour, it is very difficult, at least for me, to say anything with which you are not altogether familiar. Nevertheless what I can do I will endeavour to do.

Now Lord Macaulay, in his *History of England*, tells us that in the reign of Charles II. the town of Leeds was already a town of clothiers and clothmakers; but, he said, it had only in the time of Charles I. received its municipal privileges; it obtained the power of electing a member to Parliament in the time of Oliver

Cromwell. It was a town of 7000 inhabitants. It had a cloth trade, which upon a brisk market-day, as he says, might sell in the open air upon the bridge some thousands of pounds' worth of cloth, and the men of Leeds were well satisfied with such a market. The oldest inhabitants of that day could remember the building of the first brick house, which was called for a long time after the Red House : which, as I am told, still exists.

Now I suppose at this moment there are single firms in Leeds that turn over a larger capital than the whole town of Leeds at that day. At that time Norwich was a far greater town in importance than the town of Leeds. Norwich was a city of eight or nine and twenty thousand people. It had already a flourishing trade. What is the relative condition of things now? Leeds has from two to three hundred thousand people. It has a manufacture which is amongst the most renowned in England, perhaps standing at the head of its kind. The capital of Leeds I will not venture to conjecture. It has become the sixth or seventh great city or town in the British Empire. While Leeds has grown to this vast importance in commerce and in wealth, the whole of the British Empire has increased likewise. There has been a development of its commercial power, of its productiveness, of its labour, its skill, its capital, which is almost fabulous. I will give but one fact, which will be sufficient. A French gentleman, well conversant with commercial subjects, gave in evidence before a committee of commerce in France that at this time Great Britain, with its population of some

30,000,000, has a larger mercantile marine than all the other maritime powers of the world put together. Whereas the mercantile marine of all other powers reaches 6,600,000 tons, the mercantile marine of Great Britain reaches 6,900,000 tons. What is the cause of all this enormous development of wealth? Some may say it is capital. I say there is something before capital —there is skill. Some then may say it is skill. I say there is something before skill—there is labour; and we trace it up to labour strictly. The first agency and factor of this great commercial wealth, and therefore of the greatness of our country in this respect, is labour. In a book with which I have no doubt you are all familiar, one of the series of the Useful Knowledge Library, published first about the year 1830, when the insanity of certain uneducated persons set on foot an agitation to destroy agricultural machinery—and perhaps many who hear me reach back in their lives sufficiently long to remember personally what I mean—in this book, then called the *Results of Machinery*, and afterwards published some ten or fifteen years ago under the title of *Capital and Labour*, is to be found this sentence: 'In the dim morning of society Labour was up and stirring before Capital was awake.' There is no doubt of this; and therefore I may affirm that labour is the origin of all our greatness.

I am speaking, as you will remember, strictly upon that one point; I am not now speaking on the moral conditions of labour, though I may touch that hereafter slightly, but I speak of labour as a political economist would speak. I will not try to define labour,

but will describe it to be the honest exertion of the powers of our mind and of our body for our own good and for the good of our neighbour. I say honest, for I do not account any labour which is not honest—which is superficial, tricky, and untrusty—as worthy of the name of labour. I call it exertion, because unless a man puts forth his powers, and puts them forth to the full, it is not worthy of the name of labour. Unless he puts forth his powers honestly for his own good, I call it his destruction: and if he does not put forth those powers for his own good, and also for the good of his neighbour, I call it selfishness. I think, therefore, that my description is a just one: it is the honest exertion of the powers of mind and body for our own good and the good of our neighbour. And here I must put in a plea in passing for the exertion of the powers of the mind, and I feel confident that in the Mechanics' Institute of Leeds I shall be safe in saying that those who exert the powers of the mind and of the brain are true labourers. They may never have wielded an axe, they may never have guided a locomotive, and they may never have driven a spade into the ground; but I will maintain they are true labourers, worthy of the name. But this I pass over, and shall only touch it again hereafter for the purpose of applying it strictly to our subject.

I. We will now come to what we call, for the present, bodily labour. I may say that this bodily labour is in one sense the origin of everything, though it is clear that mind must precede it. The first man that ever bent a hook to take a fish, the first man that ever constructed and laid a snare to take a bird or a beast

—that man exercised a mental action before his hand accomplished what he designed. This stands to reason.

In these days, perhaps, men are inclined to depreciate mere strength without skill, because our labour is become half skilled and fully skilled, and our industry is becoming scientific. Nevertheless in the mere labour of the body there is a true dignity. The man who puts forth the powers of the body, and that honestly, for his own good and the good of his neighbour, is living a high and worthy life, and that because it is his state in the world. It is the lot in which we are placed, and any man who fulfils the lot of his existence is in a state of dignity.

The condition on which we obtain everything in the world has always more or less of labour. Nature, it is quite true, offers to us certain of her gifts as if she held them out in her hands. The trees bear fruit over our heads, and they seem to be offered to us to eat; and yet we must take them. The gold is in the earth, coal is in the mine, and we must take them too; and the taking is more laborious. And the bread that we eat is in the grain, and before that grain will nourish us there is a great deal of labour in raising it and in preparing it. So in the smaller things; and that which is in the smallest becomes more complex as we advance.

Now there is no limit as yet ascertained to the fertility of the earth. We are told that in the time of King John the productiveness of the soil of England was about one-fourth as compared with the productiveness of the soil all over the face of England at this time, and as about one-fifth compared with the productiveness

of the soil round about London. What makes the difference? Labour, skill, capital, science, and the advancement of agriculture. This calculation shows that we have been steadily advancing in the productiveness of our soil, and have never reached its limit. Only the other day I saw a statement which seemed to me at first so incredible that I bought the Report, and verified it by examining the passage. Till then I believed that there must be some inaccuracy in it. The committee of the House of Lords last year upon the drainage and improvement of land has this statement, resting upon the authority of two very eminent agriculturists. The one stated that of 20,000,000 of acres in England only 3,000,000 are adequately drained; and the other said that of the land in England only one-fifth part is as yet adequately treated by agriculture. Therefore labour may be only in the dawn of its work; and if England has developed itself by its labour—as I began by saying—to so vast an extent, do not let us for a moment imagine that we have reached the limit of what may be done by the advancement of that labour.

I am old enough to recollect when the political economists of England startled us by a statement that there did not exist in England coal under the earth for more than 800 years. It seemed to me even then that our nerves might stand the announcement. Nevertheless it is clear that we never yet have ascertained what is the limit of the coal-mines in England. I do not know that any man can make even a probable conjecture.

But not only is labour the law of our state, it is also the law of our development—it is the law of the development of mind and body. Just as labour cultivates the earth, so labour cultivates and civilises man. I do not know whether those who hear me are familiar with the book of Mr. Pritchard, published some years ago, on Man. The first chapter contains a contrast which I always thought both just and striking, proving what I say. He says: 'Who could ever imagine that a boshman sitting in a hole of the earth, and watching for spiders as his daily food, was of the same race as the civilised and cultured Englishman whom we see in the streets of London?' I have shown that the soil of England in King John's time, as compared with the soil of England in the time of Queen Victoria, represents the same law of advancement. Now what has been the cause of this? Call it education, call it civilisation, if you like; it is, after all, labour bestowed upon ourselves — self-culture, self-improvement — that for which, I suppose, all Mechanics' Institutes were formed.

But, further than this, labour is the condition of all invention. I quoted before a very expressive sentence, that 'in the dim morning of society Labour was up and stirring before Capital was awake;' I may say that not only in the 'dim morning,' but through the noontide of society, mind must be up and stirring before labour is awake. For mind must precede labour; and the whole history of inventions of every form, scientific and social, all show this law, that mind carries the light before the hand—mind goes first, and labour follows. I need not dwell upon this, because it is a

truism. Nevertheless an illustration or two may show more clearly what I mean. Between the intelligence and the hand there is a correspondence so delicate, so minute, that it bears one of the strongest evidences of the wisdom of our Maker. The versatility of the mind in its operations can never be measured; nevertheless the flexibility of the hand is such that it corresponds with the versatility of the mind. The man who in the dim morning of society made a flint knife had a hard labour to execute works of skill. The man who succeeding him had a Sheffield blade could do perhaps a thousand operations which the flint knife could not accomplish. Now we read that in the time of Edward III. a tax was laid upon the property of England for a war against France, and in Colchester, at that day one of the largest towns, a tax was laid upon all property. The names of all the tradesmen, artificers, and residents were taken down, with the value and description of their property, and I think the whole amount came to something like 3000*l.* or 4000*l.*; and yet Colchester was then about the tenth town of importance in England. There was a carpenter in the town, whose whole stock-in-trade was taxed, and the value of his implements and tools was put down at one shilling. We will not calculate the difference of the value in money; he possessed two axes, one adze, a square, and a naviger for making wheels. Supposing that this carpenter, who was far beyond the man with only a Sheffield blade, and still farther beyond the man with the flint knife only, were to find himself in such a shop as Holtzapffel's in Long Acre, and were to see himself surrounded with

planes and bevel planes and finisters and centre-bits, and I know not what, he would believe that he had got into a magician's palace, or that he himself had a hundred hands, and every one of those hands had a hundred operations: that is to say, mechanical instruments give to the intelligence an outlet, arm it with power, invest it with a variety and a tact and a delicacy of execution, so great that we can set no limit to its capacity.

Next, labour with invention is the condition of all creation. I should like to know—if the Mayor of Leeds, who is the highest authority here, will tell me—how many hands were employed in making a yard of cloth when cloth was sold upon the bridge? Compare it with the number of hands employed in making a yard of cloth now, when we are seated here in the Mechanics' Institute. The other day I made a calculation on this point. You will find in the little book to which I have already referred, and from which, if there be anything that I am saying worthy of your hearing, I may confess it is in most part derived—that there must be now some five-and-twenty operations before ever we get a coat of Leeds cloth on our back. I will throw out the farmer, and the factor, and the shipper, and the carrier, until we get the wool into Leeds: and I then find certain operations which were to me occult and mysterious, the very names of which I had never heard before, and cannot even now understand, but I have no doubt to practised ears I shall only be speaking words of a most familiar language. I find there were sorters and scourers and dyers and carders and slubbers and spinners; and that there was warping and weaving and burling

and muling and dressing and gigging and brushing and singeing and friezing, as I suppose it ought to be, and drawing—that is to say, sixteen distinct skilful operations. Invention has separated the tangled skein of labour, and has thrown off separate threads into a multitude of hands—these operations have become finer and finer and continually more perfect by that operation. I suppose that I ought to add that the calculation says there are still five-and-twenty thousand stitches before the coat is put on our back; and this too shows how minutely labour is subdivided, and how in that minuteness of labour perfection is ever advancing.

Well, further than this, I have already said I can remember the time of what were called the Swing riots. I daresay in the North of England the fame of Swing may not be so familiar as it is to me, who have lived all my life in the South; but I remember well at that time I was living in the county of Kent, and night after night I saw the horizon red with the burning of threshing-machines and of rick-yards. Madness had been infused into the minds of our simple agricultural population. They believed that machinery was their ruin. We have now happily, and I think through the action of Mechanics' Institutes more than any other agency, come to a period when our whole population, agricultural and manufacturing, recognise that the advancement and multiplication of machinery is the greatest aid to them in creating labour. In order to give the simplest proof of this—if proof be needed, and from your response I see it cannot be—I will mention one or two facts which may not be familiar to some who

hear me. Until the other day they were not familiar to myself. First of all, in the last century, inventions followed one another in a rapid succession. As you are well aware, in 1743 the fly-shuttle was invented; in 1769 the son of the inventor constructed what is called the drop-box; in 1767 came the spinning-jenny, in 1769 the water-frame, in 1779 the two were combined into the mule, in 1813 the power-loom followed; in 1765 the steam-engine had been completed, in 1811 steam was applied to ships, and in 1824 it was applied to railroads. That is to say, taking only one line of invention—that which applies to the manufacture of cotton and wool—this extraordinary advancement in machinery was attained in two-and-twenty years. Then the power of locomotion by land and by sea was added. Now what was the effect of this? At first sight it might have been supposed that it would have thrown out of employment a vast number of hands.

M. Say, the French political economist, in his complete Course of Political Economy, states, upon the authority of an English manufacturer of fifty years' experience, that in ten years after the introduction of the machines the people employed in the trade—spinners and weavers—were more than forty times as many as when the spinning was done by hand. According to a calculation made in 1825, it appears that the power of 20,000 horses was employed in the spinning of cotton, and that the power of each horse yielded, with the aid of machinery, as much yarn as 1066 persons could produce by hand. But if this calculation be correct—and there is no reason to doubt it—the spinning machinery

of Lancashire alone produced in 1825 as much yarn as would have required 21,302,000 persons to produce with the distaff and spindle. In order to bring down our calculation to a nearer time, I find in Mr. Brassey's most interesting address on wages the other day, before the Social Science Association at Norwich, this statement: he says: 'Messrs. Bridges & Holmes estimate that the proportion of spindles in 1833 [eight years later than the date I have quoted] was 112 to each hand, while the corresponding number at the present day would be 517. The speed of the mule has been so much increased that more stretches are now made in ten and a half hours than formerly in twelve. In 1848 a woman would have had only two looms; now she will attend to four. The speed of the power-loom in 1833 varied between 90 and 112; it now varies between 170 and 200 picks in a minute.'[1] The great Pyramid in Egypt is one of the mechanical wonders of the world, and we have no certain knowledge of the mechanism by which the stone was lifted into its place from the quarry, but we have one mode of estimating the amount of labour that was employed on it. The Egyptians, according to Herodotus, hated the memory of the kings who built the Pyramids, and he tells us that the great Pyramid occupied 100,000 men for twenty years in its erection. Now it has been calculated that the steam-engines of England, worked by 36,000 men, would raise the same quantity of stones from the quarry and elevate them to the same height as the great Pyramid in eighteen hours. If this be so, it seems to be a proof

[1] *Wages in* 1873, p. 39. By Thos. Brassey, M.P. (Longmans, 1873).

that while labour has been advancing, skill has been developing, invention has been increasing, and the creation of every kind of capital has been augmented beyond anything we could have conceived. So that there has been a perpetual accumulation of muscular power, of mental power, of manual power, and of mechanical power; and this is the true capital of our country, not money alone.

Let us, then, enlarge our idea of capital, and take into that conception all that I have enumerated—the muscular and mental and manual and mechanical power which has been created by labour. Therefore, as I said before, I claim for the man that can only bring to the field of labour his strength without skill, as well as the man that brings his strength with a half skill, or with a complete skill, or with a scientific industry—I claim for them all the name of honest labourers; and I believe that if they be honest—that is, mentally and morally exerting their power for their own good and the good of their neighbour—they are entitled to all respect for the dignity of their state and of their work. And I cannot better express what I mean than in these words, which I find also quoted by Mr. Brassey, and his selection of them shows how he sympathised in what I am saying. Quoting some words of Mr. Ruskin, who has written lately with great sympathy for working men, and for all who are engaged in labour, Mr. Brassey says that 'there is one thing necessary for us all, and that is "reverence."'

I know nothing that is more undignified than for a man to think there is nobody of higher stature, morally

or intellectually, than himself. The smallest man on earth is the man who thinks there is nobody greater than himself. A man who is able to lift up his eyes to excellence wherever he finds it, and who has an honest and earnest admiration for it, without a spark of jealousy and without a particle of envy—I think that man is worthy of the name of a true labourer. 'Now,' Mr. Ruskin says, 'this is the thing which I know, and which if you labour people usually know also, that in reverence is the chief power and joy of life; reverence for what is pure and bright in your own youth, for what is true and tried in the age of others, for all that is gracious among the living, and great among the dead, and marvellous in the powers that cannot die.'[2]

II. I will turn now to the other part of my thesis; that is, to the rights of labour. I am not going to be communistic, and I have no will to be revolutionary. Adam Smith says, 'The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbour, is a plain violation of this most sacred property.' Therefore, first of all, I claim for labour the rights of property. There is no personal property so strictly one's own. It is altogether and entirely personal. The strength and skill that are in a man are as much his own as his life-

[2] *Wages in* 1873, p. 53. By Thos. Brassey, M.P. (Longmans, 1873).

blood; and that skill and strength which he has as his personal property no man may control. He has this property in him. Lawyers say a man's will is ambulatory, that is, it travels with him all over the world. So the working man carries this property with him as ready money. He can buy with it, and he can sell it. He can exchange it. He may set a price on it. And this ready money which he carries with him, he may carry to every market all over the world; and, what is more, he will not be impeded by any foreign currency. No coins, no difficult calculations, decimal or otherwise, obstruct his exchange with other nations of the world. And further, in one sense it is inexhaustible, except that we all have limits and dimensions, and our strength and skill are bounded by what we are. But there it is, perennial, going on always through his life till old age diminishes it; then what remains in him is to be honoured with a reverence of which I spoke just now. Shakespeare gives an account of what a true labourer is in this way. He says in *As You Like It*, and puts it into the mouth of a labourer, 'I am a true labourer; I earn that I eat, get that I wear; owe no man hate, envy no man's happiness; glad of other men's good, content with my harm.' Well, then, I claim for labour (and the skill which is always acquired by labour) the rights of capital. It is capital in the truest sense. Now our Saxon ancestors used to call what we call cattle 'live money;' and we are told that what we call chattels, and cattle, and the Latin word '*capita*,' are one and the same thing; that is, 'heads' of cattle, or workers or serfs. This was 'live money.' And so is the labour,

the strength, and the skill in the honest workman 'live money.' It is capital laid up in him; and that capital is the condition of production. For capital which is in money, which I will call dead capital, or dead money, receives its life from the living power and skill of the labourer. These two must be united. The capital of money and the capital of strength and of skill must be united together, or we can have no production and no progress. And therefore 'labour and capital must,' as the book I quoted from before puts it, 'ride on the same horse;' and that book says, in a sort of mother-wit way, that 'when two men ride on a horse, one must ride behind.' It says that capital rides before. Well, now, if they cannot ride side by side, they ought to walk hand in hand. Whatever rights, then, capital possesses, labour possesses.

Once more: labour has a right of liberty. We read in Columella, who wrote a book on Roman agriculture in the first century of our era, that the soil all around Rome became so sterile, barren, and unproductive, and year after year so perceptibly lost its fertility, that the philosophers of Rome accounted for it by saying that the earth was growing old. We do not find that England has grown old, as comparing King John's time with our own. But the secret of this diminution in its productiveness was very easily discovered. It was cultivated by slaves; and slave labour is labour without a heart, it is labour without a will. It is not the strength of the arm, but it is the vigour of the will that makes the axe ring upon the root of a tree. Every labourer has a right to work or not to work. If he refuses to

work, as an idler there is an old law which says, 'If a man will not work, neither let him eat.'[3] That law has never been repealed. And the same law says that 'The labourer is worthy of his hire;'[4] and I am happy to say that law still stands in the sacred statute-book. Well, a labourer has a right to determine for whom he will work and where he will work. I do not mean in any capricious and extortionate way, but he must be first and last the judge and the controller of his own life, and he must pay the penalty if he abuses that freedom. This carries with it also the right to say whether he can subsist upon certain wages. This is undeniable. He may set too high a price upon his labour, but then he will pay the penalty. No man can appraise it for him. Another man may offer him his wages, and if he is not content he may refuse it. He cannot say, 'You shall work.' Well, now, in England serfdom lasted until the fourteenth century, and I have no doubt that serfdom was one of the reasons why the fertility of England was not what it is now;—one, I say, for I do not forget capital, skill, and science. Serfdom died out under the benign action of Christianity. Then for many centuries there existed a state of labour in this country which, though it was free in one sense, was not altogether free in another. It was under certain social circumscriptions which limited the freedom of the labourer—the old law of settlement and the like, into which I will not enter. At the present time the labour of Englishmen is, I may say, as free as the air. They may go where they will; they may labour where they

[3] 2 Thess. iii. 10. [4] S. Luke x. 7.

will; they may labour for whom they will; they may labour for what they can obtain; they may even refuse to labour. This again is undeniable. I do not see how anybody can deny this without denying a right which belongs both to property and to capital.

Let me here enter a protest, though I have no doubt you do not need it. I have said it before, in Manchester, some years ago; and I cannot help saying it again in Leeds. There are some people who are trying to force into the mouths of Englishmen a very long word—the *proletariat*. I have no doubt you have all heard it and all read it. When I see it in a book, I suspect the book at once. When a man says it to me, I doubt whether he is an Englishman. Our old mother-tongue has a great many more monosyllables than polysyllables in it, and I love it all the more for that, for I think our old Saxon monosyllables have the strength of a strong race in them. Now I had ten thousand times rather be called a working man than a *prolétaire*. I will tell you my reasons against the name of *prolétaire*. It is pedantry; it is paganism; it is false; and it is an indignity to the working man. It is pedantry, because it was dug up out of the old Roman law by certain French writers, chiefly in or about the time of the first French Revolution; and that accounts, perhaps, for its paganism in its revived state, because that was a period very rank with paganism. It is strictly pagan in its origin; it belongs to the Roman civilisation such as it was before the Christian era. But further, it is utterly inapplicable to our present state, and I will tell you why. The population of Rome was distinguished into

classes. There were those that were called in legal phrase *capite censi*, or men told by the head. They were mere numbers; they possessed nothing; they were nothing; they could do nothing; they had two eyes and two hands and two feet, and they were entered in the poll-tax by the tale. These were the lowest of the Roman population. Next to them were the *proletarii*, or men who had homes and families—if you call a home a roof or a shelter where a man could lie down; but they were destitute of property. They had nothing but their children. They could only serve the State by themselves and by their children in military service, or something of that sort. Moreover, they were slaves, or to a great extent they were slaves. They were the greatest of idlers, and the most profligate and the most dependent of the Roman populace. They lived on alms; or, what is worse, they were the followers and the flatterers of those who had anything to give them. Well, now, I ask whether it is not an indignity to English working men to call them *prolétaires?*

Labour has a right not only to its own freedom, but it has a right to protect itself. And now, gentlemen, I know I am treading very near to dangerous ground; nevertheless I will speak as an historian or as a political economist, but certainly not as a demagogue. If you go back to the earliest period of our Saxon history, you will find that there always were associations distinct from the life of the family on the one side and from the State on the other. The family has laws of its own—laws of domestic authority, laws of domestic order, and—I will say, after King Solomon—laws

of very salutary domestic punishment. On the other hand, the State has its public laws, its legislature, and its executive. But between the public and the domestic life there is a wide field of the free action of men and of their mutual contracts, their mutual relations, which are not to be controlled, either, by domestic authority, and cannot be meddled with by the public authority of the State;—I mean the whole order of commerce. Commerce existed as soon as there was the interchange of one thing for another, and these free contracts between man and man—between employer and employed—are as old as civilisation. Clearly, therefore, there is a certain field which must be regulated by a law of its own, by tribunals of its own; and as soon as we begin to trace anything in our Saxon history, we begin to trace the rise of guilds. They were of a religious character at first. Some have thought they were religious only, but that is a mistake; they were also what we should call benefit societies; they were also for protection; they were again for the vindication of liberty from the oppressive jurisdiction of those who held local authority. There were guilds, or gilds, of many kinds—some were called 'frith-gilds,' and others were called 'craft-gilds,' and these craft-gilds were composed of masters and of men—of employers and of employed.

In all the history of civilisation, if you go back to the Greeks or to the Romans, you find that trades and professions always had their societies and fellowships by which they were united together. It seems to me that this is a sound and legitimate social law. I can conceive nothing more entirely in accordance with

natural right and with the higher jurisprudence, than that those who have one common interest should unite together for the promotion of that interest. I hope to show before I have done that this has always been a principle of the most solid civil and political order, and it is that with which I am now concerned. To tell the truth, the Leeds Mechanics' Institute, as described to me by its excellent President before I came here, appears to me to be a 'craft-gild;' for, as I understand, there are in it both employers and employed—there are both capitalists who hold what I have called the dead money, and there are capitalists who hold the live money—and therefore you are united in a common interest. You seem to me, if 'craft-gilds' are dangerous bodies, to be a very dangerous body. Well, the whole of our social order in England springs from organisations of this sort. First of all, let me refer you to a book which I can only name, because I heard the clock just now, and though I was kindly told that I might have a large margin, for very shame I should not venture to go up to the frontier that was assigned to me. Therefore all that I can do will be to refer to a book by Brentano, a Bavarian writer, on the history of craft-gilds, tracing them down to present associations of trades in various kinds; and I confess that book took out of my mind entirely the erroneous conception which in some degree I had formed, that such associations have anything about them which is not perfectly innocuous if they are rightly conducted. Only let us remember this one fact. All the great mercantile cities of England are little more than the aggregation of these gilds. In

Norwich there were 12; and that was when as yet Leeds was nothing. In King's Lynn there were 12; in Bishop's Lynn there were 9; in Cologne there were 80; in Lubeck there were 70; in Hamburg there were 100; in London there were 70; and, as I think I can show, London itself is the greatest example of an aggregation of craft-gilds, for, as Brentano says, 'The oldest reliable and detailed accounts which we have of gilds come from England. They consist of free gild statutes. The drawing up of these statutes took place in England in the beginning of the eleventh century. In the case of one of these gilds, there is no doubt whatever as to the accuracy of this date. This gild was founded and richly endowed by Orcy, a friend of Canute the Great, at Abbotsbury.'[5] He says again, 'The forbiddance of gilds in the Frankish Empire, for abroad they were not well regarded, could only be justified from certain motives relating to their mode of being conducted; but from England we hear nothing whatever of any evil in these gilds.'[6] 'It appears that Englishmen at all times knew better than Continentals how to maintain their right of free and independent action, and their Government seems to have known, even at that time, how to make use in an excellent manner, and in the interest of public order, of organisations freely created by the people.' At Canterbury a gild following the same ends stood at that time at the head of the city, whilst two others existed by the side of it. There are also accounts of a 'Gildhall' at Dover, from which a craft-gild may be inferred; and charters of a somewhat later time frequently mention

[5] *Brentano on Gilds*, p. 1 (Trübner, 1870). [6] Id. p. 15.

many other gilds besides these as having been long in existence. The organisation of the gilds was thus, in the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, not only completed, but probably already widely extended amongst the Anglo-Saxons, who even recognised all their ordinances, or at least permitted them, in legislation. The gilds enjoyed already such authority in England that their agreements bound even non-members, and town constitutions were already developing themselves from them. I may say, in passing, that York at that time had three and Beverley had four. As an example of what they were, here is a curious extract from the gild of Killingham in Lincolnshire: 'If a brother or a sister is unlucky enough to lose a beast worth half a merk, every brother and every sister shall give a halfpenny towards getting another beast. If the house of any brother or sister is burned by mishap, every brother and every sister shall give a halfpenny towards a new house.'[7] Brentano then goes on, but I must not venture to give you all the matter which I have before me. He says that a much higher degree of development comes in with the amalgamated gilds. These amalgamated gilds had each grown up distinctly and separately; then they were amalgamated together. 'The fact of London preceding other places in this development presents no difficulty, since England must be regarded as the birthplace of gilds, and London, perhaps, as their cradle. At least there is documentary evidence that the constitution of the city was based upon a gild, and it served as a model for other English towns. According to the *Judicia*

[7] *Toulmin Smith on English Gilds*, p. 185.

Civitatis Lundoniæ of the time of King Athelstane, the frith-gilds of London united to form one gild, that they might carry out their aims more vigorously. This London gild governed the town, as is proved by the fact that their regulations bound even non-members. The occasion of this union was, perhaps, that here, as afterwards in other places, other gilds had gradually been formed at the side of the original old gild, and the rivalries between the old and the new prejudiced the objects of the gilds—the protection of freedom and of right.' Brentano shows that 'a similar union took place three centuries later at Berwick-on-Tweed in the year 1283-4. The townsmen of Berwick agreed upon the statute of a single united gild, that where many bodies are found side by side in one place, they may become one and have one weal, and in dealings of one with another have a strong and hearty love.'[8] Now London at this moment has, I think, some 73 or 74 liveries or companies, which are strictly the old traditional gilds surviving to this day. The Lord Mayor of London invites them to a great banquet once a year, and they are solemnly introduced to him with all the ceremonies of the City of London, as representing the original gilds.

From this it would seem to me to follow that the protection of labour and of industry has at all times been a recognised right of those who possess the same craft: that they have united together; that those unions have been recognised by the legislature; that whether they be employers or employed; whether they

[8] *Brentano*, p. 35.

possess the dead capital or the live capital—the dead money or the live money—all have the same rights. And I do not see, I confess, why all men should not organise themselves together, so long as they are truly and honestly submissive to one higher and chief, who is superior over us all—the supreme reign of law which has governed, at all times, the people of England. There is a passage of great interest quoted in this same book. I verified it, lest there should be any inaccuracy on the part of a foreign writer, and I found it entirely correct. At a time in the early part, I think, of this century, or at the close of the last, when there was great suffering at Nottingham, when the stocking-weavers were under severe depression, and there were very painful and hostile conflicts between the employed and the employer, Mr. Pitt said in the House of Commons, 'The time will come when manufactures will have been so long established, and the operatives not having any other business to flee to, that it will be in the power of any one man in a town to reduce the wages; and all the other manufacturers must follow. Then, when you are goaded with reductions and willing to flee your country, France and America will receive you with open arms; and then farewell to our commercial state. If ever it does arrive to this pitch, Parliament (if it be not then sitting) ought to be called together, and if it cannot redress your grievances, its power is at an end. Tell me not that Parliament cannot; it is omnipotent to protect.'[9] I think it remarkable that Mr. Pitt at that

[9] Pitt's Speech on the Arbitration Act, quoted in vol. xxiii. p. 1091, *Hansard.*

day should have foreseen the questions which are before us at this moment; but it is not remarkable that he should have had the statesmanlike prudence of seeing that the remedy lies in the supreme control and protection of the law.

I am now, I fear, going to utter a politico-economical heresy. I have great respect for Political Economy. I entirely believe—as you may have seen—in the law of supply and demand and free exchange and safety of capital, which are the first conditions of industry; but there is one point on which I am sorry to say I am a very lame political economist, and I cannot keep pace with others. I find political economists denouncing all interference, as they call it, of Parliament with the supply and demand in any form of any article whatsoever. They argue that as a reduction of the price of bread gives the poor more food, and as the reduction of the price of cloth gives the poor more clothing, so the reduction of the price of intoxicating drink gives the poor a greater abundance of comfort. Now, gentlemen, I do not introduce this for the purpose of giving any expression on the Permissive Bill. I have done that at other times and elsewhere; this is not the place for it, neither was I invited for this purpose. But I give that instance to show that the principle of free-trade is not applicable to everything. Why is it not applicable? Because it is met and checked by a moral condition. There is no moral condition checking the multiplication of food and the multiplication of clothing—the multiplication of almost every article of life which is not easily susceptible of an abuse fatal to

men and to society. Well, now I am afraid I am going to tread upon difficult ground, but I must do so. I am one of those—which is of no importance, but Mr. Brassey is also one of those, and that is of a great deal more—who are of opinion that the hours of labour must be further regulated by law. I know the difficulty of the subject; but I say the application of unchecked political economy to the hours of labour must be met and checked by a moral condition.

If the great end of life were to multiply yards of cloth and cotton twist, and if the glory of England consists or consisted in multiplying, without stint or limit, these articles and the like at the lowest possible price, so as to undersell all the nations of the world, well, then, let us go on. But if the domestic life of the people be vital above all; if the peace, the purity of homes, the education of children, the duties of wives and mothers, the duties of husbands and of fathers, be written in the natural law of mankind, and if these things are sacred, far beyond anything that can be sold in the market,—then I say, if the hours of labour resulting from the unregulated sale of a man's strength and skill shall lead to the destruction of domestic life, to the neglect of children, to turning wives and mothers into living machines, and of fathers and husbands into —what shall I say?—creatures of burden—I will not use any other word—who rise up before the sun, and come back when it is set, wearied and able only to take food and to lie down to rest,—the domestic life of men exists no longer, and we dare not go on in this path. I am not going to attempt a prescription—I should fail

if I were to attempt to practise in an art which is not my own—but this I will say: Parliament has done it already. Parliament, at the instance of Lord Ashley, now Lord Shaftesbury, whom all men honour for his life of charity, has set the precedent. Lord Shaftesbury, about the year 1834-5, as I remember, obtained a committee, by which he brought to light—he unearthed and brought on the surface of the earth, under the light of the sun—all that was hidden in the mines, and Parliament forbade the employment of the labour of women and of children. Parliament has again and again interposed to forbid the employment of children in factories before a certain age. In some they cannot be employed as whole-timers till after eleven years of age; in others not until after fourteen years of age; in agricultural labour not before ten years of age. Parliament has interposed over and over again with the freedom of labour. More than this; Parliament has interposed to prevent fathers and mothers from selling the labour of their children. It has forbidden it, and Mr. Walpole, the other day, extended to other trades the Acts by which the employment of children in certain noxious trades is limited or forbidden altogether. It has forbidden even the parents themselves to employ their children in those trades. They may not use the labour of their own children, to enrich themselves, if the employment of that labour be injurious to the child. Do not let it be said, therefore, that Parliament has not interposed in the question of labour, and in the question of the hours of labour. I will ask, is it possible for a child to be educated who

becomes a full-timer at ten or even twelve years of age? Is it possible for a child in the agricultural districts to be educated who may be sent out into the fields at nine? I will ask, can a woman be the mother and head of a family who works sixty hours a week? You may know better than I, but bear with me if I say I do not understand how a woman can train her children in the hours after they come home from school if she works all day in a factory. The children come home at four and five in the afternoon; there is no mother in the house. I do not know how she can either clothe them or train them or watch over them, when her time is given to labour for sixty hours a week. I know I am treading upon a very difficult subject, but I feel confident of this, that we must face it, and that we must face it calmly, justly, and with a willingness to put labour and the profits of labour second—the moral state and the domestic life of the whole working population first. I will not venture to draw up such an Act of Parliament further than to lay down this principle.

I saw in my early days a good deal of what the homes of agricultural labourers were. With all their poverty, they were often very beautiful. I have seen cottages with cottage-gardens, and with a scanty but bright furniture, a hearth glowing with peat, and children playing at the door; poverty was indeed everywhere, but happiness everywhere too. Well, I hope this may still be found in the agricultural districts. What may be the homes in our great manufacturing towns I do not know, but the homes of the poor in London are often very miserable. The state of the houses—families

living in single rooms, sometimes many families in one room, a corner apiece. These things cannot go on; these things ought not to go on. The accumulation of wealth in the land, the piling up of wealth like mountains, in the possession of classes or of individuals, cannot go on, if these moral conditions of our people are not healed. No Commonwealth can rest on such foundations.

I have endeavoured to draw out before you what is the dignity of labour. It is the law of our state, the law of our development and perfection, the source of invention, the power of creation and the cause of manifold capital in money and in skill. And as to its rights, I have shown that it is true property, true capital; that it has a primary right of freedom, a right to protect itself, and a claim upon the law of the land to protect it. I will only add that there can be nothing in a working man undignified unless he be himself the cause of it. Forgive me if I use a very common proverb, and if I make another like it: 'An idle man is the devil's playfellow;' and 'An intemperate man is the devil's slave.' As to the rights, I know nothing that can ever limit the rights of a working man excepting his committing wrong. If he commits wrong, the strong may retaliate; if he does no wrong, the supreme power of law will protect him.

Now, gentlemen, I have detained you a great deal longer than I ought—a great deal longer than I intended. I will therefore bring what I have said to an end.

I said at first that I should claim for those that

labour with the head a share with those who labour with the hand. Without brain-work where would have been all the inventions which have created our new continents of toil—our new worlds of industry? And the brain-work, how long, how continuous, how exhausting it has been before it has reached its end. How many have been worn out by it in the search after some invention which they never found: but though they died in disappointment, they laid the trains of the discovery for those who came after them. It was well said by a writer of the last century, 'We cannot reasonably expect that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation which is ignorant of astronomy, or where ethics are neglected.' The intelligence of a country does not rise like the peaks of mountains, nor like Artesian wells, in isolated spots. The intelligence of a country rises equably all over the surface, like the waters of a lake. The cultivation of science in its highest ranges enriches the lowest valleys and plains of labour. The science of Davy gave the safety-lamp to mines; the chemistry of Liebnitz has multiplied the fertility of our fields. And it is not only astronomy that helps the clothiers of Leeds, but ethics; and in morals I ought to have my say, but at the beginning, not at the end, of an evening; and therefore with ethics I will conclude. The science of morals rests on four foundations—on prudence, which guides the intellect; on justice, which guides the will; on temperance, which governs the passions; and on fortitude, which sustains the whole man in the guidance and government of himself. These four cardinal virtues of the natural order

perfect the character of man; and to-night I am not speaking in any other sense. They underlie all the dignity of man, and they justify all his rights. The labourer in our common field of toil who is prudent, just, temperate, and brave is indeed 'a workman that needeth not to be ashamed.'[10]

[10] 2 Tim. ii. 15.

III.

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

WRITTEN BY REQUEST FOR THE 'DAILY TELEGRAPH' NEWSPAPER, 1873.

IN no other land has the Catholic Church been subjected to so many or to so great vicissitudes as in England. It has been twice swept away, and it has been twice restored. The Christianity of to-day has no continuity from the Roman and British Christianity of England. It dates from S. Augustin of Canterbury, from whose mission sprang the faith and the hierarchy of Saxon England. But the Catholic Church in England at this day does not possess the dioceses or the parishes, the cathedrals or the parish churches, or the lands, or any part of the ecclesiastical order which sprang from our Saxon forefathers, and was perfected by their Norman and English successors. It has no continuity with the vast and noble material system wherewith the Catholic Church in England invested itself down to the sixteenth century of our history. From that date the Catholic and Roman faith and Church were once more all but swept away. It was for at least two generations without churches or bishops—a handful of priests ministered to a remnant of Catholics, the number of whom at the end of the last century was supposed to amount to thirty thousand. At the beginning of the seventeenth century its chief authority was

an arch-priest; after a while he was succeeded by a single vicar-apostolic. Later on a second was appointed; afterwards the number was increased to four, in more recent times to eight; and in the year 1850 a Hierarchy of one metropolitan and twelve suffragans was restored to England.

Although the Catholic and Roman Church in England has no material continuity with the structures which it raised, and the possessions which it held, down to the sixteenth century, nevertheless its spiritual continuity is unbroken. The lineage of its Catholic laity has never been extinct; the succession of its priesthood has never ceased; the direct jurisdiction of the Head of the Church supplied its supreme pastoral authority until the ordinary jurisdiction of its Episcopate was once more restored. In its faith and doctrine, jurisdiction and discipline, in its sacraments and worship, it is identical with the Church of S. Augustine of Canterbury. It presents at this hour the living image which the Venerable Bede describes in his *History of the English Nation*. It celebrates at this day every year the festivals of S. Augustine, S. David, S. Chad, S. Cuthbert, S. Swithun, S. Wilfrid, S. Alphege, the martyred Archbishop of Canterbury, S. Edmund, King and Martyr, S. Edward, King and Confessor, S. Edmund of Canterbury, S. Richard of Chichester, S. Hugh of Lincoln, S. Thomas of Hereford, S. Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury and Martyr for the liberties of England; and a multitude of other saints of Saxon and royal blood, whose names, elsewhere forgotten, are commemorated in the festivals and prayers of an

unbroken tradition of 1200 years. We lament, indeed, the loss of our noble inheritance of the English people, which, next after the inheritance of unity with the Church throughout the world, is dearest to our hearts.

Such vicissitudes as these have never passed over any other portion of the Church. The Church of Ireland, from S. Patrick to this day, abides in all its changeless identity and unbroken traditions of faith and jurisdiction the Church of the people. The Churches of Africa have indeed been swept away, but they have never been restored. The Church in Spain was for a time clouded by Arianism, but never ceased to exist, and was soon cleansed of its stain. Twice to the eyes of men extinct, and twice restored, the Catholic faith and Church in England exist full and complete at this day.

It is eminently and visibly the Church of the poor. Although, indeed, the lineage of a few great historic names binds the Catholic Church indissolubly to all classes of our English monarchy, nine-tenths of its flock in England are amongst the poorest of the land.

For the last forty years its churches have been open to the English people; they have habitually frequented them, they have been present at its worship, they have heard its instructions, they have become familiar with its members. The fears and the terrors of ignorance and prejudice and hostile misrepresentation have given way, not before the refutations of controversy, but before the plain dictates of honest common sense, founded on what men have seen and heard for themselves. The Catholic Church

at this day has once more entered fully into the public and private life of England. It takes its place amongst the public institutions of the land. It bears its part in all public works of education, of charity, and of utility. Its beneficent action is acknowledged even by those who have least sympathy with it.

The statistics of the Catholic Church in England are as follows:

1. The Hierarchy, consisting of an archbishop and 12 suffragan bishops.

2. Thirteen cathedral chapters, consisting each of a provost and 10 canons.

3. Thirteen dioceses, with 1621 clergy.

4. Churches, chapels, and 'stations,' 1016.

5. Greater colleges, 6.

6. Lesser colleges, 10.

7. Schools for the middle class and poor: in London, 200; in the rest of England, about 800.

8. Of the convents about ten are of the contemplative life; and all others of every kind of active charity: chiefly for education in every grade, but, above all, of the poor; for nursing the sick, for penitentiaries, for reformatories, for orphanages, for asylums and homes of every sort.

9. The number of Catholics in England and Wales, by every test at our command, of baptisms, &c., may be put at about a million and a half.

The disinheritance of the Catholic Church in England, by the cruelty of the sixteenth century, was so complete that no religious body in the land subsists more strictly upon the voluntary principle. Its

churches and schools have been entirely built by the offerings of its people. Its bishops and clergy are in like manner almost altogether, and in great part are wholly, dependent on the alms of their flock. It may be said, with truth, that a very large part of the clergy subsists chiefly on the offerings of each Sunday. With the exception of the larger churches in cities and towns, the greater part of the missions or parishes have an income less than their outgoings; nevertheless the generosity of the people and the good providence of God make up the balance from year to year. No religious body in England subsists more habitually on trust in the providence of God; and this state of poverty has the best and the deepest effects both on the clergy and on the people. It binds them together in the closest confidence and charity. It makes them feel that all the works of the Church are their common duty and their common interest. The authority and the independence of the clergy are not diminished in a jot or a tittle: by reason of the instincts of their faith the people recognise the office of their priests; and the clergy are united with their people by every bond of gratitude and affection. Neither the priest nor the people would exchange this mutual service in spiritual and temporal things for the richest endowments of the State.

It is hardly necessary to say what is the faith of the Catholic Church, and upon what it rests; but the present outline would not correspond with that which was given some weeks ago in the columns of the *Daily Telegraph* concerning the Established Church if this topic

were wholly omitted. The faith, then, of the Catholic Church is that which has been held from the beginning throughout the universal Church—namely, the whole revelation of God, as it is preserved, and proposed to our belief, by His perpetual Divine assistance through the Church of Jesus Christ. The revelation of Christianity was given whole and complete, and was both preached and believed throughout the world, before the Scriptures of the New Testament were written. It was therefore anterior to the New Testament Scriptures and independent of them. They presuppose it throughout; they reflect the greater part of it; they are a corroborative proof of its truth; but the New Testament Scriptures themselves depend upon the same witness which guards and delivers to us the whole revelation. The Church founded by our Lord Jesus Christ, compacted and inhabited by the Holy Spirit of God, spread throughout the world by the Apostles, is the living witness of the Incarnation, and of the doctrines, and of the commandments of the Redeemer of the world. The Church is the guardian and the keeper of the New Testament Scriptures; it is the ultimate and only competent witness of the authenticity, genuineness, number, and meaning of the books: and in its guardianship, both of the revelation it originally received, and of the books in which that revelation was subsequently in great part recorded, the Church is not only the highest human and historical witness, but a witness of supernatural authority, guided by a Divine assistance. To Catholics, therefore, the voice and authority of the Church are the voice and authority of its Divine Head,

according to the promise of the Divine Founder, 'He that heareth you heareth Me;' which promise would be falsified if the teaching of the Church were not identical with the teaching of Jesus Christ. It is this continuous and unbroken authority which identifies the Catholic faith in England at this day with the faith which S. Augustine of Canterbury taught; and it is this which identifies the Catholic faith of England with that of the Catholic Church throughout the world. It is this immutable voice which has spoken through the nineteen successive Œcumenical Councils. To this in the Council of Trent all Catholics rendered the obedience of faith; and to this in the Council of the Vatican the whole Church throughout the world, both pastors and people, renders the same obedience. The first eighteen Councils of the Church condemned particular errors, and defined particular doctrines of revelation; the Council of the Vatican defined the principle of Divine authority upon which the custody and announcement of the whole revelation of faith depend. The former Councils defined *what* we believe; the Vatican Council defined *the motive* why we believe it. It is to the doctrines of faith what the keystone is to the arch.

The world external to the Catholic Church was led to believe that the Vatican Council was divided, and would be followed by divisions. Every Council of the Church has been more or less divided by vivid discussions: witness the Arians at Nicea, the Monophysites at Chalcedon, the Nationalist parties at Constance. Few Councils have had less of internal difference than the Council of the Vatican. There was but one point of

difference of any moment; and that was not as to truth, but as to the opportuneness of defining it. Every Council has been followed by divisions. Witness again the Arian schism after the Council of Nicea, and above all the Protestant separations after the Council of Trent. What divisions have followed after the Council of the Vatican? A handful of persons, most of whom were already known to be of alienated minds, have since declared themselves, and have misled some hundreds of persons here and there in Germany, and drawn to themselves the encouragement and sympathy of a certain number of Protestants of various kinds. Thus much is said here because of the studious and sustained endeavours to make men believe that within the Catholic Church, abroad and in England, there are divisions like those which prevail elsewhere. Divisions in opinion there may be, for in opinion Catholics are as free as air. But divisions in faith there cannot be; because the motive of faith in all Catholics is one and the same—the Divine and immutable witness and authority of the Church. This internal unity is nowhere to be seen in more conspicuous relief than in the Catholic Church in England, in Ireland, in the colonies, and in the United States, where the most unrestrained liberty in opinion coexists with the most absolute unity of faith. It is, indeed, in these countries of unbounded religious liberty that Ultramontanism is to be found in its fullest strength.

Of the Catholic Church in Scotland it may be well to add a few words. The Hierarchy in Scotland was extinguished by the political events of the time about

the year 1603; and then, for two or three generations afterwards, the Catholics of Scotland were without a succession of bishops. The first Scottish vicariate was founded in 1694. Subsequently, in 1731, Scotland was divided into two districts, the Lowland and the Highland; and finally into three, in 1827, namely, Eastern, Western, and Northern, which continue to this day. A considerable number of Catholics have always maintained the succession of the faith in the Highlands and the Western Highlands. The history of their sufferings has many a dark page for Scotland. In one of the highest flats of one of the oldest houses of the wynds of Edinburgh there was to be seen, until the other day, the name of Mr. Hay indented, but painted over, upon the outer door. Bishop Hay was one of the most energetic and learned of the Vicars-Apostolic of Scotland in the latter part of the last century. The number of Catholics in Scotland has been rapidly increased by communication with the North of Ireland, and by the immigration which the great industries of Scotland have drawn to Greenock, Glasgow, Dundee, and other parts of the country. The number of Catholics in Scotland, so far as it can be ascertained, may be put at between 400,000 and 500,000. The number of priests is over 200, and there are about as many churches, chapels, and 'stations.' Of the colleges, schools, and educational establishments it is not easy to give a detailed statement.

To give any adequate account of the Catholic Church in Ireland at the end of such an article as this is impossible. It would be to write the history of a nation;

for no people in the world have ever been more identified with their faith and with the Church. We have already said, in contrasting the vicissitudes of England with the unbroken Christian traditions of Ireland, that no country in the world, except Rome alone, presents so noble an example of imperishable faith and inflexible constancy. It is the tradition of Ireland that S. Patrick received a Divine promise that he should never lose the people whom God had given him in the ends of the earth; and the unbroken fidelity of the Irish to their faith, not in Ireland alone, but throughout the colonies of the British Empire, and in the great continent of North America, presents an example of immutable perseverance in religion which fully verifies this national tradition. There was a time in the seventeenth century when the whole Catholic population of Ireland was reduced to a remnant—it has been estimated at 80,000—and shut up in the province of Connaught, which, by the Act of 26th September 1653, was 'reserved for the habitation of the Irish nation.' They have multiplied in a ratio beyond the increase of the English and Scotch races, and at this day in Ireland, and throughout the world, they overpass twelve millions. Ireland was never wholly deprived of its bishops and pastors. Its Episcopate, after many sufferings, has been always steadily replenished. It retains to this day its archiepiscopal and episcopal sees, its provinces and dioceses, its entire hierarchical and parochial form in unbroken succession and vitality.

The statistics for the Catholic Church in Ireland are as follows:

1. The Hierarchy consists of 4 archbishops, of whom 2 are primates, and 24 bishops.

2. Twenty-eight dioceses, with 1080 parishes and 3440 priests.

3. The public churches and chapels are 2349.

4. One university, 25 colleges, 116 superior schools, and about 7000 primary schools.

5. The number of Catholics in Ireland, according to the census of 1871, was 4,141,933.

The condition of the Catholic Church in Ireland is so self-evident as to render all further description needless. One only remark may be added. The great act of justice whereby the British Parliament and public opinion of these kingdoms made reparation to the Catholic people of Ireland, by the disestablishment of the Protestant Church, was brought about by two distinct causes—the one, a just and generous repudiation by the non-Catholic population of these kingdoms of the religious injustice and oppression of the last centuries; and the other, the moral power of the Catholic race of Ireland. No people have a higher appreciation of justice in their rulers, as Sir John Davies declared in the midst of their suffering in the seventeenth century; and no people are more loyal when justly dealt with, for no people more truly Christian are to be found.

The attitude of the Catholic Church in England, Scotland, and Ireland, towards all the forms of Christianity which exist around it, is not one of hostility, but of hopefulness. It believes all the Christian doctrines that the separate communions in England believe. It

would fain that they all believed all the Christian doctrines which it believes. It would not diminish one jot or one tittle of the truths which they retain. Its mission is not to pull down, but to build up. Its labour is not to destroy, but to fulfil. It is, in its spirit and in its action, essentially constructive and conservative. It desires that showers of blessing may fall upon England like the early and the latter rain; and that 'the land that was desolate' may rejoice, and that the wilderness may 'flourish like the lily.' Every fresh light that springs up over England is a cause of thankfulness: and a growing light has been visibly descending upon England for three generations. The Catholic Church bears the heart of Him who will not 'break the bruised reed, nor quench the smoking flax.' Its mission is one, first of truth, then of peace, of charity, order, benevolence, and beneficence; and, that these things may be handed down undiminished, it stands inflexibly for the tradition of Christian education, which, from the mission of S. Augustine to this day, has never yet been broken. Its thoughts towards England are thoughts of peace. They who mistrust it do not know the Catholic Church. They who would stir up Englishmen against it, whatever be their intentions, are not the friends of our common country.

IV.

CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM.

PREFACE.

The following paper was not intended for publication at the time it was delivered; and would not have been published in its first rough state, but for circumstances which had been caused without my knowledge. Nevertheless I thought it better to let it go as it then stood.

Since its publication, a great many answers and objections have been made to it from various quarters. I therefore think it well briefly to reply to the more important of them; but as I wish to avoid all appearance of personal controversy, I omit the names of the public journals in which such answers and objections have appeared.

1. I affirmed that wheresoever the civil and spiritual powers have been united in one temporal sovereign, civil despotism and religious persecution have followed.

In answer, it was objected that the state of this country is a refutation.

In the context of the passage objected to, I had expressly precluded this answer: first, by pointing out that civil despotism and religious persecution prevailed in this country for two hundred years; that is, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, thereby excluding the present time; secondly, that the reaction against the excessive prerogatives of the Crown and its ecclesias-

tical supremacy had vindicated a complete religious freedom for Scotland, Ireland, and one-half of the people of England.

In the outset of the paper, I referred to a previous Essay read by me before the Academia, from which I insert the following passage as a full reply to the above objection :

' In opening our proceedings of the year before last, I made certain observations on the state and tendency of religious thought in England, and on the temper and spirit in which we ought to meet it. And now, in addressing you at the outset of our eighth year, I do not know that I can do better than to take up the same subject where I left off. In the conclusion of the paper I then read were these words : " The Royal supremacy has perished by the law of mortality, which consumes all earthly things." I need hardly guard my words by saying that I spoke only of the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown. The civil and political supremacy was never contested. The power of the Crown, if less absolute in its mode of procedure, was never more supreme and never so widely spread as now. Its indefeasible prerogatives in the order of civil Government have become more evident and irresistible in proportion as it has disengaged itself from the monstrous pretensions of Henry VIII. The theory of established Churches demands an ecclesiastical supremacy in the civil power. The two come and go together ; and when the ecclesiastical supremacy is declining, the days of establishments are numbered. In the year before last, I pointed out the fact that the Tudor statutes have almost passed

away. The greater part are actually erased from the Statute-book. Those that remain are almost equally dead. The mind of the country is against them. In Ireland, all the tyranny of Tudors and Stuarts failed to impose the Royal supremacy upon a Catholic people. Penal laws could not accomplish it. The Established Church has not only utterly failed to conciliate the people of Ireland to the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown, but it has rendered the name and thing more than ever intolerable.[1] In Scotland, the whole people rose against it. In England, half the population has gradually rejected it. The remaining half of the people passively endure it; but in the Established Church itself, a large class profess to limit the jurisdiction of the Crown in ecclesiastical matters to the temporal accessories of spiritual things, denying altogether its competence to touch any matter purely spiritual, and reject all Royal acts exceeding these limits as abuses or excesses of power. Now, though this theory is manifestly not the law of the land, it is nevertheless worthy of our sympathy and respect. It is an additional evidence of the cancelling of the Tudor supremacy from many of the best and highest minds in the Established Church. They who hold this theory protest against all such judgments as that in the case of Mr. Gorham, and of the *Essays and Reviews*. They treat them as tyrannical acts of the State, external to the Church of England. They contend that the Church of England is persecuted, but not committed, by such acts of the

[1] Since this was written the Established Church in Ireland has ceased to exist.

Crown. The facts are not so; but it is a hopeful sign that the members of the Established Church have come to reject these pretensions of the Tudor supremacy. It is equivalent to an admission that the Catholics were right in refusing it from the first; that their instincts are justified by the event. I note this, because it is an evidence of the direction in which the stream is running; and both charity and generosity require of us to forward these tendencies with all good-will, and without a word of unkindly comment.'[2]

England is therefore a normal example of my meaning. We have neither despotism nor persecution, because the exercise of the two powers is not united in one person.

2. Some objectors have strangely affirmed that I make Cæsarism and the civil power convertible terms. I have expressly affirmed that the civil power is a creation of God, and within its own sphere has an authority and rights sanctioned by God; and that where the civil power is exercised in conformity with Christianity, it has a consecrated authority. Cæsarism is a disease; it is to legitimate civil power what elephantiasis is to the human frame, or mania to the human mind. I have affirmed that it does not exist in England, and for this reason we are free; and that it is rising again in Germany, and for that reason Germany is losing its freedom.

3. Again, it has been objected that the Prussian Government has a right to control the action of the

[2] *Essays on Religion and Literature*, third series: Inaugural Address, Session 1868-9 (H. S. King & Co., 1874).

Church, because it is established. The answer to this is obvious. The Church in Prussia was as much 'established' before the Falck laws as it is now; but the laws then were consistent with the Divine constitution of the Church and with the conscience of Catholics. It is precisely because these laws violate both, that the Bishops and Catholics of Germany refuse to obey them. A Church that consents to be 'established,' at the cost of violating its Divine constitution and its own conscience, is not a Church, but an Apostasy; and such laws are explicit persecution. No Establishment by State laws and State support has ever been, or can ever be, accepted by the Catholic Church at the cost of its own Divine constitution. The Catholic Church can stand, and has stood for centuries, in relations of amity with the civil powers of the world; but in the sense of 'establishment,' as here understood, the Catholic Church has never been 'established' in any kingdom upon earth. In the Essay before referred to, I have pointed out that the Catholic Church in England down to the 24th and 25th of Henry VIII. was not an 'Established Church,' and that by its 'establishment' in that reign it ceased to be Catholic. One objector has quoted the three great statutes of *Mortmain*, *Provisors*, and *Præmunire*, and the reigns of Edward III. and Richard II., as proofs of a Royal supremacy in England at that date, equal to the Royal supremacy of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth. Against this I have expressly pointed out that, in all pre-reformation statutes, however encroaching, the 'liberties' of the Church were always recognised and guaranteed. These very words

are to be found in no less than eighteen pre-reformation statutes, and notably in the two of Edward III. referred to by the objector, and in eight of Richard II. It is indeed true that the statutes of *Præmunire* hampered the exercise of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Holy See; but they did not invest the Crown with a final jurisdiction in appeal, nor did they make it to be the fountain of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, nor did they deny the supreme jurisdiction of the Pope, nor did they touch any purely spiritual or doctrinal question. But the Falck laws have done all these things. It seems strange to me that this objector, who is manifestly learned in the law, should fail to perceive that the Tudor legislation differs from the acts of Edward III. and Richard II. precisely in the point of transferring to the Crown 'the jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the Pope.' This cuts off the Tudor statutes from all legislative precedents before the 24th of Henry VIII. The ante-reformation laws in England, like the ante-Falck laws in Prussia, carefully guarded the spiritual liberties of the Church and its union with the Holy See. The Tudor legislation and the Falck legislation alike violate the spiritual liberties of the Church and its union with the Holy See. Lord Coke's attempt to show that the acts of Henry VIII. were only declaratory of the ancient supremacy of the Crown was as transparently futile as it would now be to attempt to show that the Falck laws are merely declaratory of the former ecclesiastical laws in Prussia. The German Bishops, who had uniformly obeyed the preceding laws, a year ago unanimously refused obedience at Fulda to the new Falck laws. It is

upon this ground that the Bishop of Ermland, on the 8th of December last, refused to plead before the Court of Final Appeal in Ecclesiastical Cases. In his letter to Dr. Falck, he writes as follows:

'The old constitutional bases of the contract between the State and the Church are abolished; the Westphalian peace, which issued from a prolonged, bitter, and bloody struggle, with its principles protecting religious rights, is pushed aside; the guarantees of the rights of the Catholic Church are disregarded; a multitude of regulations, imperilling or interring ecclesiastical freedom and independence, are put forward in vindication of the modern ideas of State authority and State peril; and, to crown the whole work, the Royal tribunal for ecclesiastical affairs has been created the new German Papal Curia, with a Protestant-Catholic *corpus juris*, which, to begin with, takes the place of the Head of our Church, according to Clause I. of the law of the 17th of May on ecclesiastical discipline, and in time will, by means of legally arranged usurpations in regard to other matters, appropriate to itself his whole inheritance in regard to all other powers.' The Prussian Episcopate had from the first (Dr. Kremenz proceeds) respectfully intimated its inability to co-operate with laws that assail the rights of the Church, and which are wholly inconsistent with liberty of conscience. The Bishop of Ermland can only repeat his former declarations, 'and must ascribe to want of respect for, or ignorance of the claims of, our faith and the religious feelings of our hearts, that I am asked to resort to a tribunal (to make good my complaints), the

acknowledgment of which is identical with treason to our Church. No Roman Catholic Christian will, if mindful of his duty, resort to such a tribunal. If, on that account, the judicial protection of the rights guaranteed to our Church is to be withdrawn, we shall bear in patience this wrong, like all the other penalties threatened in these laws, and tread the path in which the Christians of the first three centuries walked, in order to be true to their faith and consciences, in opposition to the laws of the heathen Roman Empire. All the rest we leave in the hands of God the Lord.'[3]

4. The same objector tells us, that all this 'is a question not of right but of power, or, rather, it is a question in which might makes right.' 'It is a case in which the best man will win, and in which the result alone can show which is the better of the two.' If I understand these words, they deny the existence of right altogether, and therefore of all Divine law, and therefore of any Divine Lawgiver. This grim jurisprudence would seem to me to belong neither to heaven nor earth, but to the hard realms where the Supreme Judge makes might to be right, and inflicts punishment before he hears the cause. If the justice of a cause is to be learned, not from its intrinsic nature, but from its accidental issue, that is, from its success, all morality seems to me to be extinct. This worship of material force throws much light on the worship of smallpox in India. We must be allowed to deny, with the *Syllabus* and Christianity, that accomplished facts are the tests of justice.

[3] *Pall Mall Gazette*, Dec. 31, 1873.

5. The same writer has affirmed that before the authority of the Church as a 'separate and supreme' jurisdiction can be admitted, it will be necessary to prove the existence of God, the revelation of Christianity, and the divinity of our Saviour, &c. This is what I said. I affirmed that no man could deny these principles 'without renouncing his Christian name or the coherence of his reason.' The reasoning powers of the objector are manifestly coherent.

6. The same objector says that I affirm that modern Cæsarism owes its rise to the influx into Italy of Greeks and Byzantinism after the fall of Constantinople. I made no such narrow assertion: but carefully enumerated many other causes. I affirmed that Cæsarism pervaded the Middle Ages,—nay, that it is in flesh and blood, and that Byzantinism was *one* of the causes which gave to Cæsarism a particular *form*. No Imperial or Royal supremacy had ever before attempted to suspend the canons of the Church, to prohibit the meeting of Councils, to annul their decrees, and to cut off appeals to the Holy See. They had always pretended to continue in union with Rome. The essence of Byzantinism is separation from the Holy See.

7. Again, we are told that the offence of the Emperor and Prince von Bismarck is that, in a country in which the clergy are 'State officers,' they are made to obey the laws. What laws? Not the laws which existed before the Falck laws. The Catholics of Germany are appealing to them, as Englishmen appealed to the laws of 'good King Edward.' They were willing to be, if I must use such a phrase, 'State officers,' under laws

which respected the Divine constitution of the Catholic Church. These laws they never did and never would refuse to obey. But the Falck laws are not these laws: they are new laws, tyrannous and persecuting. Rather than obey them, the Catholic Bishops of Germany have made their election. They refuse any longer to be 'State officers,' whatsoever costs, privations, or penalties they may have to endure. They have made their choice between two things, which I cannot better express than in the well-chosen words, 'the mess of pottage, or the portion of the bride.'

8. Lastly, notwithstanding incessant contradiction, we are told, over and over again, that the Catholic Church was the first to innovate; that the Vatican Council established as an authoritative article of faith a point on which opinion was formerly free; and that the plain truth is, that the decree of infallibility 'definitely cut the Church adrift from all existing moorings.' I cannot doubt that the public writers who make these assertions believe them to be true; but I am at a loss to conceive how men of undeniable ability, with the facts of history before them, can make such assertions. The governments of the world have consciously framed all their contracts and concordats with an infallible Church. The conditions on which those relations of amity were founded were always based upon the laws and principles of an infallible Church. The question as to the *seat* of that infallibility is not temporal, or civil, or political, or diplomatic, or external, but strictly internal, domestic, and theological. The Vatican definition has not altered, by the shadow of a jot or a tittle,

the relations of the civil powers of the world to the infallibility of the Church. To allege the Vatican definitions as a justification of the Falck laws appears to me to be a blot upon the good sense or upon the candour of those who allege it. Into which of the Falck laws does the infallibility of the Pope enter? No one can pretend to believe that it does. This declamation about the Vatican Council and the Pope's infallibility appears to me to be the evidence of a weak case. It is easy to create a prejudice against the accused when the world hates him, and there is a motive for doing so when the witnesses cannot agree together.

January 1, 1874.

CÆSARISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM.

Read before the Academia of the Catholic Religion, December 23, 1873.

My object in this paper is to inquire whether there be any special character in the conflict which the Church has to encounter at this day; and, if so, of what kind it is. In one sense the conflict of the Church and the world is always the same. The enmity of the world is one, and the truth is one; nevertheless the forms of that enmity are endless and always changing. In one point indeed the warfare of the world against the Church is always the same. It always uses the same weapons; but the motives and aims of those that use them vary. The weapons have been, are, and always will be, the civil power. For the first three centuries the Jews and the heretical sects excited the suspicions, fears, and hatred of the Roman Empire against the Church. In the Middle Ages the ambition or despotism of Christian princes wielded the civil power against the spiritual. Now for the last three hundred years, and especially in this century, it is a world departing from Christianity which uses the civil power for the oppression of the Church. In one word, the antagonist of the Church has always been Cæsarism, or the supremacy of the civil over the spiritual.

In a former paper I traced this out in the history of Christianity in England, and showed, first, with what

care our Saxon forefathers recognised and guaranteed, by the oaths of kings and by Acts of Parliament, the full spiritual liberties of the Church; next, that during the whole Norman and English period of our monarchy, our Parliaments always recognised and guaranteed the liberties of the Church in the very text of the statute law, even in times when custom, the corruption of Royal courts, or national jealousy, habitually violated its freedom; and, lastly, that from the date when the legal Church of England was established, the word 'liberties,' which till then had always been incorporated in Acts of Parliament, vanished from the Statute-book. What thus happened in England has happened also throughout the history of Europe. Cæsarism is to be found in all ages and countries, but the Cæsarism of the nineteenth century has a character of its own.

I. The first manifestation of Cæsarism in history, for I am not dealing with prehistoric legends or with Oriental tyrannies, may be seen in the Imperial despotism of Rome after the suppression of the Republic, and in the Roman Emperors who have stamped it with their name. In essence it is the absolute dominion of man over man: the power of life and death, including supreme power over liberty and goods, and extending to the whole life of man, political and religious, social and domestic. It may be summed up in a few words—'Divus Cæsar, Imperator et Summus Pontifex.' There is nothing in the public or private life of man that escapes from the sweeping jurisdiction of this universal sovereignty. The sovereignty of Cæsarism is absolute and dependent on no conditions; it is also exclusive,

because it does not tolerate any jurisdiction above or within its own. It does not recognise any laws except of its own making.

Now this supreme power need not be held in the hand of one man. It may be a People or a Senate, or a King or an Emperor. Its essence is the claim to absolute and exclusive sovereignty. It by necessity excludes God, His sovereignty and His laws. The sole fountain of law is the human will, individual or collective. Cæsar finds the law in himself, and creates right and wrong, the just and the unjust, the sacred and the profane. He has no statute-book but human nature, and he is the sole and supreme interpreter and expositor of that natural law. Therefore law, morals, politics, and religion all come from him, and all depend upon him. The Sovereign Prince or State legislates, judges, executes, by its own will and hand. This sovereign power creates everything: it fashions the political constitution; it delegates jurisdiction, revocable at its word; it suspends or measures out personal liberty; it controls domestic life; it claims the children as its own; it educates them at its will, and after models and theories of its own device.

Now this exclusion of God is the deification of man. It puts man in the place of God as supreme legislator, the fountain of authority, liberty, law, and right. It gives to him the control of men's actions and men's minds. 'Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem,' and 'Cujus regio ejus est religio,' are the axioms of Cæsarism.

This is the *Lex Regia;* and where this is, human

liberty no longer exists. When I say that God was excluded from the State of Imperial Rome, I mean the one true God, Creator and Governor of all things: for Rome was full of gods. But the Supreme Pontificate of all the religions congregated in Rome was vested in Cæsar. He was 'Summus Pontifex.' He was invested with a divinity. He was addressed as 'Æternitas Tua,' and Diocletian could say, 'Diocletianus maximus æternus Imperator . . . . . ad divinas aures nostras fama quædam pervenit.' The author of the *Histoire Universelle de l'Eglise*[4] describes in these words the Cæsarism of Caligula: 'The Pagan idea of the Pagan Cæsar was perfectly realised in his person. He declared himself to be a god; he consecrated to himself a temple, with priests and sacrifices. His sister Drusilla, with whom he had been guilty of incest, being dead, he made her a goddess, and publicly swore by her divinity.' He gave to his agents in Rome authority over all the goods of all men; and he told one of his kindred to remember that everything was lawful to him in respect to all men—*omnia et in omnes sibi licere*. It is not to be forgotten that Caligula made his horse a Consul.

Such is the *Lex Regia*, which may be thus summed up. Cæsar inherited all the rights of the Senate and of the people. In political matters he was the chief of the army and of the navy; he had the power of peace and war. In administration he was perpetual Consul, Proconsul, Senator, President of the Senate, and Tribune of the people. In the civil order he was Censor

[4] Röhrbacher, *Hist. Univ. de l'Eglise*, tom. xviii. pp. 1 and 2.

and Prætor; his edicts, letters, rescripts, decisions, had force of law. In religion he was priest, augur, Sovereign Pontiff, head of all priesthoods and of all religions. He was judge of all questions of religious rights, ceremonies, and worships, and interpreter of all mysteries. In fact, the sovereignty of the people in all its functions was transferred to Cæsar.

Terrasson describes the *Lex Regia* in these terms: 'All power—religious, political, legislative, and civil—in a word, omnipotence in all things and over all things—the people and the Senate transferred to Cæsar when the Republic passed into the Empire.' And this took place in virtue of the *Lex Regia*, of which Ulpian speaks in these words: 'Quod principi placuit legis habuit vigorem, utpote cum Lege Regia, quæ de imperio ejus lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat.' This Imperial power was therefore absolute, exclusive, unlimited, and omnipotent.[5]

II. We will now proceed to trace the course of Cæsarism in the Christian world. The greatest of Divine acts is the Incarnation of God. Christianity has changed the state of mankind in every relation to God and to men, in this world and in the world to come. The theological aspect of the Incarnation lies beyond the bounds of our subject; but the political consequences of the Incarnation constitute the essence of the moral, social, domestic, and civil life of men and of nations. King Herod had a true instinct in seeking

[5] Gaume, *Recherches Historiques sur la Révolution*, tom. vi. pp. 14-16.

the life of the King who was born in Bethlehem. The Cæsars of this world have followed his example. There can be no Cæsarism where Christ reigns.

Christianity, in consecrating the civil authority of the world, has laid on it the limits of the Divine law. Christianity has confirmed the civil power within its own sphere as a delegation from God Himself; but by the same act Christianity has limited the sphere of its jurisdiction. It has withdrawn from its cognisance and control the whole inner life of man. The civil power cannot command his intellect, it cannot control his conscience, it cannot coerce his will. Christianity has indeed subjected the outward actions of man to civil government, but it has withdrawn from civil rulers the whole domain of religion.

The State may imprison the body, and even take its life, but it has no jurisdiction over the soul. All its acts are free. They know no lawgiver or sovereign but God alone. By the coming of Christ into the world the kingdom of God was set up among the kingdoms of men. Cæsar was no longer 'Divus' nor 'Pontifex Maximus,' nor absolute nor exclusive lord of men. No man any longer had unlimited sovereignty over man, and no man could by right hold property in man. The Son of God had brought deliverance to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that were bound. He had redeemed men into the liberty of the sons of God, and He secured that liberty for ever by a sovereign act. He divided the two powers, spiritual and civil, and gave them into different hands, so that they could never be again united in one person, except Himself and His

Vicar, upon earth. By this Divine fact the *Lex Regia* was abolished for ever, and the *cujus regio ejus religio* became a heresy as well as a tyranny.

The presence of the Catholic Church among the civil powers of the world has changed the whole political order of mankind. It has established upon earth a legislature, a tribunal, and an executive independent of all human authority. It has withdrawn from the reach of human laws the whole domain of faith and of conscience. These depend on God alone, and are subjected by Him to His own authority, vested in His Church, which is guided by Himself.

This is the solution of the problem, which the world cannot solve. Obedience to the Church is liberty; and it is liberty because the Church cannot err or mislead either men or nations. If the Church were not infallible, obedience to it might be the worst of bondage. This is Ultramontanism, or the liberty of the soul divinely guaranteed by an infallible Church; the proper check and restraint of Cæsarism, as Cæsarism is the proper antagonist of the sovereignty of God. But to this we will return hereafter.

I will draw out somewhat more exactly and technically what is the separation and partition of the two powers, spiritual and civil, in order to show that it is from the Christian Church that the world has learnt the stable liberties of the civil order and the measured equity of a written law.

Pope S. Gelasius, in his letter to the Emperor Anastasius, enunciates the whole doctrine in few words. 'There are,' he says, 'august Emperor, two things by

which this world is governed—the sacred authority of the Pontiff and the power of Cæsar. The authority of Bishops is all the more to be venerated as they must render account to God in the last judgment, even of the salvation of kings. You are not ignorant that, though your dignity lifts you above other men, you are bound humbly to bow the head to Pontiffs, who are charged with the dispensation of Divine things, and that you owe to them submission in all that belongs to the order of religion, and to the administration of the holy mysteries. . . . In all things which are of the public order these same Bishops obey your laws, and in your turn you ought to obey them in all things which concern the sacred things of which they are the dispensers.'[6]

And what a Pontiff said to an Emperor an Emperor said to Bishops. Constantine at Nicea said: 'God has elected you to be priests and judges, to judge and to decide (the contentions of the people), forasmuch as God has set you to be over all men.'[7]

S. Bernard expresses the same in a passage of profound insight and beauty. Writing to Conrad, King of the Romans, he says: 'The Empire and the Priesthood could not be more sweetly, peacefully, or closely united and mutually interwoven than that both should alike meet in the Person of the Lord; who, according to the Incarnation, was made unto us of both tribes, Priest and King. Not only so, but He mingled and confederated these in His own Body, which is the Christian

[6] Epist. S. Gelasii ad Anastasium; Labbe et Cossart Concil., tom. v. p. 308.

[7] Gelasii Cyzic. Hist. Concil. Nicæn.; Labbe et Cossart Concil., tom. ii. p. 175.

people, He being the Head; so that this race of mankind is called by the voice of the Apostle an elect nation, a Royal Priesthood. . . . Therefore what God has joined together let no man put asunder. But rather what Divine authority has sanctioned, let the will of man strive to fulfil; and let them unite in mind who are united by laws. Let them cherish one another; let them defend one another; let each one bear his own burden. The Wise Man says, when brother helps brother, both shall be consoled. But if—which God forbid—they gnaw and bite one another, shall not both be brought to desolation? Let not my soul enter into the counsel of them who say that either the peace or liberty of the Church is hurtful to the Empire, or the prosperity and exaltation of the Empire hurtful to the Church. For God, who is the Founder of both, has united them, not unto destruction, but unto edification. If you know this, how long will you connive at the common insult and the common injury of both? Is not Rome both the Apostolic See and the Head of the Empire? To say nothing about the Church, is it honour to the King to hold in his hands an empire which is a headless trunk? I know not indeed what your wise men and princes of the kingdom counsel you in this matter; but I, speaking in my unwisdom, will not be silent of what I think. The Church of God, from its beginning unto these times, has been oftentimes in tribulation, and oftentimes delivered. Hear, lastly, what it says of itself in the Psalms, for it is its own voice: "Often they have fought against me from my youth, but they could not prevail over me. The wicked

have wrought upon my back: they have lengthened their iniquity" (Ps. cxxviii. 2, 3). Be sure, O King, that neither now will the Lord leave the Rod of Sinners upon the lot of the just. The hand of the Lord is not shortened, nor is it made weak to save. He will set free in this time also without a doubt His Spouse, whom He has redeemed with His own Blood, and endowed with His Spirit, and adorned with heavenly gifts; and, moreover, with earthly gifts. He will set it free, I say, He will set it free; but if in the hands of another, let the princes of the empire see whether it be for the honour of the King or the good of the empire? No, by no means. Wherefore gird thee with thy sword upon thy thigh, O most mighty, and let Cæsar restore to himself what is Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's. Both are the interest of Cæsar: that is, to defend his own crown and to protect the Church. The one becomes the king, the other the advocate of the Church. Victory, as we confide in the Lord, is at hand.'[8]

S. Thomas Aquinas defines this doctrine more precisely as follows. The end of the Commonwealth is the same as that of individuals. 'God has created us and placed us in this world to know, to love, and to serve Him, and by these means to obtain eternal life, which is our final end.' Every Christian Society is ordained by God to the same collective end. From this S. Thomas proves that though the king or prince has only civil power, he is bound to use it for the eternal good of the Commonwealth. He adds, 'If man

[8] S. Bernardi ad Conradum, epist. ccxliii. tom. i. p. 242 (Paris, 1690).

could obtain by his natural power this last end it would be the duty of the King to guide him in it. . . . But, as man cannot by merely human virtues attain to his end, which is the possession of God, it follows that it is no human direction, but a Divine direction, that must conduct him to it. The King to whom that supreme direction belongs is not man alone, but God also—our Lord Jesus Christ. In order that spiritual things may be distinct from earthly things, the authority of His kingdom is committed not to earthly kings, but to priests, and especially to the chief of priests—the successor of Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, to whom all kings of Christendom ought to be subject, as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself. Forasmuch as the bliss of heaven is the end of the life which we now live, it belongs to the office of a king for that reason to promote a good life in his people, with a view to attain the bliss of heaven—that is, in enjoining those things which tend to the attainment of heavenly bliss, and in forbidding, as far as possible, what is contrary to them. But what things conduce to the bliss of heaven, and what things are a hindrance to its attainment, are to be known out of the Divine law, the teaching of which belongs to the office of priests.'[9]

From these principles we see the difference between the Pagan Cæsarism and that which I will call the Christian Cæsarism.

1. The first regards the State as its own creation, the second as the creation of God.

2. The first is Pontiff and King over body and

[9] S. Thomas Aq. de Regimine Principum, lib. i. chap. xiv.

soul absolute and exclusive; the second is subject in all that belongs to the soul to the Divine law and to the Church of Jesus Christ.

3. The first makes religion an instrument or department of the State; the second makes it the limitation of civil power, and the protection of human liberty.

4. The first treats the Church as subject to itself; the second treats all civil power as subject to God and His law, of which the Church is the guardian and the interpreter.

5. The first regards all power, civil and religious, as derived from the people; the second regards civil power as formally from God, and the spiritual power as exclusively from God, and therefore dependent on God alone.

This is Ultramontanism: the essence of which is that the Church being a Divine institution, and by Divine assistance infallible, is, within its own sphere, independent of all civil powers; and, as the guardian and interpreter of the Divine law, it is the proper judge of men and of nations in all things touching that law in faith or morals.

Inasmuch as at this moment the term 'Ultramontane' is used as a nickname to kindle persecution against the Church by false accusations and misleading the public opinion of this country, I will draw out a proof that Ultramontanism and Catholicism are identical, as are also Catholicism and perfect Christianity.

Christianity, or the faith and law revealed by Jesus Christ, has, as I have said, introduced two principles

of Divine authority into human society: the one, the absolute separation of the two powers, spiritual and civil; the other, the supremacy of the spiritual over the civil in all matters within its competence or divine jurisdiction. I do not know how any man, without renouncing his Christian name or the coherence of his reason, can deny either of these principles. I can indeed understand that, admitting both, he may dispute as to the range or reach of that jurisdiction. He may contend that it is wider or narrower, that it does or does not extend to this or that particular matter. But on this, also, I will speak hereafter. For the present it is enough to say that these two principles are held by all Christians, except Erastians, who deny the spiritual office of the Church, if not also its existence. But I hope to show that these two principles are Ultramontanism; that the Bull 'Unam Sanctam' contains no more, that the Vatican Council could define no less; that in its definitions it enunciated nothing new; that its two Constitutions were, as Parliament would say, not enacting but declaratory acts; that they have changed nothing and added nothing either to the constitution of the Church or to the relations of the Church with the civil powers of the world.

To make this clear, let us shortly examine these two principles.

First, as to the separation of the spiritual and civil powers, the whole history of Christendom is sufficient evidence. The civil sovereignty is coeval with man. Society is not of man's making. The relations of authority, submission, and equality lie in the human

family, and from it are extended to commonwealths, kingdoms, empires. The civil sovereignty resides materially in society at large; formally in the person or persons to whom society may commit its exercise. Immediately, therefore, sovereignty is given by God to society; mediately, through society to the person who wields it. Both materially and formally, mediately and immediately, sovereignty is from God, and within its competence is supreme and sacred. Civil allegiance to sovereigns is therefore a part of Christianity, and treason is both a crime against a lawful authority and a sin against God, who has ordained that authority. Ultramontanism teaches that within the sphere of its competence the civil power is to be obeyed, not only 'for wrath, but for conscience' sake.'[10] It is a part of the Christian religion to obey 'the powers that are.'

As to the independence of the Spiritual Power, we need waste no words. The existence of the Church and the primacy of its head in these eighteen hundred years are proof enough. Further, no Christian of sound mind will deny that these two distinct and separate powers have distinct and separate spheres, and that within these spheres respectively they hold their power from God. Where the limits of these spheres are to be traced, it is easy enough to decide in all matters purely civil or in all matters purely spiritual. The conflict arises over the mixed questions. And yet here there ought to be no real difficulty. Nobody can decide what questions are pure or what questions are mixed except a judge who can

[10] Romans xiii. 5.

define the limits of these two elements respectively, and therefore of the respective jurisdictions. In any question as to the competence of the two powers either there must be some judge to decide what does and what does not fall within their respective spheres, or they are delivered over to perpetual doubt and to perpetual conflict. But who can define what is or is not within the jurisdiction of the Church in faith and morals, except a judge who knows what the sphere of faith and morals contains, and how far it extends? And surely it is not enough that such a judge should guess, or opine, or pronounce upon doubtful evidence, or with an uncertain knowledge. Such a sentence would be, not an end of contention, but a beginning and a renewal of strife.

It is clear that the civil power cannot define how far the circumference of faith and morals extends. If it could, it would be invested with one of the supernatural endowments of the Church. To do this it must know the whole deposit of explicit and implicit faith; or, in other words, it must be the guardian of the Christian Revelation. Now no Christian, nor any man of sound mind, claims this for the civil power: and if not, then, either there is no judge to end strife; or that judge must be the Church, to which alone the revelation of Christianity in faith and morals was divinely intrusted. And if this be so, still, unless the Church be divinely certain of the limits of its commission and of its message, no doubt or controversy between the two Powers can ever be brought to an end. But if the Church be certain with a Divine

certainty as to the limits of its jurisdiction, its voice in such matters is final. But an authority that can alone define the limits of its own office is absolute because it depends on none, and infallible because it knows with a Divine certainty the faith which it has received in charge.

If, then, the civil power be not competent to decide the limits of the spiritual power, and if the spiritual power can define with a Divine certainty its own limits, it is evidently supreme. Or, in other words, the spiritual power knows with Divine certainty the limits of its own jurisdiction; and it knows therefore the limits and the competence of the civil power. It is thereby in matters of religion and conscience supreme. I do not see how this can be denied without denying Christianity. And if this be so, this is the doctrine of the Bull 'Unam Sanctam,' and of the *Syllabus*, and of the Vatican Council. It is, in fact, Ultramontanism, for this term means neither less nor more. The Church, therefore, is separate and supreme.

Let us, then, ascertain somewhat further what is the meaning of supreme. Any power which is independent and can alone fix the limits of its own jurisdiction, and can thereby fix the limits of all other jurisdictions, is, *ipso facto*, supreme. But the Church of Jesus Christ, within the sphere of revelation, of faith and morals, is all this, or is nothing, or worse than nothing, an imposture and an usurpation—that is, it is Christ or Antichrist. If it be Antichrist, every Cæsar from Nero to this day is justified. If it

be Christ, it is the Supreme Power among men; that is to say:

(1) It holds its commission and authority from God alone;

(2) It holds in custody the faith and the law of Jesus Christ;

(3) It is the sole interpreter of that faith and the sole expositor of that law. It has within the sphere of that commission a power to legislate with authority; to bind the consciences of all men born again in the baptism of Jesus Christ; it alone can fix the limits of the faith and law intrusted to it, and therefore the sphere of its own jurisdiction; it alone can decide in questions where its power is in contact with the civil power—that is, in mixed questions: for it alone can determine how far its own Divine office, or its own Divine trust, enters into and is implicated in such questions; and it is precisely that element, in any mixed question of disputed jurisdiction, which belongs to a higher order and to a higher tribunal.

For instance, a Catholic Professor of Theology in a State University, salaried by the State, refuses the definitions of the Vatican Council. The Bishop excommunicates him; the State supports and pays him, in spite of the excommunication of the Church, as a Professor of Catholic Theology. Here is a mixed question made up of stipend and orthodoxy. Surely orthodoxy is a higher element than stipend; faith is of a higher order than thalers; and to judge of orthodoxy and faith belongs not to the Civil but the Spiritual Tribunal, which is, in that sphere, superior, absolute, and final.

The same is true of every mixed question of benefice, or collation to benefice, or privation of benefice—in a word, of every question of contract between the Church with the State, so far as faith and morals enter; and it belongs to the Church to determine whether they enter or no, and how far they enter and are implicated in the conflict.

Now let it be clearly understood that in these assertions I am vindicating to the Church her Divine rights. I am not denying to the State its power to violate every Divine right upon earth. It may abuse its power at the license of its will—Imperial, Royal, Bureaucratic, Democratic. I deny only its right. '*Id potest quod jure potest.*' It can re-enact and enforce the *Lex Regia* against the Church. But its power is violence, and its acts are tyranny.

I have affirmed, then, that the Cæsarism of the Pagan world, which was the enemy of God and the destroyer of all the liberties of man, was by one Divine act reduced to its lawful sphere. The separation of the spiritual power from the civil, and the supremacy of the spiritual over the civil order of the Christian world, have redeemed princes from the degradation of tyrants, and mankind from an inhuman slavery.

Cæsarism, whether in one person, or in a senate, or in a populace, always has been, is, always must be, tyranny in the civil and persecution in the spiritual order. The direct antagonist of this worst of human ills is the Divine law revealed by Jesus Christ, and the Divine authority committed to His Church. It has been, and ever will be, the source of all human liberty.

The Church was the mother of all free nations. All freedom of soul and conscience in men, in families, in States, comes from the limitation of the civil power; but the limitation of the civil power can only come from a superior authority. That superior authority is not in the order of material power, but of Divine right. The limitation which has changed Cæsarism into Christian Monarchy is law; and that law the law of God, represented, expounded, applied upon earth, by an authority of His own creation, and by judicial powers of His own delegation, independent of all human Legislatures and superior to all prerogatives of kings.

Now what I have here asserted is Ultramontanism, but it is not Ultramontanism alone; it is Christianity as it has been held by all men, in all ages, by Catholics and by Protestants alike, by Ultramontanes and by Gallicans, by Anglicans and by Presbyterians, by the Free Churches of England, whose noble and pathetic history has just been written, on the eve, as I fear, of their apostasy from the high and heroic spirit of their Founders and Fathers in patience and fidelity to the great law of Christian Liberty in Jesus Christ.

The sum, then, of our argument is this: Cæsarism consists

(1) In the union of the two powers in one person;

(2) In the claim of supremacy over all causes and persons;

(3) In the coercion of conscience in spiritual matter;

(4) In the isolation of national religions on the plea that no foreign jurisdiction can enter the State;

(5) In the isolation of national Churches, and

thereby the rejection of the universal authority of the Church.

Ultramontanism consists

(1) In the separation of the two powers, and the vesting them in different persons;

(2) In claiming for the Church the sole right to define doctrines of faith and morals; and

(3) To fix the limits of its own jurisdiction in that sphere;

(4) In the indissoluble union of the Church with, and submission to, the universal jurisdiction of the Holy See.

Such, then, was the Cæsarism of the heathen world: the dominion of man over man, both in matters of civil obedience and in matters of religious worship; and such was the restraint of this absolute and intolerable sway of man over man by the separation of the two powers, temporal and spiritual, into distinct authorities and spheres of jurisdiction vested in distinct persons. To this we owe the order, progress, civilisation, and, so far as there has been peace on earth, the peace of the Christian world.

III. But Cæsarism is in human nature. It is the government of flesh and blood, or of 'blood and iron;' and though restrained for a time by Christianity, it has never been extinct. Through the whole history of Christendom, from the fourth to the sixteenth century, it has been always striving to reassert itself. The Roman Empire was no sooner translated to the East than Cæsarism began to reappear. The Byzantine despotism over civil freedom and ecclesiastical liberty is a byword. Byzantine and despotic are convertible terms. The

Roman Empire was no sooner revived in the West than the same tendency began to reappear. Even Charlemagne stretched his protectorate, or episcopate of outward things, into many violations of ecclesiastical liberty. But the Cæsarism of the Saxon, Suabian, and Bavarian Emperors, as seen in the conflicts of S. Gregory VII., Alexander III., Innocent IV., makes the reign of Charlemagne to seem normal and Christian, like the reign of Constantine.

The two chief causes of the revival of Cæsarism in Christendom are—first, the school of jurists created by the Pandects of Justinian and the University of Bologna, from which sprang the whole theory and organisation of the Ghibelline Cæsarism; and, secondly, the influx into Italy of Greeks and Greek literature and Byzantinism after the fall of Constantinople. It was this that rendered possible in Christian Europe the royal supremacies of the sixteenth century. The theory of investing the prince with supreme legislative and judicial power over all persons and in all causes, ecclesiastical and civil, is not only Byzantine, but Pagan. It is the reunion in one person of the two powers which Christianity has put asunder. And it has been followed, in every country where it has taken root, and so long as it has existed, by civil despotism and by religious persecution. The most ample exhibition of this is to be found in the Tudor legislation, and in the enforcement of a legal religion in England and Ireland by penal statutes. The religious history of England, Scotland, Denmark, Sweden, and the North of Germany, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is the

history of the revival of Cæsarism, and of a reaction against the liberty of religion and of conscience with which Christ has made us free. What is chiefly to be noted is, that this oppression of Christian freedom has been accomplished to the cry of liberty of religion and of conscience.

For proof of this, it is enough to refer to a book entitled *A History of the Free Churches of England*,[11] in which the sufferings of Nonconformists and Catholics under the Cæsarism of the English Crown are patiently and fully described. The effect of this mixed civil and religious despotism has been gradually to obtain for one-half of the English people and the whole population of Ireland a complete religious liberty. Scotland has always rejected the interferences of kings in matters of religion; and in our day one-half of the Scottish population has rejected even the remnants of civil interference lingering in the law of patronage. The political tendency of the whole world is towards 'free churches;' that is, to the desecration of the civil power and to the rejection of the Church.

The temporal sovereignty of the Supreme Pontiff has been violated on the plea that the civil and spiritual powers ought to be once more separated, not as Providence has ordained hitherto, but on the impossible theory of a free Church in a free State. The Italian Revolution has put this forward as its solution of the religious conflicts of the nineteenth century. It will endure until the first quarrel, and the first quarrel will arise upon the first pontifical act in condemnation of the

[11] By Mr. Herbert S. Skeats (Miall, 1868).

usurpations of the free State. The supremacy of the civil power will then be declared to be vital to its freedom. It must, however, be acknowledged that, violent and sacrilegious as the acts of the free State have been and still are in practice, Italy has hitherto refrained from committing itself in the domain of principle and of law to doctrines such as are embodied in Prussian ecclesiastical legislation. From this the Catholic faith and instinct of Italy have saved it. Through twenty years of revolution, it has never entangled itself in the tyrannous and pedantic absurdities of the Falck laws. It has had two things profoundly impressed upon its intellect and its conscience—the one, the impious monstrosity of the 'Divus Cæsar;' the other, an inextinguishable consciousness that the Catholic Church is a Divine creation. Excepting a handful of Petruccelli della Gattinas, no people in Europe can look upon the Prussian persecution with less sympathy or more secret contempt than the Italians.

But the pretensions of the Berlin Government are only the first indications of an Imperial omnipotence, which will hereafter be more explicitly and violently put forth. This Imperial legislation may be regarded as the link between the old royal supremacies of the sixteenth century and the revived *Lex Regia* which the anti-Christian revolution is preparing for the future of Europe.

The following quotations will best exhibit what I mean. I will give a passage from a leading journal, representing a school of political doctrine which, though not yet numerous, has already obtained a place among

us. After saying that there is a conviction widely spread hostile to the Catholic Church, the writer goes on to say: 'Side by side with this negative conviction, a positive conviction, vague indeed and indistinct, but exceedingly powerful, has been and still is growing up, that a nation, as such, is essentially a better thing than a Church; that it is, in fact, of all positive human institutions at present known to us, the most sacred, the most deeply-rooted in human nature, and the best fitted to engage the affections of a rational man. Contrast for a moment the English nation and the Catholic Church, and see to which of the two it is best worth an Englishman's while to be loyal. . . . All this, we say, puts nations—for the same sort of statements are true of most other nations besides England—above Churches as objects of affection and loyalty. . . . We should regard no one as really loyal to his nation who did not regard it as being to him a higher and more sacred object than any Church whatever.'[12] This doctrine is revived Paganism.

In the Prussian Chamber, Dr. Falck laid down the following doctrine on the 15th of January last year: 'We have become more "concrete;" we have estimated the rights of the State. There is the reason why the proposed laws must be carried.' On the 17th of January he added: 'If the State and the Church are equal in the domains of moral power, the State must always have the supremacy in the domain of law.' That is to say, as M. de Pressensé remarks, 'This amounts to saying that the Church has all the benefits

[12] *Pall Mall Gazette*, Jan. 23, 1873.

of equality in the domain of abstractions, on the condition that the State has all power in the domain of the "concrete;" that is, Right is a theory, Force is the only reality."[13]

This brings out the essence of modern Cæsarism, which is not only that the State has supreme power over the Church in all persons and causes, but supreme right to determine the limits of the rights of the Church, its liberties, offices, and duties; or, in other words, that the State can determine, and the Church cannot determine, what is the authority and commission intrusted to it by its Divine Founder. This is the vital point in the contention. The Church claims to be the sole, because the divinely-appointed, judge of the sphere of its own spiritual office, authority, and jurisdiction. The modern Cæsarism claims this ultimate power of determination for the State. Between these conflicting claims there can be no *modus vivendi*. To concede or to abdicate this supreme spiritual office would to the Church be death. It was for this that a long line of its martyrs died. It was for this that S. Thomas of Canterbury died, which the other day was described as his 'exploits.' It is for this that the Archbishop of Posen has also declared his readiness to die. And now the Berlin Government, it is said, is about to attempt to impose on every future Bishop the following oath:

'The Bishops are henceforward to swear obedience to the laws of the country, to bind themselves by oath to exhort the clergy and laity to be loyal to the king, patriotic and obedient to the laws, and not to permit

[13] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Mai 1873, 1er liv. p. 27.

the clergy under their control to teach or act in opposition to these principles.'[14]

The cynicism of this oath is clear as day. The Berlin Government supports the Old Catholic heretics against the Catholic Church, on the ground that the Church has innovated in its doctrines. It now proposes to bind Catholic Bishops to obey the laws of the State after all the Falck innovations. It refuses the innovations of an infallible Church, but binds the Bishops of the Church by oath to obey whatsoever laws may now or hereafter be made by a fallible State. But Cæsarism is infallible in 'the domain of the concrete.' 'Divus Cæsar.'

Prince von Bismarck declared in the Chamber of Peers that 'the future of an Evangelical Empire has shown itself clearly on the horizon of Germany;' that is to say, the Catholic Church, which is the direct antagonist of the Evangelical Empire, must cease from before it. Such is, in fact, the inevitable effect of this legislation. Finally, the Emperor justifies his legislation against the Catholic Church by asserting a claim of absolute independence against all religious or spiritual authority whatsoever upon earth, which is equivalent to claiming a supremacy over all religious and spiritual matters within the Empire of Germany. 'The Evangelical creed, which, as must be known to your Holiness, I, like my ancestors and the majority of my subjects, profess, does not permit us to accept in our relations to God any other mediator than our Lord Jesus Christ.'

[14] *Times*, Friday, December 19th, 1873.

As it is impossible to suppose that the august personage whose name is attached to this letter could intend that the Pope had claimed to be a mediator between God and man, except as the Chief Pastor of the Church of God, these words must be taken to deny the existence of any such Church, under any such ministry, bearing Divine authority upon earth. This denial, coupled with the assertion of supreme power over the Catholics of Germany, is equivalent to the claim of an absolute and unlimited Cæsarism. The recent ecclesiastical legislation, which violates both religion and conscience, is the legitimate consequence of this supreme Pontificate. This is the key to the Falck laws, the effects of which are in sum as follows:

First, they cut off appeals to the Holy See, by declaring that all causes must be determined by German tribunals. This cuts the Church in Germany from the centre of Catholic Unity and from its universal jurisdiction.

Secondly, they suspend the power of excommunication upon the concurrent sanction of the civil authority, which is to deprive the Church of its judicial power of deciding who are and who are not of its communion.

Thirdly, they give to the State the office of forming and educating the clergy, by compulsory education in the gymnasiums, lyceums, and universities of the State, leaving to the Bishops to superadd a course of theology on men whose whole intellectual and moral nature has been shaped by a State training: and even in their theological examinations the presence of a commissary of the State is required.

Fourthly, they suspend the power of the Bishops in giving cure of souls, and changing their clergy from cure to cure, upon the assent of the civil power.

Fifthly, they establish an Ecclesiastical Council, which is, in fact, the supremacy of the Crown put in commission, invested with a final jurisdiction over ecclesiastical persons and matters. The effect of this is to substitute the Emperor for the Pope; and to invest him with supreme power over religion and conscience, over the Church, the Episcopate, and the clergy, as the head of all religions and of all priesthoods within the Empire.

The result, then, of these laws is that no 'official function,' as the Berlin Government puts it,—that is, no spiritual act, from the excommunication of a heretic down to the teaching the catechism to school-children, —can be performed without the sanction of the civil power, under pain of fine or imprisonment, and, this failing, of deposition. The Ober-Präsident of Posen has already called on the Archbishop of Posen to resign his archbishopric for numerous offences against the Falck laws; which offences are so many high spiritual duties. If he refuse to resign within eight days, he is to be cited before the Royal Tribunal in Berlin. The Act 24 and 25 Henry VIII. made the king outright head of the Church, and by one stroke all jurisdiction formerly belonging to the Pope was transferred to the Crown. This was intelligible. The Falck laws are indirect and circuitous. They compass what they do not claim. They suspend all spiritual jurisdiction on the civil power, and make the sovereign absolute in matters of religion.

What is this but 'Divus Cæsar'? It is the re-uniting in one person of the two powers which God has separated, and a denial, not only of the supremacy of the spiritual power of the Church of Christ, but a denial that any such spiritual power of Divine institution exists upon earth. This, as we have seen, was formally enunciated by the Emperor in his letter to the Pope.

Now we might at first sight wonder how such a preposterous claim could have been set up in the nineteenth century. But there are agencies at work which will account for it.

First, there is, perhaps, no country in Europe from which the Christian faith has been more completely wiped out than Prussia. It became Christian in the thirteenth century; it fell into the Lutheran heresy in the sixteenth; it has developed into simple rationalism in the educated, and into materialism among the masses of the people. The idea of a Church with spiritual authority is simply effaced. The civil power, with its military organisation, is the sole ideal of power before the eyes and the minds of the Protestant population of Prussia. The fusion of the Lutherans and the Calvinists, some years ago, into an Evangelical Church has prepared them for the return of the old rule—*Ejus religio cujus regio.*

We have seen how the vivid consciousness of the Divine authority and office of the Church has restrained and saved Italy from greater revolutionary excesses. There is nothing of this kind to restrain or to save Prussia. In rejecting the Church of God it is deifying Cæsar. We are going back into the barbarism of the

Old World. And this is not said as a mere stroke of rhetoric or of controversy. There has been for some time a school of writers in Germany labouring to restore the Byzantine Cæsarism. Just as the jurists were the satellites and flatterers of the mediæval emperors of Germany, and as Machiavelli and Gravina and Hobbes have been the apostles of royal supremacies and modern Erastianism, so the school known at Munich as Byzantines has been preparing the way for the Imperial primacy of Berlin. The Byzantines got their name from their literary labours upon the Greek Church and the canon law of the Patriarchate at Constantinople. They so far affected the Government of Munich as to induce it to meddle with the seminaries of the Bishops. It was this school, together with certain persons once honoured among us, who used Prince Hohenlohe as their mouthpiece in conspiring against the Vatican Council. After this their ecclesiastical politics were carried to Berlin, and the Government of Prussia was thereby led to commit itself to the patronage of the 'Old Catholic' heresy. Like all heretics, they sheltered themselves under the civil power, and flattered it into the attempt to carry out that Byzantine Erastianism against the Catholic Church in the Empire. Witness the oath lately taken by Dr. Reinkens, and the State grant which was its reward.

Finally, there is another agency which has been far more potent than all others in bringing about this present persecution. There is no manner of doubt that the sect of Freemasons has been long labouring to break up the religious settlement in Germany. The

Peace of Westphalia secured the political status of Christianity, though divided into Catholic and Protestant. The Freemasons desired the overthrow of both. They thought that the time was come to complete what the Thirty Years' War left unfinished. They believed that the Catholics in Germany, weakened by the overthrow first of Austria and next of France, would easily fall under the power of the Evangelical Empire, as Prince von Bismarck calls it. I am but repeating his own words. In the Prussian House of Peers in 1870 he spoke as follows :

'Peace began to be disturbed after the war in Austria, after the fall in 1866 of the Power which was the bulwark of the Roman influence in Germany, and when the future of an Evangelical Empire showed itself clearly on the horizon of Germany. All tranquillity was lost when the second-rate Catholic Power in Europe had followed in the way of its predecessor, and Germany became the first great military power for the moment, and, according to the will of God, for a long time.'

Does Prince von Bismarck fear for the stability of 'the first great military power' of the world? What could the Catholics of Germany do against it? What would they ever have desired but its perpetual stability if it had only dealt justly with them, according to the existing laws? Prince von Bismarck creates resistance by persecution, and then pleads that resistance to justify the persecution which has called up that resistance. There was no resistance to the existing laws as they stood before the new Falck legislation. It cannot be doubted

that the object of the Falck laws is to render impossible the existence of the Catholic Church in Germany,—that is, to exterminate it. I say this because no Catholic, without sin against God, can obey these laws. Every man who obeys them ceases in that moment to be a Catholic. Can we, then, for a moment imagine that Prince von Bismarck was not aware of this? That he acted in ignorance, or unconsciously, or on misjudgment? That he so little knows the Catholic doctrine and discipline as to expect obedience? He does not desire it. He wished for a pretext, and has made it. Nobody can doubt that he knew to the full extent the violation of conscience and of faith which he was inflicting. These laws can be no otherwise understood than as a deliberate scheme to render it impossible for Catholics to obey, that they might then be accused and dealt with as resisting the authority of the Empire. But in this the astuteness of the German Chancellor has overreached itself. If the Falck legislation had been such as a Catholic could by any subterfuge obey, even though its injury to the Church were never so great, then the nations of Europe might have been misled into condemning the Catholics of Germany as contumacious and refractory.

But at this time not a nation in Europe commends the Falck laws. A handful of strangely-assorted persons about a year ago went on a pilgrimage to offer their incense to Prince von Bismarck on his penal laws. They were peers and gentlemen, Free Kirk men and Liberals, and the preachers of 'our glorious Revolution' and of civil and religious liberty; and now we are in-

formed that the delegates of cities and towns in England are to meet this month, under the presidency of Earl Russell, to express sympathy with Prince von Bismarck in his persecution of Catholics and in his violation of religious liberties; which, for half a century, has been the special political cry of the noble Earl. We are a paradoxical people, and somewhat too reckless of what the outside world may think of our political incoherencies.

But it is well to see how we are regarded from without. M. de Pressensé, a Frenchman and a Protestant, in denouncing the Prussian persecution, has given to Englishmen a warning which I hope will not be lost upon us. In last May, after detailing the injustice of the ecclesiastical legislation of Prussia, he added:

'That which is more grave is that (public) opinion is misled even in countries which, like England, are the classic land of religious liberty. The religious policy of the German Emperor receives in England congratulations which we must be permitted to look upon as scandalous. We know that the English Parliament would not allow any one of the laws passed at Berlin to be so much as discussed: but it is not right to applaud that which we would not do. We ought more than ever to rise above sectarian passions, and to remind ourselves that the persecution which strikes our religious adversaries strikes that which is our common good, and our sole guarantee in the conflict of ideas and beliefs—I mean, the liberty of conscience.'[15]

We have now traced in outline the three Cæsarisms —the Pagan Cæsarism, the Christian, and the modern,

[15] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Mai 1873.

which I must describe as the Cæsarism of the last age of civil power lapsing or lapsed from Christianity. But it is more than time to make an end. I hope that I have made clear that Christianity has redeemed man and society from Cæsarism—that is, from the unlimited despotism of man over man—and that so long as the two powers, spiritual and civil, are vested in distinct persons, the liberty of conscience and the liberty of religion, as well as the liberty of man in his public and private life, are secured; that wheresoever the civil power or Sovereign usurps upon the spiritual liberty of the Church, and affects to exercise a supremacy over it, all liberties are at stake—the liberty of conscience, the liberty of religion, the domestic liberty of families, and the political liberty of citizens. Under Cæsarism all kinds of freedom alike are violated.

The natural antagonist of Cæsarism is the Christian Church, with all its liberties of doctrine and discipline, of faith and jurisdiction; and the vindication of these liberties of the Church in their highest and most sacred form is Ultramontanism. Therefore the world hates it. Therefore it now rails against it in all its tones and with all its tongues. 'Divus Cæsar' and 'Vicarius Christi' are two persons and two powers and two systems, between which there can be not only no peace, but no truce. They have contended for eighteen hundred years. In Germany they are locked once more in conflict. The issue is certain. The same who has always conquered will conquer again. Where, now, are the Emperors of Rome, Germany, and France? But Peter is still in his See, and Peter now is Pius IX.

V.

ULTRAMONTANISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

ULTRAMONTANISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

I took up Mr. Stephen's article on Cæsarism and Ultramontanism with a full hope of finding all that could be said for the former, and against the latter, urged with the close reasoning of which I have always believed the author to be a master. I laid it down with a feeling of disappointment. The case argued is not mine. The whole issue has been changed. The title ought to have been 'Faith and Doubt.' This is the sum of the argument. 'Ultramontanism is untenable, because Christianity cannot be proved to be true;' or, again, 'Ultramontanism cannot be proved to be true, because we cannot be certain of the existence of God.' The whole article is a profuse verification of a sentence in the essay under attack, in which I said: 'No man can deny that the authority of the Church is separate from all civil powers, and within its own spiritual sphere supreme, without renouncing his Christian name, or the coherence of his reason.' In this the article before us is not incoherent, and Mr. Stephen admits that, granting Christianity to be a Divine Revelation, and the Church to be a Divine institution, he does not see how he could stop short of my conclusions (p. 510).

He then proceeds to say that, so far from Chris-

tianity being proved to be true, even the existence of God is not certain: that the arguments of Locke, Clarke, Butler, Pascal, and Dr. Newman fail to prove it. He says: 'We have all great want of light and knowledge about the nature of the world in which we live, and what is to follow it. We are all impelled to dwell upon the questions—What? Whence? Whither?' (p. 503.) He says 'that the existence of God is probable enough to supply to men a motive to a virtuous life, but is not so established as to serve as a foundation for inferences about any particular event or institution' (p. 504). He then proceeds thus: 'What is necessary for me to say is, that the truth of the history of Jesus Christ is not proved beyond all reasonable doubt as against ordinary men of the world, on whom the clergy are trying to force their yoke on the strength of it' (p. 510). Mr. Stephen then goes on to consider the evidence of the truth 'of the history of Jesus Christ as given in the Apostles' Creed.' He believes, 'supposing the universe to be the work of a Being having consciousness, will, and power, that such a Being would be able to raise the dead;' also, 'assuming that Jesus Christ did actually live, die, rise, and ascend into heaven after working miracles, it would be rational to believe Him;' and that it would be 'probable that He would know more about God and a future state than other people' (p. 511); that he can imagine 'evidence which would put these things beyond reasonable doubt.' But he adds that of the witnesses of these facts, 'most were not original witnesses' (p. 514); that they had only 'hearsay;' that the vision on the way to Damascus is not easily dis-

tinguishable from the delusions of sunstroke' (p. 515); that as to the four Gospels, 'the state of things is as if in the year 3800, the principal authorities as to the life of Napoleon Bonaparte were four popular biographies written in English somewhere about the present time, and quoting no authorities' (p. 515). Much more of the same kind on the articles of the Apostles' Creed I gladly pass over, and come to the conclusion. Mr. Stephen proceeds: 'Upon the whole it appears to me that ordinary men of the world both may and ought to say to Archbishop Manning, as I do, "You have entirely failed to make out any sort of claim to be my spiritual master. . . . The fundamental principle upon which your whole system depends is based upon arguments which the limitation of human knowledge considerably weakens. The history which you next appeal to rests upon hearsay evidence which can no longer be tested, though innumerable points in it show the necessity of further inquiry or of continued doubt"' (pp. 525, 526). I have here collected what may be called the serious argument of the article, for I cannot believe that Mr. Stephen's excursions to Bellarmine and the *Arabian Nights*, the Limbus Patrum and the imaginary jury, the black man and the fishes, winding up with the wit of undergraduates about Moses and the whale, were intended for argument. When a writer has declared that Christianity is not yet proved to be true, and that the existence of God is doubtful, I think I may postpone my answer as to what I believe of infants dying without baptism. My answer cannot appreciably affect the thesis before us. I have, indeed, very explicitly given

my answer to this question, publicly and in print, but to repeat it here and now would break the line of what I have to say. I fully acknowledge that I cannot render Ultramontanism credible to any mind that does not believe the articles of the Apostles' Creed; nor can I hope to render Christianity credible to any mind that is not convinced of the existence of God. The article before us is of great value. It reveals the position of a small number of minds among us. They are convinced that what they think is the opinion of their age. The more confidently they believe it themselves, the more confidently they believe others must think as they do.

This comes out somewhat amusingly in two sentences. 'The Church is simply a collective name for a number of *not very wise laymen*, superintended by clergymen who differ from the ordinary Anglican clergy principally in the colour of their spiritual veneering' (p. 526). Ten lines lower we read, 'I am entitled to appeal to the general conduct of the *lay world* as a plain proof that *mine* are the views usually entertained by *laymen*.' The lay world is thus divided into 'not very wise laymen,' and 'laymen who hold my views.' They, if not very wise, at least are wise. *Sapiunt quia sentiunt mecum*. This does not seem to me powerful or consecutive as reasoning. And when I recall to mind the belief of Englishmen in the Christian Revelation, and in the existence of God, it does not seem to me to be a true estimate of the laymen of the Church of England, or of the Established Kirk or of the Free Kirk of Scotland, or of the Nonconformists in either country. I hope I have said nothing disrespectful to

Mr. Stephen, for whom I entertain a true regard. It will not, I hope, give him pain if I add how well I am aware that to him Ultramontanism must be foolishness if, indeed, I am right in affirming Ultramontanism to be Christianity.

Although I cannot think that I shall be expected to enter upon the question whether God exists or no, as a necessary condition to the discussion of Ultramontanism, I cannot refrain from making certain remarks on Mr. Stephen's argument.

First, I am glad to see that he justly and truly appreciates the nature of the evidence which is to be expected or required for proving the existence of God. He says, 'I should not require a mathematical demonstration' (p. 503). It was probably, therefore, a slip of the pen when he wrote that I am not entitled to affirm the existence of God unless I affirm it as I would the proposition, 'two straight lines cannot enclose a space' (p. 504).

Secondly, I am not sure that I understand Mr. Stephen's comment on Bishop Butler's letter to Clarke, in reference to the book on the *Demonstration of the Being of God*. Does Mr. Stephen mean that Bishop Butler expressed himself to be in doubt as to the sufficiency of the proof for the existence of God? Butler says only that he cannot make up his mind to affirm that the proof is *demonstrative*. That he held the proof to be *certain* is beyond all question. He doubted only whether it reached the character of demonstration. We in England have affixed to the word *demonstration* a technical and second intention. We confine it to such

proofs as science, properly so called, can afford. Clarke used the word in its larger sense, as other languages of Latin origin are wont to do; intending to affirm that the moral certainty of the existence of God amounts to demonstration. It does, indeed, amount to a certainty beyond all doubt. But it cannot be stated in terms which involve the intrinsic impossibility of conceiving its contradictory, as in the propositions that 'two parallel lines can never meet,' 'the whole is greater than a part,' and the like. It was of this only that I understand Bishop Butler to hesitate.

Thirdly, it seems to me that Mr. Stephen has failed to state correctly the method of proving the Divine origin of Christianity and the Divine foundation of the Church.

He has treated it as a question of evidence from Scripture. Surely it is a question of facts. The documents of the New Testament may be offered in proof at a certain stage of the argument; but assuredly not at the outset.

Again, Mr. Stephen writes as if the *onus* of proving Christianity to be true rests upon us who believe it. But surely at this time of day the *onus* of proving it to be false or to be doubtful rests upon those who refuse to believe it. Meanwhile, *Securus judicat orbis terrarum*. The Christian world is in possession. It is a fact which must be accounted for before Christianity can be rejected. It is a visible fact, as palpable as the British Empire. It is a fact in history which can be traced up to its foundation. As the British Empire has its succession of sovereigns, its unwritten

and written laws, its legislature and its tribunals, its customs and traditions of public and private life, its documents and records: so has the Christian Church, more widely known, more profuse in evidence, more open to every kind of test. Like the British Empire, the Church has a corporate identity and living consciousness which are traceable up to the time of its Founder. Its account of itself rests upon a history which cannot be rejected without shaking all evidence, except the personal eye-witness and ear-witness of each man for himself. If we were to believe nothing but what we have seen, heard, and touched, the human mind would dwell in a blank isolation. The Divine origin of the Christian Church rests upon a history which cannot be shaken without shaking the foundations of all moral certainty. It rests upon a legitimate authority of direct evidence, the most explicit and uninterrupted to be found in all history. It claims our belief on the maximum of historical certainty. If its history is not to be believed, all history would be shaken.

S. Augustin says: 'Si auferatur hæc fides de rebus humanis, quis non attendat quanta rerum perturbatio, quam horrenda confusio subsequeretur' (*De Fide*, cap. 2, n. 4).

And Grotius: 'Pro rerum diversitate, diversa quoque sunt probandi genera. Alia in mathematicis, alia de affectionibus corporum, alia circa deliberationes, alia ubi facti est quæstio: in quo genere standum est nulla suspicione laborantibus testimoniis; quod nisi admittitur non modo omnis historiæ usus perit, medicinæ quoque pars magna, sed et omnis quæ inter parentes

liberosque est pietas, ut quos haud aliter noscamus' (*De Verit. Relig. Christ.* lib. ii. c. 29).

I use authority here, not in its official or jurisdictional sense, but in its etymological sense, for the motive of our belief or source of evidence. No witnesses have authority but those who are competent and veracious. All incompetent and unveracious witnesses are excluded as illegitimate, because wanting in the properties necessary for evidence. But the common sense and common lot of mankind compel us to believe much upon authority.

The whole formation of the human mind, *ante usum rationis*, is by necessity on authority, which is legitimate both by parental duty and by competence of reason.

The scientific knowledge of almost all men is received on authority.

The whole practice of medicine and surgery exacts submission to authority.

The whole historical knowledge of men rests upon two authorities which do not corroborate each other: first, on the authority of historical monuments and documents; and next, upon the authority of the historical critic.

This is no small tax on our submission, or credulity; and if we were not free to disbelieve every word of it, and if the value of a halfpenny or the slightest civil privilege depended upon it, we should perhaps rise against it. And yet to reject the authority of human history would be an irrational act, unworthy of reasonable men.

But why? Because its authority is measured by its evidence: because if the writers who give testimony to facts of the past be competent and veracious, they have a claim to be believed: above all, if they were eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses of the facts they relate. They have then the highest certainty of sense and reason for what they record.

To affect to doubt the credibility of human history is the work of reckless or senseless men; it is to ruin the traditional basis of right, and law, and contracts, and moral obligations, and loyalty, and authority in the commonwealth and in human life.

For the truths of the natural order, which are the proper objects of moral and metaphysical philosophy, we have the legitimate authority of the monuments and documents of the old world; which testify to us the belief of mankind in the existence and nature of God, of the human soul, and of the primary distinctions of morality. This *communis consensus* is an authority sufficient to demand my attention. It is also a criterion whereby to distinguish these uniform and universal truths from the local partial idiosyncratic opinions of men or of ages. And yet though this be a *rule*, it is not the *motive* of my belief. I believe these truths on their own intrinsic evidence, which manifests them to my reason; and my reason reflecting on itself verifies the conformity of its own acts with these truths, and thereby generates in my reason a certainty which excludes the hesitations of probability and the entrance of doubt.

Again, the visible fact of the Christian world pro-

poses to my reason the maximum of evidence for the events upon which it rests. That evidence is the evidence of eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses. It is a part of their autobiography; their testimony was an adequate motive of credibility to those who heard them; the expansion of that testimony throughout the world, and its continuity through all ages, if it has not added to the *intrinsic* certainty of the facts, has in no way lessened it. But it has proportionally increased the *extrinsic* evidence by way of corroboration and accumulation, reaching up to the moment of the facts alleged. I affirm, therefore, that this authority is both competent and veracious, and for that reason legitimate; and that its action upon the human intellect is not by way of imperious command, but of the proposition of evidence. It comes and speaks to us clothed with the evidence of its testimony.

Authority is, therefore, not an imperious act substituting command for reason, *Sic volo sic jubeo stet pro ratione voluntas:* but it is reason and evidence speaking by a legitimate voice. Authority and evidence are thereby identical and convertible.

Bishop Butler has pointed out that the proof of Christianity does not rest wholly upon the probative force of particular evidences, but also upon the *cumulus* of a multitude of proofs and probabilities which amounts to moral certainty. He says: 'Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things reaching as it seems from the beginning of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the collateral proofs, and making up all

of them together one argument; the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be compared to what they call *the effect* in architecture or other works of art; a result from a great number of things so and so disposed, and taken into one view.'[1]

Again, he says: 'Admitting the fact that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion; the same account may be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible, surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men's own fault, it deserves their most serious consideration whether it be not so. However, it is certain that doubting implies a degree of evidence for that of which we doubt; and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under obligation as demonstrative evidence.'[2]

Now though I have not called upon Mr. Stephen to admit my claim to be 'his spiritual master,' on the arguments offered in the essay on Cæsarism and Ultramontanism, I fully admit that I have bound myself to justify my assertions that the Church is separate from all civil powers, and within its own sphere supreme. This is my thesis, and this has been attacked. This I am in duty bound to defend, and with this only I have now to do. If the Lord Chief Justice had delayed judgment the other day until counsel had argued the Mosaic cosmogony, the lawful heir of the Tichborne estates would still be long kept out of his rights. I will not, then, be captured by the temptation to discuss even the

[1] *Analogy*, part ii. chap. vii.
[2] Ibid., conclusion.

existence of God, though I admit it to be fundamental, not only to Ultramontanism, but to the civilisation of man; and that because in this present contention it is so remote as to be irrelevant.

I am addressing those who believe Christianity to be a Divine Revelation.

I will therefore dismiss from this contention the two first of Mr. Stephen's four theses, namely:

1. There is a God.

2. The historical statements of the Apostles' Creed are all true in fact, and amount to an account of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ.

And I accept as a duty the maintenance of the third and fourth:

3. Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution and powers which I claim for my Church.

4. My Church is the Church so established.

For the present I will confine myself to the third thesis.

And in proof of this I will offer in this article only the evidence of non-Catholic witnesses.

The point we have in hand is this, that the Church is separate and supreme.

I. The Established Church of England affirms to this day, in its whole ecclesiastical law and by the teaching of its highest authorities, that the Church of Jesus Christ is a society separate in its spiritual constitution from all civil powers, and within its own sphere of doctrine and discipline supreme. In making this assertion I shall not be misunderstood to mean that the Established Church has preserved its spiritual supre-

macy in doctrine and discipline. I may refer to the first essay in a volume lately published, in which I have expressly shown that the change effected by the 24 and 25 of Henry VIII. has reduced its spiritual powers to subjection. Nevertheless the spiritual supremacy in doctrine and discipline is in *theory* explicitly recognised in the very statutes by which in practice it has been suspended. The claim pretended by constitutional lawyers from Lord Coke downwards, that the Acts of Henry VIII. did not create any new jurisdiction in the Crown, but only restored its ancient supremacy, is enough alone to prove this point. No man of ordinary knowledge will pretend that the Catholic Church in England prior to Henry VIII. was not in perfect communion of doctrine and discipline with the Church throughout the world; and no man will venture to say, with S. Gregory VII. and S. Thomas of Canterbury before his eyes, that the Catholic Church did not claim and vindicate to itself its spiritual supremacy in faith and morals. If anybody has doubts as to the independence and spiritual supremacy within its own sphere of the Church of England from its first foundation, I may refer to the essay already mentioned, and to such works as Spelman's *Councils*, Wilkins' *Concilia*, and the collections of Mr. Haddan and Mr. Stubbs. The doctrine cannot be better summed up than in the following passages. Of the Anglican Councils, after speaking of the provincial and diocesan synods, &c., Mr. Wilkins says:

'Besides these councils in the time of the Anglo-Saxons, convened for the affairs of the commonwealth, there met also synods

of the clergy, in which the bishops as ecclesiastical judges presided, and promulgated rules and statutes in matters purely ecclesiastical. And if at any time during the session of the civic councils there were any urgent necessity to treat of ecclesiastical questions, the bishops used to withdraw from the convention of the State to an ecclesiastical synod, to decide on points affecting the welfare of the Church; and their decrees sometimes received the assent of Parliament, and in this manner acquired the authority of the laws of the kingdom, in addition to their force as the canons of the Church.

To these synodical assemblies of the Saxon times we must add other ecclesiastical councils, which, so long as they had no civil character, were held at the summons of the archbishop, by the suffragan bishop and prelates. The kings with their nobles attended them *by invitation;* and such of their proceedings as they approved obtained the royal assent. If any ecclesiastical canons were made in synod in the king's absence, they were enjoined on the whole Anglican clergy by the decree of the custos and nobles of the kingdom and the king's counsellors in the next convention. None of the determinations of the ecclesiastical councils were regarded as *public statutes* unless approved and confirmed by the supreme power of the sovereign.'

After the Conquest, Wilkins says:

'When ecclesiastical matters were to be treated, the legate of the Pope, or the archbishop, with the consent, sometimes by the order, of the king, caused a mandate for the holding of a synod to be published, the meeting of which mostly coincided with the state assemblies or festivals, so that the king might be present to conduct the proceedings, and either restrain or confirm them. In the king's absence abroad, the archbishop had from him authority to convene the bishops and prelates, even when the great councils were not held' (Wilkins' *Dissertatio de veteri et moderna Synodi Anglicanæ constitutione*, viii., prefixed to the *Concilia*).

Johnson's account is as follows:

'During the time of our Saxon and even Danish kings, the bishops were in full possession of the power of making as well as executing canons; nor does it appear that they ever abused it to the hurt of civil government. Our kings were so far from apprehending any mischief from ecclesiastical synods, or from send-

ing their prohibitions to them, that they often honoured these assemblies with the presence of themselves and their nobility, without interposing in their debates or giving any stop or impediment to their definitions. The Norman princes never attempted to diminish or interrupt the archbishop's ancient right and practice of assembling synods, and making such canons and ecclesiastical provisions as were deemed necessary or seasonable. But after the Pope had set himself up for sovereign in *temporals* as well as spirituals, and in order to exercise this sovereignty had introduced his canon law into all nations that were in communion with him, and had a number of men in every country ready to execute his will and pleasure, in opposition to the *civil* government, and to its great detriment, our kings saw it necessary to check the arrogance of the Pope, and his creatures here in England, by sending prohibition to the bishops in their synods (that they might make no canons to *the injury of the king's prerogative* and of the civil constitution) and in their courts, that they might put no such canon in execution. . . . But still the authority of enacting canons and constitutions in matters merely *spiritual*, and the cognisance of such causes, remained untouched, entirely in the hands of the convocation as to the *enactive* part, and of the prelates as to the *executive*.

Though the Saxon bishops had an unlimited power of making canons, yet we have many laws relating to matters merely spiritual enacted by kings in their great councils or civil gemotes. This may seem to some to have been an intrenchment on the authority of the bishops. To this it has been answered that the bishops, without whom no great council was held, retired into a place by themselves in order to draw up and enact laws relating to religion, as was the practice in some neighbouring countries. And I will not deny that this might sometimes be done. Yet when I see here and there an ecclesiastical law interspersed among a great number of such as are purely temporal, at other times almost an equal number of ecclesiastical and civil laws mutually succeeding each other in the same system, at other times two or three ecclesiastical laws dropped into a set of temporal, and *vice versâ*, temporal among ecclesiastical,—I am inclined to believe that both sorts of laws were made by an amicable conjunction of both powers. *In truth the old Saxon laws and English statutes made in relation to the Church were in effect only civil sanctions of old canons or grants made to the Church of some civil privileges* which she enjoyed not before, or a reinforcement of such grant with penalties annexed; and there could be no

reason why the bishops and clergy should not accept the assistance of kings and great men for these purposes. . . . I do not remember a single instance of a law (before the Conquest) but what any bishop upon the principles of that age might fairly consent to, and no law relating to the Church or religion but what may justly be thought to have been promoted, if not postulated, by the prelates. And I take the Articles of Clarendon (A.D. 1164) to be the first instance in our history of making laws that bishops did not care to sign' (Johnson's *Ecclesiastical Laws*, part i. Preface, xxiii. xxiv.).

I have given these quotations in full, because they will afford the best prelude and exposition of the celebrated Act of 24 Henry VIII., by which religion in England has been made to depend upon the civil power. We have seen that the Church in England was from the first recognised as a spiritual society of Divine foundation, invested with Divine authority, both legislative and judicial, independent of all civil powers, and in matters of doctrine and spiritual discipline supreme. The frequent violations of this Divine authority, and the royal customs which usurped upon this independence, are simple violations and usurpations, which in no way extinguish or annul the Divine rights and powers of the Church. The encroachments of the royal power were ever advancing from the Conquest to the reign of Henry VIII. In the reign of Henry II. they were checked and thrown back for a while by the martyrdom of S. Thomas of Canterbury. Afterwards they revived again and gathered strength, and at last grew to a head in the reign of Henry VIII., under the form and title of the Royal Supremacy. Nevertheless it will be found that in theory the Divine foundation, authority, rights, powers, and office of the Church both in doctrine and discipline were still recognised in the

fatal statute which rent England from the Catholic faith and unity. The preamble of the 24 of Henry VIII. runs as follows:

'Whereby divers sundry and authentick Histories and Chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed, that this realm of England is an Empire, and so hath been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme Head and King, having Dignity and Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of the same: Unto whom a Body politick, compact of all sorts and degrees of people, divided in terms and by names of Spirituality and Temporality, been bounden and owen to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience: He being also institute and furnished, by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God, with plenary whole and entire Power, Pre-eminence, Authority, Prerogative, and Jurisdiction, to render and yield Justice and final determination to all manner of folk, resiants or subjects within this his Realm, in all Causes, Matters, Debates and Contentions happening to occur, insurge or begin within the limits thereof, without restraint or provocation to any foreign Princes or Potentates of the World: The Body Spiritual whereof having power, when any cause of the Law Divine happened to come in question, or of Spiritual Learning, that it was declared, interpreted and shewed by that part of the Body politick called the Spirituality, now being usually called the English Church.'[3]

The preamble affirms the following points:

1. That the realm of England has only one supreme head and king.

2. That the body politic subject to that supreme head is divided into spiritualty and temporalty.

3. That the body spiritual has power, when any cause of the law divine or of spiritual learning should come in question, to declare and interpret, and that part of the body politic called the spiritualty was called usually the English Church.

[3] 'On the Spiritual Jurisdiction of the Church of England, 24 Henry VIII. cap. 12: For the Restraint of Appeals;' Gibson's *Codex*, ol. ii. p. 924 (Oxford, 1761).

The effect, therefore, of this statute was, as its title declares, to restrain appeals by excluding all authority of the Holy See. As regards, indeed, the universal Church, this statute violates both unity and faith: but as regards the constitution of the local Church in England it made no organic change. The two provinces of Canterbury and York, with their spiritual jurisdiction, tribunals, and judges for doctrine and for discipline, remained as before. They were, however, paralysed and annulled by the erection of an appellate jurisdiction higher than the Court of the Metropolitan, and vested in the Crown. Against this it was, among other things, that S. Thomas of Canterbury contended to the death. One of the Constitutions of Clarendon runs as follows: 'Ab archidiacono debebit procedi ad episcopum, ab episcopo, ad archiepiscopum, et si archiepiscopus defuerit in justicia exhibenda ad Dominum Regem perveniendum est postremo.' The jurisdiction and tribunals of Archdeacons, Bishops, and Archbishops in both cases were left intact, though they might be annulled in the last resort; but even in this case, as we shall see hereafter, it has been done, not by denying the spiritual rights and powers of the Church, but under the plea of reviewing and correcting the forms of procedure. Throughout the whole of the Tudor legislation, notwithstanding the encroachments of the Crown and Parliament, and the actual violations of liberties and office of the Church, its Divine constitution, rights and powers, synods and tribunals, for doctrine and for discipline, were always explicitly recognised and professedly respected. I can hardly think it necessary to load this

article with quotations in proof of this assertion. The members of the Anglican Church will certainly not require it, excepting those only who represent the small Erastian school, which has always existed in it. It may nevertheless be as well to show in what language the highest authorities of the Anglican Church have spoken in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, on the Divine authority of the Church, its unbroken succession, the powers of the keys and of ordination, the deposit of the faith, and the teaching and judicial office of the Church.

Bishop Bilson says, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth:

'The Apostles' charge to teach, baptise, and administer the Lord's Supper, to bind and loose sinners in heaven and in earth, to impose hands for the ordaining pastors and elders: these parts of the apostolic function and charge are not decayed and cannot be wanting in the Church of God. There must either be no Church, or else these must remain; for without these no Church can continue.'[4]

In the same manner Hooker says:

'In that they are Christ's ambassadors and His labourers, who should give them their commission, but He whose most inward affairs they manage? Is not God alone the Father of spirits? Are not souls the purchase of Jesus Christ? What angel in heaven could have said to man, as our Lord did unto Peter, Feed My sheep; preach, baptise; do this in remembrance of Me; whose sins ye retain they are retained, and their offences in heaven pardoned whose faults you shall on earth forgive?'[5]

Jeremy Taylor says:

'If Antichrist shall exalt himself above all that is called God,

[4] Bilson, *Perpetual Government of Christ's Church*, chap. ix. p. 156, Oxford edition, 1842.

[5] Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, book v. sect. 77.

and in Scripture none but kings and priests are such—*Dii vocati, Dii facti*—I think we have great reason to be suspicious that he that divests both of their power . . . does the work of Antichrist for him . . . especially . . . if the discipline or government which Christ hath instituted is that kingdom by which He governs all Christendom . . . when they . . . throw Christ out of His kingdom.' [6]

Bishop Beveridge, speaking of the succession of Bishops, says: 'By which means the same Spirit which was breathed by our Lord into His Apostles is together with their office transmitted to their lawful successors the pastors and governors of our Church at this time; and acts, moves, and assists at the administration of the several parts of the Apostolic office in our days as much as ever.'[7]

Almost any amount of quotations might be added from Andrewes, Hall, Laud, Bramhall, Hammond, Pearson, and a host of others. I will, however, add but one more witness, and that because his language is identical with that which is to be found in 'Cæsarism and Ultramontanism.' In the midst of the controversy between Atterbury and Wake and Kennet, on the subject of the Royal Supremacy and the independence of the Church, Leslie, one of the best defenders of the Church of England, writes thus:

'I intend not to interpose in this dispute; only this use I have to make of it, that both parties do now happily agree in the original and inherent rights of the Church as a society *distinct* from and *independent* upon the State, even when the State is Christian. This Dr. Kennet does frankly declare to be the chief end that moved him to write his book, viz. "to assert the nature of the Christian Church as a society endowed with fundamental

[6] *Taylor on Episcopacy*, Introduction.
[7] Beveridge, *Sermon on Christ's Presence.*

rights to preserve its own being; and among these a right for the governors to assemble and agree upon the common measures of faith and unity as at first independent on the heathen, so even now on the Christian magistrate, when the necessities of desertion or persecution so require." The Christian Church was endowed as a society, with a Divine right of preserving the faith and securing the discipline that should be necessary to hinder the gates of hell from prevailing against her. In order to this end the Church governors had authority to meet and consult upon all urgent affairs.'

Leslie says that Kennet quarrels with Atterbury, because

'He claims no Divine right; he quotes not one text for the Divine right of councils . . . he proposes no one reason for the necessity of such an inherent and original power in the Church: he does not labour to prove that Christian magistrates cannot retract nor a national clergy recede from antecedent rights; he waives the Christian, and acts only the Englishman. I am sorry the Church of England has come to that pass, that to assert her only rights is to waive the Christian. Have not our laws confirmed to her all the rights belonging to a Christian Church? if not, sure they should be mended.'

I may say that Leslie's whole work, from beginning to end, affirms as the doctrine of the Established Church of England, that the Christian Church, and the Church of England as a part of it, is a society separate from all civil powers, and in the exercise of its spiritual office in doctrine and discipline independent and supreme. I will therefore add only a few more passages:

'If the independence of the Church not only on heathen but Christian magistrates be an original, inherent, and Divine right, with which Christ has invested her, it ought always to be maintained; good princes will be most willing to allow it, but if granted to them others will not part with it; nor will they endure to have their encroachments on the rights of the Church called either persecution or desertion; and they will always find time-servers and flatterers to support them in it.'

He says it is the duty of bishops and priests

'To tell them [civil rulers], and not to fear they will be displeased at it, that Christ is *above them*, and His Church too, and *independent* on them: that they themselves are part of her flock, and so *subject* to her discipline, and in that capacity as well as any other, though entirely and without reserve, subject to them in all temporals.'

'Again, if bishops will not exercise that power which Christ has given them, they are accountable to their Lord for it: but they cannot give it away neither from themselves nor from their successors, for it is theirs only to use, not to part with.' . . .

'This makes short work with the submission: let lawyers, therefore, look to it, how they can reconcile it with this great and fundamental truth; if not, then down it must come. The bishops are no ways concerned: let them try whether any judge in Westminster Hall will hold up an Act of Parliament against the Gospel, or say that they are more proper judges of the Gospel than the bishops. Let Erastus show his face without a vizard; it is the only way to overthrow him effectually. You need not be afraid that any Christian will fall in love with him. But if the bishops will submit themselves to his yoke, who can speak in their defence? Some would let them go, if religion did not go with them; and that is the reason why others would have them gone. They find the keys of their discipline hung at the belt of Erastus; and some would persuade them that it is best so, lest Pharaoh increase their burdens; and that to think of a deliverance is to put a sword in his hand to slay us!'[8]

There is nothing contained in the essay of 'Cæsarism and Ultramontanism' more explicit than these passages. They assert the Divine foundation, the Divine authority, the Divine office of the Church in doctrine and discipline, its judicial office by the power of the keys, its independence of the State, and its ultimate and supreme power in the sphere of spiritual things over all civil powers, as abundantly and as precisely as I have done. The re-

[8] Leslie, 'Preface to the Case of the Regale and Pontificale;' *Works*, vol. iii. (Oxford, 1832).

lation of the Established Church to the Crown and civil power has always been justified in the following, or in similar terms. They have said:

'1. It is an article of our Baptismal Faith that the Church of Christ is a Divine Kingdom; in this world, but not of it; governed by its Divine Head through the Pastors whom He has lineally commissioned to feed His flock; that to His Church He intrusted the custody of the Faith and Holy Sacraments—or, as we say, of doctrine and discipline—with full spiritual power to administer and to rule in all things pertaining to the salvation of souls, by His authority and in His Name. For the perpetuity of the Church, and for the preservation of the truth, He has pledged His own perpetual presence and the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

'From all which revealed promises and principles of His Divine Kingdom it follows that the Church, in all things relating to the custody of doctrine and discipline, possesses a sole, supreme, and final power, under the guidance of its Divine Head, and responsible to Him only.

'2. And further, we believe that the Church in England, as a member or province of this Divine Kingdom, possesses *in solidum*, by inherence and participation in the whole Church, the inheritance of the Divine tradition of faith, with a share in this full and supreme custody of doctrine and power of discipline, partaking for support and perpetuity, in its measure and sphere, the same guidance as the whole Church at large, of which, by our Baptism, we have been made members.

'3. The Church in England, then, being thus an

integral whole, possesses within itself the fountain of doctrine and discipline, and has no need to go beyond itself for succession, orders, mission, jurisdiction, and the office to declare to its own members, in matters of faith, the intention of the Catholic Church. On this ground alone the present relation of the Church in England to the Church of the East and of the West can be justified. We trust that the spiritual organisation of the Church, which, through Saxon, Norman, and English periods of our history, has united this great Christian people, surviving through all perils and mutilations, contains still within itself the whole doctrine and discipline, the faith and power descending from its Divine Head.

'So far from exalting the insular position of the Church in England into a normal state, we lament the unhappy suspension of communion which divides the visible Church of Christ. But we trust that as, in the period of the great Western schism, the Churches of Spain, France, Germany, and many others were compelled to fall back within their own limits, and to rest upon the full and integral power which by succession they possessed for their own internal government; so the Church in England has continued to be a perfect member of this Divine Kingdom, endowed with all that is of necessity to the valid ministry of the Faith and Sacraments of Christ.

'On these grounds our chief writers and canonists have rested the defence of the English Church, and it is of vital necessity that the principles of this defence should not be violated.

'4. By this we see at once what is the office and relation of the civil power towards the Church at large, and in England in particular, namely, to protect, uphold, confirm, and further this, its sole, supreme, and final office, in all matters of doctrine and discipline. The joint but independent action of the spiritual and civil powers from our earliest history may be traced through the succession of our Councils and Parliaments —the king expressing and exercising the sum of the civil power, the archbishop of the spiritual,[9] of which joint action the celebrated preamble of the 24th of Henry VIII. 12 is a recital and proof.

'5. The Royal Supremacy is, therefore, strictly and simply a civil or temporal power over all persons and causes in *temporal* things, and over ecclesiastical persons and causes in the *temporal* and *civil accidents* attaching to them. It is in itself in no sense spiritual or ecclesiastical—understanding the word ecclesiastical to mean anything beyond a *civil* power accidentally applied to ecclesiastical persons or causes.

'An Anglican would further add, that he knows of no supremacy in ecclesiastical matters inherent in the civil power or prince, but either (1) such power as all princes, Christian or heathen, alike possess; or (2) such as has been received by delegation from the Church itself.

'As to the first or original prerogative, Constantine, before his conversion, had as full a supremacy as after it; Julian, after his apostasy, had no less. S. Augustin says: "Qui Augusto imperium dedit ipse et Neroni

[9] Stillingfleet, *Ecclesiastical Cases*, vol. ii. p. 91.

. . . qui Constantino Christiano ipse Apostatæ Juliano."[10] The supremacy was simply a supreme dominion of power and coercion by the civil sword.

'As to the derived or delegated supremacy, it amounts to no more than a supreme power over all the forms and processes in which the *coercive* jurisdiction of the Church in Christian States has been clothed. It is neither legislative nor judicial by way of *discretion* or *determination*[11] in any matter relating to the faith or discipline of the Church.'

If I were to object to such an Anglican argument, that the Convocations and tribunals of the Established Church have been again and again violently overborne by the Crown and Parliament, or by the Crown in Council, as, for instance, in the decisions in the case of Mr. Gorham and in the case of the *Essays and Reviews*, it might be said that violence does not make law; and that though the Established Church suffers the intrusion of false doctrines, that does not alter its spiritual office; and, moreover, that the judges of the Privy Council recognise that spiritual office by expressly declaring that they are incompetent to judge as to the *truth* of any doctrine, and use their jurisdiction only to inquire what doctrines may *legally* be held and taught by the clergy of the Established Church. It is not my purpose now to point out the reach and bearing of this answer in relation to Catholic truth and unity.

[10] S. Aug., *De Civit. Dei*, lib. v. c. 21.

[11] Beveridge, *Synodicon Prolegomena*, tom. i. p. 11: 'Leges civiles non præcedere debent sed sequi ecclesiasticas.'

I adduce it only to show that theoretically the law of England at this moment recognises the spiritual office of the Church, and its exclusive competence in determining the truth of doctrine, and therein of judging whether and when its spiritual office and its doctrines are invaded. It was therefore strictly accurate to say, as I have said, that the Established Church of England affirms as broadly as I did that the Christian Church is separate from all civil powers, and within its own spiritual sphere superior to them. It was, I believe, a profound consciousness of this truth which caused the conspicuous absence of the Anglican clergy from the late meetings at St. James's Hall and Exeter Hall. Self-respect made it impossible for them to take part in stirring up a No-Popery cry, and the consciousness that the Falck laws are a tyrannous violation of the Divine constitution and office of the Church, as they themselves believe it, restrained them both in conscience and in justice from countenancing the outrages and persecution of the Prussian Government.

In thus drawing out the historical and legal theory of the Established Church in its relations to the civil power, I do not forget that a large latitudinarian and rationalistic section of its members would in practice refuse its spiritual office and authority. I must, however, affirm that the still larger numbers of its clergy and of its members who hold the theory and principles I have here drawn out are the truer representatives of its history and of its legal rights. Still less do I forget the habitual violations of these rights at all times, and in all reigns, for three hundred years. No one in these

days can forget for a moment the appeals to the Crown in Council, and the legalising of false doctrine within the Established Church. These very facts have brought out into greater relief and fuller light the theory and claims of the Established Church as it exists on paper. It has, moreover, spread throughout a large part of its clergy and people a desire of separation from the civil power as the only way of obtaining independence. And lastly, it has called forth from many of the highest and best minds in the Establishment an outspoken declaration that they do not and will not recognise the sentences or judgments or condemnations of the Crown in Council, either as affecting the Anglican Establishment or as binding in any way upon their conscience. Such men, if consistent, may one day form a Free Kirk in England.

II. What has hitherto been proved from the documents of the Established Church in England may be even more easily proved from the documents of the Kirk of Scotland.

'Presbyter is but Priest writ large.'

In the first chapter of the *Second Book of Discipline*, under the title of 'The Kirkis Jurisdiction is of God, and is groundit on the Word,' we read:

'The Kirk . . . has a certain power granted by God, according to the which it uses a proper jurisdiction and government exercised to the comfort of the whole Kirk. This power ecclesiastical is an authority granted by God the Father through the Mediator Jesus Christ unto His Kirk gathered, and having the ground in the Word of God to be put in execution by them, unto whom the spiritual government of the Kirk by lawful calling is committed.

'The policy of the Kirk flowing from this power is an order

or form of spiritual government which is exercised by the members appointed thereto by the Word of God, and therefore is given *immediately* to the office-bearers, by whom it is exercised to the weal of the whole body.'

Under the title 'The difference betwixt the spiritual and civil jurisdiction,' we read:

'This power and policy ecclesiastical is different and distinct in the own nature from that power and policy ecclesiastical which is called the civil power, and appertains to the civil government of the Commonwealth, albeit they be both of God. . . . .

For this power ecclesiastical flows *immediately* from God and the Mediator Jesus Christ, and is spiritual, *not having a temporal head on earth* but only Christ, the only spiritual king and governor of His Kirk.

It is a title falsely usurped by Antichrist to call himself head of the Kirk, and ought not to be attributed to angel or man, of what estate that ever he be, saving to Christ, the only Head and Monarch of the Kirk.

Therefore this power and policy of the Kirk should lean upon the Word *immediately* as the *only* ground thereof, and should be taken from the pure fountains of the Scriptures, *the Kirk hearing the voice of Christ, the only spiritual King*, and being ruled by His laws.

Notwithstanding as the ministers and others of the ecclesiastical estate are subject to the magistrate civil, so ought the person of the magistrate be subject to the Kirk spiritually and ecclesiastical government. And the exercise of both these jurisdictions cannot stand in one person ordinarily. The civil power is called the power of the sword, and the other the power of the keys.

The civil power should command the spiritual to exercise and do their office according to the Word of God: the spiritual rulers should require the Christian magistrate to administer justice and punish vice, and to maintain the liberty and quietness of the Kirk within their bounds.

The magistrate handles external things only and actions done for men; but the spiritual ruler judges both inward affections and external actions in respect of conscience by the Word of God.

The magistrate neither ought to preach, minister the sacra-

ments, nor execute the censures of the Kirk, nor yet *prescribe any rule how it should be done.*

Finally, as ministers are subject to the judgment and punishment of the magistrates in external things if they offend, so ought the magistrates to submit themselves to the discipline of the Church if they transgress in matters of conscience and religion.'

In the third chapter of the *Second Book of Discipline* is prescribed how persons are admitted to ecclesiastical office. Besides the inward calling of God is required the outward calling of the Kirk; and this has two parts—election and ordination. In the election must be the judgment of the eldership and the consent of the congregation. No intrusion contrary to these two conditions is valid.

In the tenth chapter, 'Of the Office of a Christian Magistrate in the Kirk,' Christian princes are said to be

'Holden to advance the Kingdom of Jesus Christ, to be nourishers of the Kirk, to maintain, foster, uphold, and defend it against all hurt. . . . Also to assist and maintain the discipline of the Kirk, and punish them civilly that will not obey the censure of the same, *without confounding always the one jurisdiction with the other.* . . . To make laws and constitutions agreeable to God's Word, for advancement of the Kirk and policy thereof; without usurping anything that pertains not to the civil sword, but belongs to the offices that are merely ecclesiastical, as is the ministry of the Word and Sacraments, using of ecclesiastical discipline and the spiritual execution thereof, or any part of the power of the spiritual keys which our Master gave to the Apostles and their true successors.'

We have here in the amplest terms the separate existence of the spiritual power, its independence, its direct authority derived from its own Head, its supremacy within its own sphere over the civil State and civil rulers, its exclusive power to make spiritual laws, to pronounce spiritual judgments, to elect and ordain its

own ministers, in absolute independence of all persons and powers of the civil State, and its right to invoke the secular arm to enforce by civil process the discipline and the judgments in which it admits neither of appeal nor review.

It would be waste of time to trace out the history of the Kirk since these decrees were made. It gave pretty good evidence of its independence and supremacy in the seventeenth century, when it bound kings in chains and nobles in links of iron. It vindicated these great laws of liberty of conscience by noble histories of suffering unto bonds and death under the persecutions of Charles II.

III. Direct and explicit as the evidence of the Kirk of Scotland is in proof of my assertion, the witness of the Free Kirk is still more decisive. Between the Established Kirk and the Free Kirk there is no particle of difference either in doctrine or discipline; the sole cause of the Disruption was the refusal of the Free Kirk to recognise the jurisdiction of any civil court in the call of ministers. They regarded the acquiescence of the Established Kirk in the claims of the civil courts to be at variance with their duty towards Christ, and fatal to the independence of His Church. On the 18th of May 1843, four hundred and seventy-four ministers, headed by Dr. Chalmers, accompanied by a great body of elders and multitudes of people, separated themselves from the Established Kirk. By that act they revived in all their precision and intensity the principles of spiritual independence and supremacy declared by the *Second Book of Discipline*.

IV. Lastly, it can hardly be necessary to trace the history of what are called the Free Churches of England. They came into existence by a refusal of the Royal Supremacy in religious and ecclesiastical matters. This one principle of spiritual independence and liberty of conscience within the sphere of religion has created the Brownists, the Puritans, the Presbyterians, the Independents, the Baptists, and all Nonconformists of every name. For this one principle for two hundred and fifty years they suffered civil disfranchisement, penalties, imprisonment, capital punishment, exile, contempt, and every form of contumely and privation galling to upright and honourable men. In all these sufferings they had companions, who, though differing from them in the most sacred truths, nevertheless agreed with them in this, that the faith and the Church of Jesus Christ are 'neither of men nor by men, but by the Holy Ghost,' and that the authority of revealed truth is supreme over all civil powers. Nonconformists and Catholics lay bound in the same prisons and suffered on the same scaffold, and, notwithstanding their wide divergence of faith, in this point at least they suffered for the same cause.

It would be easy to go on multiplying historical evidence of what I have affirmed, but I think that enough has been already offered to justify the main assertion, which has caused the criticism of Mr. Stephen. I had said: 'All freedom of soul and conscience, in men, in families, and in States, comes from the limitation of the civil power; but the limitation of the civil power can only come from superior authority.

That superior authority is not in the order of material power, but of Divine right. The limitation which has changed Cæsarism into Christian Monarchy is law; and that law the law of God, represented, expounded, applied upon earth by an authority of His own creation, and by judicial powers of His own delegation.' These words read like a quotation from the *Second Book of Discipline*, or from the Anglican Leslie. There is not a syllable which does not fall within the limits of the Free Kirk of Scotland.

I further affirmed what follows: 'Now what I have here asserted is Ultramontanism, but it is not Ultramontanism alone: it is Christianity as it has been held by all men in all ages, by Catholics and by Protestants alike, by Ultramontanes and Gallicans, by Anglicans and by Presbyterians, by the Free Churches of England, whose noble and pathetic history has just been written on the eve, as I fear, of their apostasy from the high and heroic spirit of their founders and fathers in patience and fidelity to the great law of Christian liberty in Jesus Christ.'

I then added: That Ultramontanism consists

1. In the separation of the two powers (spiritual and civil), and the vesting them in different persons;

2. In claiming for the Church the sole right to define doctrines of faith and morals; and

3. To fix the limits of its own jurisdiction in that sphere.

I affirm, then, once more that these three principles are held by Anglicans, by Presbyterians, by Nonconformists of every name; and, further, that they are of

the substance of Christianity; that no man can deny any one of them without denying the office, and even the existence, of the Christian Church, or without affirming the preposterous and monstrous doctrine that the revelation of Divine truth is to be judged and disposed of by royal mandates, legislative enactments, and civil tribunals, which is the lowest and basest form of Erastianism. *Cujus regio ejus religio.* Surely this is a denial of Revelation altogether. Why not say so at once?

I therefore affirm again that every Christian, who believes that Christianity is a Divine Revelation, must also believe that a Divine Revelation is independent of all civil authorities, and is dependent upon the authority of God alone, whether that Divine authority make itself known by its own action in the isolated conscience of each individual man, or in the assembly of each Christian sect, or in the congregation of a Presbytery, or by the acts of an Episcopate, or by the voice of the Visible Head of the Universal Church. The forms, indeed, are different; the principle is one and the same. The Revelation of God is sustained and promulgated to the world by the authority of God Himself, in independence of all civil authorities, and in supremacy over them all.

This is the claim I have, therefore, made for the Catholic Church, abstracting from all forms of visible order and external polity; and I submit that Mr. Stephen's third thesis is maintained explicitly by the Anglican Establishment, the Established Kirk, the Free Kirk of Scotland, and by all Nonconformists in

both countries: namely, that 'Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution (visible or invisible) and powers which I claim for my Church.' The answer, 'We ought to obey God rather than men,' carries the whole claim of Divine authority.

VI.

CHRISTIANITY AND ANTICHRISTIANISM.

CHRISTIANITY AND ANTICHRISTIANISM.

I LAID down Mr. Stephen's first article on Cæsarism and Ultramontanism with disappointment; I have now read through his second with satisfaction; not, indeed, without regret. It is a still further and ampler confirmation of the assertion in my last paper, that the independence and supremacy of the Christian Church cannot be denied without denying the Christian revelation. Mr. Stephen has again explicitly done this, and in terms which I have no will to repeat.

As I read through his article I noted certain epithets, phrases, and figures of speech which struck me as hardly worthy of a grave subject or usual in educated writers. My first thought was to make a *catena* of them; but when I reached the end I felt that it would give to this article a character of personality. I decided, therefore, to disconnect altogether this manner of writing from the defence of Revelation, and indeed I hope I may say from myself. Nevertheless, though I shall refrain from reference to Mr. Stephen, I shall take in as we go on, and reply to, such of his arguments or assertions as are relevant to the point I have to maintain. Let me, therefore, re-state the purpose I have had in view.

In the essay on Cæsarism I condemned the Falck

laws and justified the resistance of the German Bishops on the ground that the civil power of Prussia had violated the spiritual office and liberty of the Church. Further, I justified this assertion by affirming that the Church has a spiritual authority, independent of all civil powers, and, within its own sphere of faith and morals, supreme. I was met by the charge that this is Ultramontanism. I answered by saying that it is Christianity; that, in this respect, Christianity and Ultramontanism are one and the same; that all Christian Churches, even while they disclaim infallibility, assert the same independence for themselves; that all Christians, even those who deny the institution of a visible Church, assert the same independence and supremacy of revealed truth conveyed to them by some channel or test of Divine certainty. It was, therefore, strictly relevant to bring forward Anglicans, Presbyterians, Free-Kirkmen, and Nonconformists as witnesses. Even these, while they deny infallibility, claim the same spiritual independence of all civil powers, and would regard the Falck laws as violations of religious liberty and of conscience.

For instance, neither the Archbishop of Canterbury, nor the Moderators of the Kirk or of the Free Kirk, nor the President of the Wesleyan Conference, nor any Nonconformist, would ordain or admit to their ministry any man not trained and tested by themselves. None of them would allow the claim of the civil power to decide who ought or who ought not to be excommunicated, or put out of his office as a religious teacher of youth. And this resistance would be offered on one

and the same principle, namely, that the Church visible, or invisible as some of them say, is independent of all civil powers, and in such questions supreme.

It is, therefore, of no use, it is simply irrelevant, to talk of the differences and mutual contradictions of these bodies.

If they be in contention with each other, so much the better for my argument. Multiply their contradictions as you will, you do but strengthen my proof. If, in spite of all contentions, they agree at least in this, then I claim it as a still stronger proof that such points as they hold in common are of the essence of Christianity. But they are also of the essence of Ultramontanism. This answer, then, is clear gain to my thesis.

The *Spectator* of April 4, 1874, has borne a direct testimony to the truth of my main position, namely, that in the claim to be, within the spiritual sphere, separate from all civil powers, and superior to them, Ultramontanism and Christianity are identical. It was for this precise reason that I forbore, in the last article, to quote any Catholic evidence. It was for this also that I widened out the proof from the extremes of Anglicanism to the extreme of Pietism. By this evidence I showed beyond contradiction that, whatsoever be the notions entertained by Christian bodies or sects as to the *form* or *constitution* of the Church, they all alike refuse to receive from the civil powers the definitions of doctrine, or the forms of worship, or the matter of religious belief; thereby declaring that Revelation has a jurisdiction over conscience separate from and superior to all prerogatives of Princes and all legislation of States.

The *Spectator* says that I have taken 'pains to prove what needed no proof, that most Christian Churches have hitherto, whether consistently or inconsistently with their practice, held highly anti-Erastian views, and generally assumed that a certain sort of spiritual infallibility was, somehow or other, within their reach. That is perfectly true, and, as we hold, a very natural mistake for a body, to which a Divine Revelation had been committed, to make.' It is strange that this error should be universal. Whether they all possess it or not, this common belief points to a truth which the *Spectator* has well put in these words: 'Nothing seems more natural *à priori* than that, if God reveals any truth to man, He should take precautions for exactly defining and preserving the truths so revealed—otherwise the revelation would be misunderstood, and, so far as it was misunderstood, would be no revelation.' The *Spectator* adds, that 'we are just beginning to understand that God has *not* done so.'[1] Of this we must speak hereafter.

I am, however, surprised that the thoughtful and candid writer in the *Spectator* should not perceive that the force of the argument is greatly increased by the fact that the same claim is made by every community of Christians 'in the widest possible acceptance of the terms.' To be separate, therefore, from civil powers and to be supreme in matters of faith—for this only, and not *infallibility*, is our present thesis—is not peculiar to Ultramontanism. It is universal in all Christian bodies and sects; all alike claim this independence and

[1] April 4, 1874, p. 442.

supremacy. I repeat this, and insist upon it for an obvious reason. It demonstrates the inconsiderateness or the bad faith of those who are endeavouring to crush Ultramontanism under the mountains of popular odium, suspicion, and Falck laws, on the charge that it claims to be independent of all civil powers, and, in the sphere of faith, supreme. So does every Christian Church, communion, and sect upon earth. Crush them all if you can. Be open and sincere. Cry *Ecrasez l'infâme*. Cry aloud and spare not. Let us know what you are, and we shall know how to meet you. Tell us at once that you are Antichristian. But do not profess to be Christians; do not pretend that you are believers in Christianity, or in a Divine Revelation. Now it was to take the mask off this pretence that I said in the essay which has provoked so much criticism, 'What I have here asserted is Ultramontanism, but it is not Ultramontanism alone; it is Christianity as it has been held by all men, in all ages, by Catholics and Protestants alike' ('Cæsarism and Ultramontanism,' p. 145).

I believe, indeed, that the reckless habit of talking and writing, common at this day, may have betrayed some men who sincerely believe in Christianity into the grave fault of denouncing Ultramontanism, without reflecting that in so doing they are destroying the base of their own Christian belief. But of this I am sure: the journals of the Revolution, which are at this time denouncing Ultramontanism with every form of calumny in all countries, and the foreign correspondents of our own newspapers, who are playing the same game in

England, are, with more or less of consciousness, writing down Christianity. They wish to pull down all Churches, to destroy Christian education, and to efface the Christian name. My purpose, then, has been to divide the camps; to show that the Christian Church claims independence and supremacy in all matters of Divine Revelation, not because it is Ultramontane, but because it is Christian; that if this be Ultramontanism, the Established Kirk of Scotland, the Wesleyan Conference, are all alike Ultramontane; and that the persistent reiteration of this stupid clamour is a proof of shallowness or of bad faith. I shall not be for a moment suspected of offering this dilemma to the courteous and evidently sincere critic in the *Spectator*.

One further remark in the *Spectator* ought to be noticed. The writer says that I have not proved that a Church has been founded 'with the constitutions and powers that I claim for my Church, but only that Christ has been hitherto generally understood by Christians in all ages to have done so.'[2] What further proof could I have offered? If Christians of all ages have so understood, who shall know better than they? The *Spectator* goes on to say that even this I have established only in the widest possible acceptation of the terms. That was precisely my intention.

For my answer is this. I have proved that the spiritual independence and supremacy of the Church is no question of 'constitutions' or 'forms,' but of the Divine authority of truth; that every Christian body, whether it hold the Church to be visible or invisible,

[2] *Spectator*, April 4, 1874, p. 442.

holds its authority as a teacher to be Divine, independent of all civil powers, and supreme in its own sphere. I am sure that the friend, whose words I quote without his leave or knowledge, will forgive me for doing so. An Independent minister of high and deserved influence, and of much cultivation, in a letter just received, writes as follows: 'I believe most earnestly in the Personal Comforter, Interpreter, and Guide. There is a sentence of Bishop Hoadley's which, much as I sympathise with some of Hoadley's views, seems to me about as far as possible from the truth. He says, "Christ, the chief captain of the army, being absent and invisible, instead of leaving officers whom His soldiers are bound to obey, has left orders in writing to be considered and consulted by every soldier in His army." I think that this expresses very fairly the popular Protestant view; but to me "orders in writing" in spiritual matters are a dreary substitute for a living guide, in whose perpetual presence I believe, and in whose guidance of the Church I trust.' He then adds, 'But I cannot see the kind of guidance which I seem taught to look for in any authoritative human organ, be it Council or Pope.'

In the act of rejecting 'any human organ,' which I also do as earnestly and peremptorily as this thoughtful writer, he affirms the existence of an order divinely guided for the perpetuity of truth. This is, in effect, a Church, 'in which there is neither Pope nor Council;' nevertheless it is a Divine organ of perpetual guidance in truth. The *Spectator* will not tell us that such 'a divinely guided Church' is neither independent of civil powers, nor in its spiritual office supreme. No one

has recognised this more clearly or affirmed it more broadly than the *Spectator* in many valuable articles.

I will now take up the main argument where I left it last time.

My thesis, then, is this: not only, as Mr. Stephen somewhat hastily supposes, that a Divine Revelation depends on God alone, a truism that he might easily have known to be unlikely to be found in his pages or in mine, but that the Revelation of Christianity has been so given and left, as Bishop Butler says, that the evidence for it in the natural order of human and historical evidence amounts to moral certainty; and, as the Catholic faith further affirms, that this certainty is also Divine.

The Act of Faith made by every Catholic contains two points: the first, 'I believe all that God has revealed;' the second, 'I believe all that the Church teaches;' or, in other words, 'I acknowledge God as the sole fountain of Revelation; and the Church as the sole channel of what He has revealed.'

Now in the last paper I have stated the position of those who believe the first of these two propositions. They rest on the moral certainty of human and historical evidence. I have now to go on and to state the position of those who believe that God has not only revealed His truth, but has made a Divine and imperishable provision for the custody, perpetuity, and promulgation of His truth to the world, that is to say, through the channel of His Church, divinely founded, divinely preserved from error, and divinely assisted in the declaration of truth.

With Schlegel I have affirmed, and I affirm again, that the maximum of evidence for the history of the past is to be found in the witness of the Catholic Church. I have pointed out how this witness contains in itself all the sources of truth, namely, sense, reason, testimony, and authority. I have affirmed that authority has two senses, obvious to any mind patient enough to think. In its popular sense it stands for command or rule; in its stricter sense it stands for the motive of belief. We say, 'I have this on the authority of an eye-witness.' In this way of speaking it is equivalent to evidence. I have, in this sense, affirmed that the authority of the Church is evidence of the Divine facts which it attests. The eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses of those facts delivered their evidence to others. These again, after testing the evidence, believed on their authority. The authority of the Apostles was grounded on their personal evidence of the facts which they had seen and heard. There is no confusion of terms here. Words clink as men think; and it needs little art to make a jingle out of what we do not understand.

The witness, therefore, of the Catholic Church is both a motive of belief and the source from which we receive the evidence on which we believe the Divine facts of Christianity. That witness contains in itself the personal testimony of those who were eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses of the facts they attested. Their testimony is intrinsically certain. To reject such evidence is to isolate the human mind, and to confine it in a state of irrational scepticism or self-sufficient ignorance of human history and of human life. Such a

scepticism destroys the moral relations of human society by destroying the trust which binds human life together; 'Perit,' as I quoted from Grotius, 'omnis quæ inter parentes liberosque est pietas, ut quos haud aliter noscamus.'

The witness of the Church, then, has ultimately this element of personal evidence and *intrinsic* certainty in itself. It has also the world-wide and accumulating *extrinsic* evidence of the whole of Christendom. If this *intrinsic* certainty never grows greater, at least it never grows less. It is the same to-day as it was in the beginning. Its safe custody and unchanged tradition is secured and attested by the *extrinsic* evidence of the whole Church from the beginning until now. Such was and is my argument. When any man says, in reply to this, 'How very true Buddhism and Brahminism must have grown by long keeping and earnest belief,' I can only hold my peace; especially when it is the same person who is telling others that they do not understand what proof or evidence means. Such things need no answer.

To expose this fully let us take a parallel.

The fact that Charlemagne was consecrated emperor by Pope Leo III. in the Basilica of St. Peter's on Christmas-eve in the year 800 is, I suppose, attested by the evidence of eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses whose testimony is intrinsically certain. This fact laid the foundation of the Holy Roman Empire, which, as Mr. Bryce tells us, lingered on till the year 1806. For a thousand years the nations of Christendom have believed in the fact and the place and the date and the agent

of that consecration. The tradition of Christendom has guarded and handed on that original testimony. It was intrinsically certain at the first. It has never become more certain or less certain in itself; but the extrinsic historical tradition which has guarded and delivered it to every successive age has attached to it an ever-accumulating security of its unchanged identity and truth.

Let me take another illustration. I remember hearing Lord Macaulay say that some day the New Zealanders may, perhaps, describe the conquest of their country as the exploit of two valorous chieftains called Lion and Unicorn, just as we describe the conquest of England by Hengist and Horsa. Now I suppose no calm man would believe that this fiction would become true by any extent or continuity of tradition, nor would think that any other man of sound mind could have ever said or thought that falsehood could grow into truth.

What is false in the beginning can never become true by any length of transmission; what in the beginning is true, if safely guarded from change, remains true for ever. It is of those who refuse to believe on the evidence of legitimate authority that our Lord said, 'They have Moses and the Prophets; let them hear them: if they hear not Moses and the Prophets, neither will they believe if one rise again from the dead.'

Let us, then, go on.

If there be a fact of past history adequately proved by an unbroken succession of witnesses running up from our time to the time of its occurrence, and to the

evidence of those who saw and heard what they attested, it is the institution of the Christian Church by its Divine Founder, and its spread throughout the world by those to whom He gave commission and commandment for that purpose. If there be any continuous history, unbroken in its tradition, sedulously recorded in its chief events, diligently maintained in all the links of its succession, it is the history of the world-wide Episcopate of the Church. Every episcopal see became the guardian of its unwritten and written testimony. At every succession of its Bishops the rightful order and validity of every act by which its authority and witness were transmitted were guarded by the most vigilant and jealous care. What was done at Jerusalem and Antioch and Alexandria and Rome was done in every episcopal see founded in every city, however small and remote, in the album of Imperial Rome. The whole Empire became conscious that there had arisen in the midst of it an organised and universal system, absolutely one in its corporate existence, and in the mutual relations and inter-communion of its members. It was conscious also that this system did not spring from itself, nor depend on its authority; that it lived a life apart from the Empire; that its laws and its customs, its tribunals and its jurisdiction, were wholly its own and supreme within itself. The Empire legislated against it as a 'religio illicita' and as a 'societas illicita.' The Imperial power strove for three hundred years to sweep it out from its borders. But there it was. And there it is to this day. If cut down it sprang up again. If thinned by persecution it multi-

plied itself more rapidly. Its organisation, if broken, always renewed itself. The succession of its Bishops could never be cut off. When one fell another rose; and that, not here and there, but everywhere. It confronted the Prætors in the provinces and the Cæsars on the Palatine Hill. Everywhere it said the same thing. Everywhere it claimed to be independent of all civil powers, and within its Divine office supreme. And for that independence and supremacy of its spiritual office it went everywhere, and gladly, to prison and to death. If, I say, there can be found a historical fact in the world which commands the belief of rational men, it is the history of the Christian Church—a history which alone solves the phenomenon of its present visible existence, its world-wide presence, and its perfect identity in every place. The history of the Sovereigns of England is not more evidently traceable than the history of the Roman Pontiffs; the history of the Parliaments of England is not more patent than the history of the Œcumenical Councils, which for eighteen hundred years have legislated for the Catholic Church. If there be anything provable by historical evidence it is, that the Catholic Church from the beginning has claimed, and by suffering has vindicated, its spiritual independence and supremacy. This claim is not more evident, by reason of its uniform and universal assertion, than by the uniform and universal persecution it has thereby drawn upon itself in every country and in every age. And that persecution, impotent to destroy, has set its seal to the history and the prerogatives of the Christian Church.

Thus far I have treated the Christian Church as a human and historical witness attesting its own origin, constitution, powers, and jurisdiction. If its witness be not credible, human history exists no longer: there is no fact beyond our eyesight or the reach of our arm to be believed: for all beyond these are hearsay or secondhand. The whole of my arguments hitherto may be used by all Christian communions who rest their motives for believing in Christianity upon the universal testimony of the Christian world. Against Mr. Stephen's sceptical criticisms their argument is invincible. The theory of calling up the twelve Apostles in the nineteenth century for cross-examination in the Court of Queen's Bench is a theory which subverts the whole moral order of human life. Their testimony was taken and tested at the time and on the spot, and it abides for ever. And here I might close the argument, for I am arguing, not with those who reject the evidence of Christian history, but with those who profess to believe it. And I am hardly willing to continue the argument, because I foresee that what I have to add will be assailed as affording a cheap and easy diversion from the position I have hitherto defended in behalf of all who retain the Christian name.

Nevertheless I will go on, that I may fully and openly state the whole case of Christianity against Cæsarism. Hitherto I have argued upon a basis on which all Christians stand together. But the argument does not end here: I will therefore take it up again and complete it. The Catholic Church affirms all I have advanced, and more. But I have already said that I

will not argue here and now that the Catholic Church exclusively possesses the independence and supremacy of which we are treating. It will be enough for the present to show that it possesses these prerogatives *eminenter*, and for special reasons.

Some of these arguments are common in their kind to all other Christian bodies or communions—such, I mean, as rest on Scripture, tradition, and reason. There remains still one other foundation of my argument, which, though I touched it only in passing, has been copiously used as a topic to excite odium or incredulity: I mean the infallibility of the Church and of its Head. It is right therefore that I should, with all frankness, state what is our faith on this point, and that I should make the grounds of that faith as clear and explicit as I can.

I will therefore do so, and all the more willingly because Mr. Stephen has quoted a book published by me some years ago on the *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, and has twice or three times described its purport in words which either prove that he did not understand so much as the terms of the subject, or that, understanding them, he could not refrain from so representing them as to excite odium. I will therefore, partly by quotation, and partly by a summary, give the argument of the book. To do so I shall be forced into the most sacred subjects. But Mr. Stephen is responsible for the introduction of this matter into the *Contemporary Review*. Once more I must warn my readers that I proceed to this matter not as if it were necessary against Mr. Stephen's objections. Once more I repeat

that, as a reply to his arguments, the voice of Christendom and the evidence of Christian history are enough.

I have, I hope, already shown that there is no Christian nor body of Christians that does not believe in the existence of the Church, whether visible or invisible, whether indivisible or divided; and there is no Christian or body of Christians which does not claim for the Church, understood, as it may be, in various ways, a Divine authority independent and, within its sphere, supreme. The existence of a Church divinely founded and with a Divine office is a part of Christianity. It is not only manifest in the world, but recorded in the New Testament. I had therefore no need of citing Catholic witnesses to prove that Jesus Christ established a Church with the constitution and powers which I claim for my Church, for in my argument against Cæsarism I had claimed only the independence and supremacy of the Church in matter of revealed truth. Every Church, communion, and sect whatsoever makes the same identical claim. I shall therefore leave Mr. Stephen's third proposition, and proceed to the fourth, which is as follows:

'My Church is the Church so established, and as such possesses the powers in question.'

But the powers in question are precisely independence and supreme authority in matter of faith and morals. To this I will now go on. I am afraid that I shall disappoint all who desire to see a controversy among those whom I have cited as witnesses. I am indeed going to prove that the Catholic and Roman Church, as a witness, teacher, and judge of faith and morals, is

within that sphere independent of all civil powers and supreme. But I am not going to prove here and now that the Catholic and Roman Church exclusively possesses this Divine office. If I were to enter upon this controversy I should chiefly gratify those who wish to find or to make contentions in the Christian world. My desire is to rally all Christians in one common cause against the growing Antichristianism of the day. Of one thing I am confident. The people of these three kingdoms are a Christian people. They have no sympathy with infidelity, impiety, or profaneness. They retain with a tenacious belief two great traditional facts: first, that Christianity is a Divine Revelation; and secondly, that the Holy Scriptures are the Word of God. They believe also in the great outlines of the Christian faith. Rationalistic infidelity is the disease of individuals among us. The people of England and Scotland would never for a moment tolerate a royal religion such as the Evangelical Church set up in Prussia, nor an imperial supremacy such as the Falck laws.

They would refuse obedience to all such violations of Christian liberty on precisely the same principles as are maintained by the Archbishop of Posen and the Archbishop of Cologne. I have already given their testimony to the constitution and office of the Christian Church as they believe it. It is enough for my argument to show that all that they claim for themselves is to be found in an eminent degree and above all in the Catholic Church. This, at least, they do not deny, and this for my present argument against their adversaries and ours is enough.

It cannot be necessary for me to enter into an historical proof that the Catholic and Roman Church reaches upwards from the present day to the mission of the Apostles, or that the great family of nations which compose it now is the lineal descendant of that family of all nations which the Apostles knit together. There has never been but one Church of all nations, and out of that one Church all separate communions or churches have sprung. But their separation, whether in the East or West, whether in ancient or modern centuries, has not diminished the identity nor the universality of the Catholic Church. It still remains in its unity and world-wide extension, with its unbroken Episcopate under one supreme Head and its nineteen Œcumenical Councils, the one chief witness both by visible presence, audible voice, and unity of testimony to the Divine fact of the Incarnation and to the revelation of Christianity. Take Rome out of Christendom, what remains? What Church can trace an unbroken line and a universal presence for the last eighteen hundred years? What Church has continuity if Rome has not? What Church has universality if Rome be taken away? What Church speaks in every language under heaven, if it be not the Church Catholic and Roman, which the other day called together the pastors of some thirty nations in the Council of the Vatican?

What other Church presents at this hour to the world the unity of the Apostles, who preached one doctrine in every place; what other has a continuous identity with itself in all successions of time? The doctrines which we preach day by day in England our forefathers

defended and suffered for three hundred years ago; and the same in all fulness and precision may be read in Bede's History of the Anglo-Saxon race. What was preached by Bede in the seventh century was preached last Sunday, and will be preached next Sunday, in England, in China, in Australia, and in Spain; and for this same faith the pastors and people of Germany are contending now, as our English forefathers contended three centuries ago. Through all this tract of time, and throughout this world-wide unity, the pastors and the people of the Catholic Church have always held as a doctrine of revealed truth that the authority of the Church in the sphere of faith and morals is by Divine institution independent of all civil power, and supreme over all authority of man. If the Church of England and the Kirk of Scotland can claim to be independent and supreme in all matter of revealed truth, *à fortiori* the Catholic and Roman Church can make good its claim. All that they possess they derive, if not from us, at least through us. Every argument that can be advanced by them has greater force when advanced by the Catholic and Roman Church. Every proof from the testimonies of Scripture tells in the first place in our behalf. Every proof drawn from tradition if it reach to them must first include, if it does not even spring from, us. This at least is certain, that if the *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus* is to be verified now on earth, it can be verified eminently in the One Body which has unbroken continuity, universality in extent, and identity of faith in every place.

For my present argument, then, it is enough to show

that what is claimed by every Christian communion may be shown to exist in an eminent and especial degree in the Catholic and Roman Church.

I will now go on, and I must enter upon the region of theology in which the human and historical certainty of Revelation is shown to be also Divine, and secured by a Divine provision.

It is not by accident, or by mere order of enumeration, that in the Baptismal Creed we say, 'I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Catholic Church.' These two articles are united because the Holy Spirit is united with the Church. And this union is indissoluble. It is the source of supernatural endowments to the Church which can never be absent from it, or suspended in their operation. The Church, of all ages and of all times, is therefore immutable in its *knowledge, discernment,* and *enunciation* of the truth, in virtue of its indissoluble union with the Spirit of Truth, and of His perpetual guidance; whereby He directs its teaching not only from council to council, and from age to age, with an intermittent and broken utterance, but always and at all times, by the continuous enunciation of the Faith.

What I here assert is the doctrine of the Scriptures, Fathers, and Theologians, and the faith of all Catholics. I might assume that the evidence of Scripture is too obvious to need quotation, but I will give the following.

The testimonies from Scripture, being familiar to all, shall be recited as briefly as possible.

Our Lord promised that His departure should be followed by the advent of a Person like Himself—

another Paraclete—the Spirit of Truth, who proceedeth from the Father : 'I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you for ever. The Spirit of Truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth Him not, nor knoweth Him : but you shall know Him, because He shall abide with you, and shall be in you.'[3]

'The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you.'[3]

'It is expedient for you that I go; for if I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to you.'[4]

'When He, the Spirit of Truth, is come, He will teach you all truth. For He shall not speak of Himself; but what things soever He shall hear, He shall speak; and the things that are to come He shall show you. He shall glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine, and shall show it to you. All things whatsoever the Father hath are Mine. Therefore I said, He shall receive of Mine, and show it to you.'[4]

The fulfilment of this promise ten days after the Ascension was accomplished on the day of Pentecost by the personal advent of the Holy Ghost, to abide for ever as the Guide and Teacher of the faithful in the name and stead of the Incarnate Son. I forbear to quote the second chapter of the book of Acts, in which

[3] S. John xiv. 16, 17, 26.

[4] Ibid. xvi. 7, 13-16. Eph. iv. 4-16. Rom. xii. 4, 5. 1 Cor. xii. 11-14, 27. Eph. i. 19-23. S. John vii. 39.

this Divine fact is recorded by the Holy Spirit Himself.

S. Paul has traced out the events and a succession in this Divine order, connecting them with the creation and organisation of the Church, where he says, 'One body and one spirit: as you are called in one hope of your calling. One Lord, one faith, one baptism. One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all. But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ. Wherefore He saith, Ascending on high, He led captivity captive: He gave gifts to men. Now that He ascended, what is it, but because He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens, that He might fill all things. And He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors. For the perfection of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ, until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ: that henceforth we be no more children tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine by the wickedness of men, by cunning craftiness, by which they lie in wait to deceive. But doing the truth in charity, we may in all things grow up in Him who is the Head, even Christ: from whom the whole body, being compacted and fitly joined together, by what every joint supplieth, according to the operation of the measure of every part, maketh

increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in charity.'[5]

The same delineation of the Church as the mystical body runs through the Epistles to the Romans and the Corinthians. 'For as in one body we have many members, but all members have not the same office; so we being many are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.'[6]

Again to the Corinthians, after enumerating with great particularity the gifts and operations of the Holy Ghost, he adds that 'all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will. For as the body is one and hath many members; and all the members of the body, whereas they are many, yet are one body; so also is Christ. For in one Spirit were we all baptised into one body, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether bond or free; and in one Spirit we have all been made to drink. For the body also is not one member, but many. . . . . Now you are the body of Christ, and members of member.'[7]

These passages explicitly declare that the Church is a living body, made up of Head and members inhabited by the Spirit of Truth, who is a Divine Person; that it is complete in its organisation, indefectible in its life, always in possession of the truth, and constituted to be the channel and the organ of that truth to mankind. It is expressly described as independent of all human teachers, and dependent on God alone, itself a Divine witness and a Divine teacher. The same is the doc-

[5] Eph. iv. 4-16. [6] Rom. xii. 45.

[7] 1 Cor. xii. 11-14, 27. Eph. i. 19-23. S. John vii. 39.

trine of the Fathers. I forbear from quoting more than one or two passages. S. Augustin says:

'What the soul is to the body of man, that the Holy Ghost is to the body of Christ, which is the Church. What the Holy Ghost does in the whole Church, that the soul does in all the members of one body. . . . In the body of a man it may happen that a member—the hand, the finger, or the foot—may be cut off. Does the soul follow the severed member? While it was in the body it was alive; cut off, its life is lost. So a man is a Christian and a Catholic while he is alive in the body; cut off, he becomes a heretic. The Holy Ghost does not follow the amputated limb.'[8]

Again he says:

'The body is made up of many members, and one spirit quickens them all. . . . The offices of the members are divided severally, but one spirit holds all in one. Many are commanded, and many things are done; there is one only who commands, and one who is obeyed. What our spirit—that is, our soul—is to our members, that the Holy Ghost is to the members of Christ to the body of Christ, which is the Church.'[9]

From these principles S. Augustin declares the Church to possess a *moral personality*. He says:

'The head and the body are one man; "Christ and the Church are one man." . . . . Therefore let Christ speak, because in Christ the Church speaks, and in the Church Christ speaks, both the body in the Head and the Head in the body. . . . Our Lord Jesus Christ often speaks Himself—that is, in His own person, which is our Head—oftentimes in the person of His body, which we are—namely, His Church . . . . that we may understand the head and the body to consist by an integral unity, never to be put asunder after the manner of matrimony, of which it is said two shall be in one flesh.'

From all this he concludes:

'If there are two in one flesh, how not *two in one voice?*'

The same doctrine is copiouly taught by the Greek

[8] S. Aug., *Serm. in die Pentecost.* 1, tom. v. p. 1090.

[9] Ibid. *Serm.* 2, tom. v. p. 1091.

Fathers, such as S. Gregory Nazianzen and S. Cyril of Alexandria. It is also explicitly taught by S. Gregory the Great. The quotations are given in the work quoted by Mr. Stephen, the *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, from p. 40 to p. 48.

I have said that the union between the Spirit of Truth and the mystical body of the Church is indissoluble. Before the Incarnation the Holy Spirit dwelt and wrought in the souls of men one by one, illuminating, converting, sanctifying, and perfecting those who were faithful. But the union between His presence and each individual man was *conditional* on the correspondence and fidelity of his life and will. It was a *dissoluble* union, and in the multitudes who fell from grace it was actually dissolved. In the faithful that union was sustained to the end. We also are under the same law of individual probation. If we persevere in faith and obedience, the union between us and the presence of the Holy Spirit in us remains firm. If we fail, we dissolve it. This union is *conditional*, depending upon the finite, frail, and unstable will of men. It is the error of these later days to suppose the union of the Holy Spirit with the Church to be in like manner conditional and dissoluble.

It is manifest, however, that the union of the Holy Spirit with the Church is not *conditional*, but *absolute*, depending upon *no finite will*, but upon *the Divine Will alone*. It is therefore indissoluble to all eternity. For it is constituted (1) by the union of the Holy Ghost with the Head of the Church, not only as God, but as Man, and in both these relations this union is indis-

soluble. It is constituted further (2) by the union of the Holy Spirit with the mystical body, which, as a body, is imperishable, though individuals in it may perish. There will never come a time when that body will cease to be, and therefore there will never come a time when the Holy Spirit will cease to be united to it. But that which shall be eternal is indissoluble also in time—the union, that is, of the Spirit with the body as a whole. Individuals may fall from it, as multitudes have fallen; provinces, nations, particular Churches, may fall from it; but the body still remains, its unity undivided, its life indefectible; and that because the line of the faithful is never broken.[10]

The union, therefore, of the Spirit with the body can never be dissolved. It is a Divine act analogous to the hypostatic union, whereby the two natures of God and man are eternally united in one Person. So the mystical body, the head and the members, constitute one moral person; and the Holy Ghost inhabiting that body, and diffusing His created grace throughout it, animates it as the soul quickens the body of a man.

From this flow many truths. First, the Church is not a physical, but a mystical person, and all its endowments are derived from the Divine Person who is its Head, and from the Divine Person who is its Life. As in the Incarnation there is a communication of the Divine perfections to the humanity, so in the Church the perfections of the Holy Spirit become the endowments of the body. It is imperishable, because He is God; indivisibly one, because He is numerically

[10] Eph. ii. 22.

one; holy, because He is the fountain of holiness; infallible both in believing and in teaching, because His illumination and His voice are immutable. The Church, therefore, being not a physical, but a *moral person*, depending not as we do, one by one, upon the fidelity of our *human will*, but depending as a body only on the Divine Will, *it is not on trial or probation*, but is itself the instrument of probation to mankind. The corporate existence of the Church cannot be affected by the frailty or sins of the human will, any more than the brightness of the firmament can be darkened by the dimness or the loss of human sight. It can no more be tainted by human sin than the holy sacraments, which are always immutably pure and divine, though all who come to them be impure and faithless. What the Church was in the beginning it is now and ever shall be in all the plenitude of its Divine endowments, because the union between the body and the Spirit is indissoluble, and the operations of the Spirit in the body are perpetual and absolute.

Thus the revelation of God is divinely preserved and divinely proposed to the world. A Divine revelation in human custody would be soon lost; a Divine revelation expounded by human interpreters puts off its Divine character and becomes human: as S. Jerome says of the Scriptures when perverted by men, it is no longer the Word of God. A Church likewise, if subject to man, would cease to be a Church.

But God has provided that the Church cannot teach falsehood: that what He has revealed should be for ever

preserved and enunciated by the perpetual presence and assistance of the same Spirit from whom the revelation originally came. And this gives us the basis of a Divine certainty and the rule of Divine faith.

(1) The voice of the living Church of this hour, when it declares what God has revealed, is no other than the voice of the Holy Spirit, and therefore generates Divine faith in those who believe. The Baptismal Creed represents at this day, in all the world, the preaching of the Apostles and the faith of Pentecost. It is the voice of the same Divine Teacher who spoke in the beginning, enunciating now the same truth.

(2) The Decrees of General Councils are undoubtedly the voice of the Holy Ghost, both because they are the organs of the teaching of the Church, and because they have the pledge of a special Divine assistance, according to the needs of the Church and of the Faith.

(3) The Definitions and Decrees of Pontiffs speaking *ex cathedrâ*, or as the Head of the Church and to the whole Church, whether by Bull or Apostolic Letters or Encyclical or Brief, in matter of faith and morals, to many or to one, are undoubtedly guided by the same Divine assistance, and are therefore infallible.

Now the Pontiffs, as Vicars of Jesus Christ, have a twofold relation: the one, to the Divine Head of the Church, of whom they are the visible representatives on earth; the other, to the whole body. And these two relations impart a special prerogative of grace to him that bears them. The endowments of the head, as

S. Augustin argues, are bestowed in behalf of the body. It is a small thing to say that the endowments of the body are the prerogatives of the head. The Vicar of Jesus Christ would bear no proportion to the body if, while it is infallible, he were not so. He would bear also no representative character if he were the fallible witness of an infallible Head. Though the analogy observed by S. Augustin between the head and the members cannot strictly apply to the Vicar of Christ and the members upon earth, nevertheless it invests him with a pre-eminence of guidance and direction over the whole body, which can neither be possessed by any other member of the body, nor by the whole body without him. This supreme office attaches to him personally and alone as representing to the body the prerogatives of its Divine Head. The infallibility of the Head of the Church extends to the whole matter of Revelation—that is, to the Divine truth and the Divine law as revealed to us—and to all those facts or truths which are in contact with faith and morals.

If the relation between the body and the Spirit were conditional and dissoluble, then the enunciations of the Church might be fallible and subject to human criticism.

If the relation be absolute and indissoluble, then all its enunciations by Pontiffs, Councils, Traditions, Scriptures, and by the universal consent of the Church are Divine, and its voice also is Divine, being identified with the voice of its Divine Head in heaven. 'He that heareth you heareth Me.'

But that the relation between the body and the Spirit is absolute and indissoluble, the Theologians, Fathers, Scriptures, and the universal Church declare.

And therefore the infallibility of the Church is perpetual, and the truths of Revelation are so enunciated by the Church as to anticipate all research, and to exclude from their sphere all human criticism.[11]

Having thus stated the grounds on which Catholics believe the evidence on which we receive the revelation of Christianity to be certain, not only in the order of history, but by a special provision divinely ordained for its custody and perpetuity, I will add a few words on the attempt, so sedulously made, to find or to feign a division in the Catholic Church between Ultramontanes and non-Ultramontanes, and to pretend further that the non-Ultramontanes are Old Catholics, and that the Old Catholics are the true Catholics who reject the Vatican innovations.

All Catholics believe that the Catholic Church by Divine assistance is preserved from error, both in what it teaches and in what it believes; or, in other words, that the Church is infallible. The only question among Catholics was as to the organ by which this infallibility is to be exercised, and the test by which it is to be ascertained.

All Catholics believe that the Church, whether dispersed or gathered in one Œcumenical Council, is infallible. In an Œcumenical Council the whole Church is gathered in its Bishops with their Head.

[11] *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost* (Longmans, 1865), second edition.

Every definition of faith and morals promulgated by such a Council with its Head is, in the belief of all Catholics, divinely certain, that is, infallible. And every one who shall reject such a definition is a heretic, and every one who shall deny such a Council to be Œcumenical is excommunicated.

On all these points there has never been a question among Catholics. The self-called 'Old Catholics' are therefore, *ipso facto*, heretical and excommunicate. They deny the Council of the Vatican to be Œcumenical, and the definitions made by it to be doctrines of the faith.

Such was their first position. And such was the position of Dr. Wohlmann, Professor of Religion in the Gymnasium of Braunsberg, justly excommunicated by the Bishop of Ermland. The Prussian Government, thinking that it had found its opportunity, supported Dr. Wohlmann against the Bishop, thereby putting itself visibly and irrevocably in the wrong. All its violence since that date is the transparent evidence of a will to crush those whom it had wronged.

But I leave this for the present.

The only question ever raised among Catholics as to the organ and seat of infallibility was this: Whether the Divine assistance promised to the Church as a whole, including its Head, is promised to its Head when acting in behalf of the Church out of an Œcumenical Council, or in the intervals between Council and Council. Let us take an analogy. The Crown is sovereign while Parliament is sitting; does it cease to be sovereign between Session and Session,

or between Parliament and Parliament? An opinion sprang up in France, and was fostered by the French monarchs and courtiers from the time of Louis XIV., that the Head of the Church out of Œcumenical Councils possessed indeed 'the chief authority in defining doctrines of faith,' but that such definitions were not irreformable, that is, infallible, 'until accepted by the Church.' I will not stay to point out the impossibility of this test. How is it to be applied? Who is to apply it? Who to judge of its application? What majority is to be the test of truth? What minority to be the proof of error? What is to become of definitions while the test is being applied? What is to check heresy in the mean while? What is to arrest controversy? What *ad interim* is to be believed as of faith? This is in fact the well-known theory of 'open questions.' It would need only a controversy on each of the twelve articles of the Baptismal Creed to make the whole faith an open question. And such, in fact, would be the possible state of the Christian Church if its Head could propound false doctrine for its reception. This incoherent theory existed only in France, and even there only in the theology of a school, and not of all members even of that school. It was imposed by royal mandate, but the Church in France never believed it. All theologians were bound to teach it, but only a few ever obeyed. Gallicanism here and there tainted a few Bishops, priests, and laymen, but, like the principles of 1789, it was never accepted by the Church of France. Its tradition was Catholic and Roman, or,

as men would now say, Ultramontane. It endured the theology of its kings and their servants, but in the first Œcumenical Council assembled after 1682, in union with the Catholic Episcopate, it extinguished Gallicanism for ever. If the Vatican Council had met and parted without condemning Gallicanism, it would have given to it a presumption of truth, or, at least, of probability, such as Lutheranism would have gained if the Council of Trent had spared it, or Arianism if it had been passed over in silence by the Council of Nicea.

I know nothing more dreary and hopeless than the floods of persistent misrepresentation of which the definition of the infallibility of the Head of the Church has been made the theme. It has been described as a dogma created and carried by the adulation of flatterers, the servility of sycophants, the ignorance of a packed majority, the credulity of weak minds, the superstition of bigots inspired by the ambition of courtiers, and the venality of place-hunters. Such have been the deliverances of the 'men of culture,' 'scientific historians,' 'Old Catholics,' and 'German professors.' The utterances of 'Berlin Correspondents' were still more amusing. We were told that Pius IX. had received 'Divine attributes;' that, as was well known, he had eagerly sought, and at last obtained, his 'deification;' that he had been declared to be a 'Vice-God;' all this and oceans of ribaldry, blasphemy, and trash have been poured out from abroad over England. It is an astonishment to me to see how the common sense of Englishmen has waded through this 'great Serbonian

bog' of nonsense, and come out safe on the other side. I confess that I have almost despaired at this deplorable revel of clamorous absurdity. To contradict was useless; to explain was worse. If exposed, the story was repeated next day. Now at last men begin to see that the infallibility of the Head of the Church is simply the question of how we are to ascertain the seat of the Divine certainty on which we receive Christianity. This is highly disappointing and commonplace. It is, after all, only a part of the treatise *De Locis Theologicis*. All the sensational clamour about 'Divine attributes' subsides into a dry argument about the Rule of Faith. Now the Vatican Council defined the infallibility of its Head, because to deny it is to deny a Divine fact, and to expose the infallibility of the Church as a whole to a series of logical difficulties. This I can affirm of my own personal knowledge to have been the motive which caused the Bishops to be so uncompromising and inflexible. Any man who understands the infallibility of the Church will see this at a glance. They who do not understand it must, I fear, go on talking, writing, and thinking like our 'Berlin Correspondent.'

As I was writing these words, the Berlin Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* supplied me with an example, which will save the trouble of description. In the debate on the Supplementary Ecclesiastical Laws —the effect of which is to enable the Government to 'intern,' or to exile, all ecclesiastics who shall continue, for conscience' sake, to exercise their spiritual functions after deposition from office by the Imperial Tribunal— we are told that 'one member, an ex-Excellency, qua-

lified his adversaries as a lot of tea-drinking old women;' another, a celebrated rationalistic theologian, called his opponents 'a draggletail of little-brained fanatics.' Herr von Sybel's ribaldry against the Catholic religion was interrupted by 'Shouts of Homeric laughter,' 'Roars of laughter,' 'Loud and prolonged laughter,' 'Roars of laughter.' Finally he said, 'You may be sure that if Prince Bismarck was to-morrow to resolve upon the restoration of the imperial power and the mutilation of Italy, to-morrow would Pope Pius IX. sanction the May Statutes, and confer upon the Minister of Public Worship—that is, if Dr. Falck wanted to have it—the Grand Cross of the highest Papal Order.' This, we are told, 'fairly brought the house down' for some minutes.

> 'Dixeris hæc inter varicosos centuriones
> Continuo crassum ridet Vulfenius ingens.'

Persius does not see in this gross laughter any token of culture.

The 'Homeric laughter' was so great that they seem to have forgotten what they were debating. It was the exile, for conscience' sake, of free men and Christians, who refuse to betray their Divine office at the will of a Government. The correspondent then goes on with the cool insolence of a persecutor, as follows:

'The Government does not propose to add to its powers of offence and defence until it shall be in a position to judge by a fair amount of experience whether or not the subordinate *Popish* clergy, or any considerable section of that body, will think fit to submit itself to the *secular arm*, and, by doing so, *to sever the connection existing between it and the Vatican.* The group of laws already available to the authorities for *quelling* the *disobedience* of *his Majesty's Bishops* will enable the Executive, within the next few months, to get all the prelates and their vicars-general,

besides a considerable sprinkling of the lesser clergy, *safely into prison* or across the frontier, whilst the *civil* powers will have secured the *entire* and *exclusive administration of the vacated dioceses*. A good many cures will be vacant, and every possible encouragement will be given to their congregations to appoint thereto, by election, priests of the Old Catholic or Reformed Catholic persuasion, if no Papal clergyman can be found to take the oaths and subscribe the declaration required under the new enactments. Should such congregations prove *refractory*, and *refuse* to elect ecclesiastics who may be *acceptable to the Administration*, they will *simply have to do without spiritual ministrations and functions* until such time as they may deem it wiser to yield to the stern necessities of the situation.'

We have here German Liberalism unmasked. It is a compound of Antichristian hatred, inflated contempt of conscience in other men, with the bigotry of unbelief and the despotism of intolerance. Liberty of conscience exists no longer in Prussia, and where liberty of conscience is violated all liberty perishes. Prussia has become the strongest and the least civilised country in Europe. Its civilisation is that of the world without God. Alcibiades was an orator, a soldier, a musician, a refined citizen, a free-thinker, an aristocrat, a despiser of superstitions, a mutilator of sacred things, a profligate, and a fop. This is the civilisation which is arising again, where Christianity is dying out. Such civilisation I do not deny to Prussia, but it is not the civilisation of the Christian world. There are men among us who are labouring to make Englishmen admire and adopt this civilisation. While they applaud these tyrannical persecutions, they are not worthy of the soil of England, nor of the Christian liberty which they abuse in railing at Christianity.

An Ultramontane, then, is one who believes that the

Church, in virtue of its infallibility, is independent of all civil powers, and is, in all that belongs to faith and morals, supreme over all human authority. The question as to the seat of that infallibility was once a domestic question, and is a question no longer.

We are now in a condition to appreciate the Falck laws, and, I must add, the ignoble pretence that they are directed, not against the Catholic religion, but against 'Ultramontanism.' They violate the Catholic religion by violating the spiritual independence and the Divine office of the Church. They pretend to make the sanction of the civil power a condition of determining who are and who are not Catholics, who are and who are not heretics, who are and who are not excommunicate: what is or is not the faith of the Catholic Church, who are and who are not to be put in cure of souls, how candidates for the priesthood are to be educated, and what doctrine they are to hold. Lastly, by the third law of May it is provided that all appeals are to be decided by the Imperial Tribunal within Germany, or, in other words, the Church in Germany is to be cut off from the supreme appellate jurisdiction of its Head, whom the 'Old Catholics,' with the congenital insolence of heretics, call 'the man outside of Germany.' That is to say, the Church in Germany is to be placed in a permanent schism. These are the laws which are not directed against the Catholic religion! I must use the free speech of an Englishman and the liberty of a Christian to denounce this pretence as an ignoble hypocrisy.

Mr. Stephen has complained that I have interrupted

his argument. I might with more justice complain that while I was denouncing this Prussian persecution he was endeavouring to plunge me into the bottomless pit of a controversy with scepticism. Life is short. The little that remains to me will, I hope, be given to issues that are vital, not to individuals here and there, but to Christians of every name. I have purposely elicited and laid bare the truth that the conflict now raging is between Christianity and Antichristianism. As the enemies of Christianity widen out their line against the Christian name in every country of Europe, so it is our duty to widen out our defence along the whole line of Christian faith. Those who remember the year 1848, and the universal and simultaneous rising of Antichristian revolution which threatened all Europe, will readily see in what is passing in Italy, Spain, France, Austria, and Germany at this time the same simultaneous movement grown strong and bold by success. It has ascended thrones, controlled cabinets, overthrown governments, and usurped their place. Who can fail to see that the exclusion of Christianity from education, and from laws, and from States is only the prelude of an attempt to destroy the Christian Faith and the Christian Church? The war against Christianity in Germany fell by necessity upon the Catholic Church, because it is the chief, I might say the only solid, organised, and consistent witness for Christianity in the new empire. The civil power has behind it a social revolution urging it on to persecute the Catholic Church as the price of its co-operation and support. Until this crisis, which Prince von Bismarck has created

for himself, arose, the Government of Prussia was just and equitable to all Christian confessions, including the Catholic faith. But the Antichristian revolution has pushed it into the excesses of Cæsarism, fatal to its future. The pretext that the Falck laws were necessary because of the hostility of Catholics to the empire served its purpose at the time. Nobody in Germany believed it even then; and now it is believed nowhere. Everybody now sees that if the Prussian Government had continued to deal justly with Catholics it would have detached them from all alleged foreign sympathies, and bound them to itself. But it dared not enter upon such a policy. The Antichristian revolution was at its back. It therefore entered upon a policy of extermination against the Catholic Church, to buy the political support or to buy off the enmity of an Antichristian conspiracy which is undermining every throne in Germany.

Mr. Stephen defends the proposition that a 'nation is a higher and more sacred object than any Church whatever.' I would ask, does he mean the nation as it existed in Pagan Rome; or the nation as it exists in Christian Europe? If he mean the former, I would refer him once more to his classics, or to Dr. Döllinger's work on *Gentilism and Judaism*. If he means the nation as it exists in Christian Europe, I would remind him that it is the Christian law of marriage, Christian morals, and Christian education which have recreated the nations and the civil society of the world. Nowhere but in Christianity does the law of marriage create, purify, and sustain the unity

and sanctities of domestic life; from no other source have come to us the Christian ethics, public and private, which have elevated, restrained, and matured the morality of the modern world. And yet Mr. Stephen asks whether I am to be trusted with authority over the laws of marriage and education. I have claimed no authority for myself; I have claimed it for Christianity; and I am bold to say that the people of England would at once intrust authority over marriage and education rather to Christianity than to Secularism, or Cæsarism, or Scepticism, or to a State stripped of the laws and morals of Christianity. The same may be affirmed of every country in Europe, except, perhaps, of Prussia; and there we have the reason assigned by the Prussian authorities, namely, that so large a part of the population has ceased to practise any religion that the laws of civil marriage and secular education have become inevitable. Protestant authorities tell us that not two per cent of the people of Berlin go to any place of worship, and not more than one-third of the dead are buried with religious rites. Without doubt in such a population civil laws must take the place of Christian marriage and Christian morality. That is to say, where the civil State has fallen from the Christianity which once raised it from Paganism to the civilisation of the Christian world, it must needs fall back upon itself. It has no other sanctions, laws, or ethics except those of Nature, and so much of the personal and domestic morality of its extinct Christianity as may still survive. For a while these ancient traditions will, in some degree,

linger and live on, but let nobody hold this up as the perfection and ripeness of States. The whole civil society of Europe seems to be withdrawing itself in its public life from Christianity. The formula of 'separating the School from the Church and the Church from the State' is, in truth, the separating of both School and State from Christianity. This is the ideal of those who have rejected Christianity, and are misleading Christian men by formulas into false principles fatal to their strongest and best convictions. One good effect of such a discussion as I have thus far, with much reluctance, engaged in is to bring out this fact into daylight. I hope men will be on their guard before they adopt as axioms or principles the phrases and formulas of an Antichristian movement which is separating the civil society of the world and the generations of the future from the Christian Revelation.

As I have made one digression, I cannot refrain from another, which shall be as brief as possible. I have read, with more astonishment than I can express, the studious effort of Mr. Stephen to excite odium, and to inflame his readers with animosity against those who refuse to accept his arguments. For what other purpose does he talk of inquisitions and dragonnades and massacres? This is the last refuge of Exeter Hall, when reason and fact run dry. Mr. Stephen does not forget that both Catholics and Protestants, in turn, have been guilty of persecutions. They cannot, then, be charged on Catholicism only. If he say that Catholics have been worse than Protestants, then, where both are guilty, what argument is there in measuring

degrees? If he say that these horrors are the offspring of Christianity, I ask him, as a historian, as a lawyer, and as a jurist, to say whether it was Christianity that created the penal code of the modern world? Was it the Christian Church or the civil power that invented and created the severities of the criminal law? The nations of the whole world, if any are guilty, are all guilty. The civil society of the world inherited from the Roman empire a penal code, against which Christianity has striven all along its history. The mitigations of the criminal code are due to Christian ethics and to the Christian Church. The atrocities which Mr. Stephen quotes, with a carelessness of argument into which he never would have been betrayed if he had been calm, were indeed the work of Christians and of Catholics, but neither of Christianity nor of the Catholic Church. It is almost within the memory of living men that women were burnt in England. In 1773 Elizabeth Hering was burnt alive. In 1777 Sarah Parker was burnt for counterfeiting silver coin. In 1786 Phœbe Harris was burnt for the same offence. Lord Loughborough defeated the Bill to commute this penalty to hanging.[12] It is within the memory of many of us that children might be sentenced to death in England for offences which would have been too severely punished by a whipping. Down to 1818 a child might be hanged for stealing in a shop goods worth five shillings. What would Mr. Stephen say of me if I had given this as a sample of English Christianity and the State Church?

[12] See *Annual Register*, in Phillimore's *History of George III.*, pp. 51, 65, 66, notes.

He well knows that to impute the atrocious penal codes of Europe to the Christian Church, or to imply what is not explicitly imputed, is as unjust and, I must say, as unmeaning as to say that Christianity introduced slavery among mankind, and that the State abolished it.

Mr. Stephen had no need to show that in theory the 'Lex Regia' is supposed to represent the will of the people. I fully provided for such an answer. But it is like saying that the capitular election of the Anglican bishops is free, because the Crown issues the *congé d'élire*.

But all this is beside the point.

It may be well briefly to guard against certain objections. It may be said that the Falck laws affect only Ultramontanism. No better proof can be given to show that the Falck laws are a persecution, not of Ultramontanism, but of Christianity, than the fact that the first to lead the opposition against them in the Chambers was the venerable Baron von Gerlache, a Lutheran of known fidelity to his profession. Add to this the protests and petitions of the Lutherans in Hesse and in Hanover; the support given emphatically on this ground by the Lutherans in Munich to the Ultramontane candidate, who was also a Catholic priest; and finally, the fact that a number of Lutheran ministers have been fined, or thrown into prison, for refusing to obey the new ecclesiastical laws.

Again, it may be said that the Falck laws affect only those who pretend that the Church is infallible. Surely the facts just alleged are answer enough. They are better than a score of theological replies. Never-

theless I may repeat that the claim of independence for conscience, religion, and faith may be made good by every Christian and Christian communion on the arguments of my last paper, and on the human and historical testimony of Christendom, apart from the higher and Divine certainty which the Catholic Church asserts for itself.

Lastly, it may be said that to claim for the Church the power to define its own sphere is inconsistent with the independence of the civil power. First, I would ask: Does not every Christian Church and sect define its own sphere? If the Church is not to define its own sphere, who is to do so? No one can define how far the sphere of the Church extends but one who knows how far the Revelation intrusted to it reaches. But who knows this if the Church does not? or who knows this except the Church itself? Will any one say that the State is to define the sphere of the Church? If so, the State must know the whole circumference of Revelation, and all that it contains. But no Christian ventures to be so coherent. If the State cannot claim to define the sphere of faith and morals, and if by the hypothesis the Church may not, who is to trace the circle round its jurisdiction? I have already drawn this out, in a slight degree, in the essay which has provoked so much question. It is impossible to treat the subject as it needs at the end of this paper. I can only state one or two propositions:

1. No one can define the extent of the office of the Church but one who knows the limits of the commission it has received, and the Revelation intrusted to it.

2. No one can know these things adequately except one who has received that commission and trust; for these limits are a part of the Revelation.

3. The State received neither the commission nor the trust, and therefore cannot know the limits of either.

The consequence is obvious.

It is full time to bring this paper to an end. I will therefore restate the thesis I have undertaken to prove. In the essay on Cæsarism and Ultramontanism I maintained that the revelation of Christianity has withdrawn the whole province of faith and conscience from all civil powers, and has intrusted it to the jurisdiction of the Church, which is separate from all civil powers, and in all matters of faith and morals supreme. I therefore condemned the Falck laws as a manifold violation of conscience and of the independence and supreme office of the Church. To this argument answer was made that I could not claim such independence and supremacy for the Church until I had first proved the existence of God, the revelation of Christianity, the foundation of the Church with such powers as I claimed for it, and the identity of the Catholic Church with the Church proved to be so founded.

In reply, I rejected Mr. Stephen's two first points as irrelevant in a debate among Christians. To no others I address myself. If I make no answer to those who disbelieve or doubt of the Christian Revelation, it is not that they are on any hypothesis 'beneath my contempt;' for I regard them with kindness and sorrow, as creatures of Him whose existence they doubt, and as redeemed by

Him whose teaching they reject. I address myself to those who have not put off the name of Christian, and to them I acknowledged myself to be bound to offer proof of the two last propositions. So far as the narrow limits of an article admit, I hope that I have done so. In the former paper I have shown that every Christian community which professes to believe in a Church believes that Church to be independent of all civil powers, and in matters of religion supreme: in the present paper I have shown that the Catholic and Roman Church holds this faith as to the constitution and liberties of the Church, and founds its faith in that truth on an order of Divine facts which renders it impossible for the Church ever to compromise, or to yield in conflicts about faith and morals with the civil powers of the world. It is one thing to offer proof of a thesis; it is another to offer proof that will satisfy certain minds. The latter is a task I have not undertaken; it is a task no sane man will undertake. The former I hope and I believe has been done. No man can deny the premises of my argument without denying the foundations of Christianity: no man can admit the premises, and deny that the Falck laws are barefaced persecution, without incoherence of reason. The only consistent and logical antagonists are Christianity and Antichristianism. They are face to face now, and God will judge our cause.

VII.

THE POPE AND MAGNA CHARTA.

THE POPE AND MAGNA CHARTA.

About two years ago, in speaking of the conflict of S. Edmund of Canterbury against Henry III. for the liberties of the Church, I pointed out that his contest was only one of many periods in the continuous resistance to royal excesses, in behalf of the laws and liberties of England, maintained by S. Anselm, S. Thomas, Archbishop Langton, and S. Edmund. I might have added, by Archbishop Richard, his immediate predecessor. This statement was next day met by the old taunt that the Pope condemned Magna Charta. I then shortly pointed out the distinction, here again asserted, between the *mode* in which the Great Charter was obtained, and the *contents* or *merits* of the Great Charter itself. The former, not the latter, was condemned.

Before I enter upon this point, I cannot refrain from quoting a passage from the preface of Professor Stubbs, in his volume of *Documents illustrative of English History*. And in doing so I must express my grateful sense of the service he has rendered to historical truth. His small volume stands alone for learning and discernment.

Describing the period I was speaking of, he says :

'The political situation may generally be stated thus: Since the Conquest, the political constituents of the nation had been divided into two parties, which may be called the national and the feudal. The former comprised the King, the ministerial nobility, which were created by Henry I. and Henry II., and which, if less richly endowed than that of the Conquest, was more widely spread and had more English sympathies; the other contained the great nobles of the Conquest, and the always large but varying body of lower vassals, who were intent on pursuing the policy of foreign feudalism. The national party was also generally in close alliance with the clergy, whose zeal for their own privileges extended to the defence of the classes from whom they chiefly sprang, and whose vindication of class liberties maintained in the general recollection the possibility of resisting oppression.

The clergy may be roughly divided into three schools—the secular, or statesman school; the ecclesiastical, or professional; and the devotional, or spiritual. Of these, the representative men are Roger of Salisbury, Henry of Winchester, and Anselm of Canterbury. Thomas the Martyr more or less combines the characters of the three throughout his life. The three stages through which he passed—that of Chancellor, that of Primate, and that of candidate for martyrdom (*sit venia egregio auctori*)—answer well to the three schools of the clergy. Throughout the whole period, the first of these schools was consistently on the side of the King, the last as consistently on the side of the nation; the second, when its own privileges were not in danger—as from the peace of the Church, in 1107, to the Beckett quarrel, and after the conclusion of that quarrel—continuously on the same side. No division of the clergy ever sympathised with the feudal party.'[1]

Again Mr. Stubbs writes :

'From the beginning of the thirteenth century the struggle is between the Barons, clergy, and people on one side, and the King and his personal partisans, English and foreign, on the other. The Barons and prelates who drew up the Charter were the sons of the ministerial nobles of Henry II., the imitators of S. Anselm and S. Hugh, of Henry of Winchester and Thomas of Canterbury.'[2]

[1] Stubbs' *Documents*, pp. 31, 32 (Oxford, 1874). [2] Ibid. p. 33.

But does not this show that if the spiritual prelates were with the people, they were certainly with the Pope, by whom they were canonised? How, then, was not the Pope with the people and its Christian liberties?

I will now give evidence of my assertion that the Barons, and not the contents of the Charter, were condemned by Innocent III.

1. Let us first examine the antecedents of the conflict between John and the Barons, out of which the Great Charter arose.

It is simply impossible to form an adequate conception of this conflict unless we go back to the reign of our earlier kings. Mr. Stubbs, in his valuable work, the *Memorials of S. Dunstan,* gives the *Promissio Regis,* or the oath taken at his coronation by the Saxon King Edwy, which is as follows:

'This writing is written, letter by letter, after the writing that Archbishop Dunstan delivered to our lord at Kingston, on the day that they hallowed him king; and he forbade him to give any pledge except this pledge, which he laid up on Christ's altar, as the bishop directed him: "In the name of the Holy Trinity I promise three things to the Christian people my subjects: first, that God's Church and all Christian people of my dominions hold true peace; the second is that I forbid robbery, and all unrighteous things, to all orders; the third, that I promise and enjoin in all dooms justice and mercy, that the gracious and merciful God, of His everlasting mercy, may forgive us all, who liveth and reigneth."'[3]

Here we have the germ of the oaths and charters of the Norman times.

It may be indeed true that there did not exist any very precise code to which the people of England, after

[3] *Memorials of S. Dunstan,* p. 355.

the Conquest, were always appealing as to 'the laws of good King Edward.' Nevertheless there was a well-known tradition of ecclesiastical and popular liberties, partly written, but chiefly unwritten, descending from the legislation and the usage of Saxon times. These liberties were frequently violated even by the Saxon kings. Edward the Confessor wielded an authority, from his known integrity and fidelity to God and his people, which enabled him to promote ecclesiastics in a way hardly consistent with the perfect freedom of elections. The electors acquiesced in what was well done, though in the doing of it a good king set a dangerous example for bad kings to quote. The laws and liberties of England were guaranteed by the coronation oaths of every sovereign. Saxon and Dane alike swore to preserve them. William the Conqueror and his successors, in like manner, bound themselves by their coronation oath to respect them.

But the conflict between traditional liberties and royal customs, which began before the Conquest, became sharper and less tolerable after the Conquest. The rule of our foreign kings was especially despotic, and under them the conflict between legal rights and royal usages brought on the conflict of S. Anselm with Henry I., and the martyrdom of S. Thomas of Canterbury under Henry II.

These laws and liberties may be divided and classed under two heads: first, the liberties of the Church, in its tribunals, goods, appeals, and elections; and secondly, the liberties of the people in respect to inheritance, taxation, military service, and the like.

We need only to take one example, which will serve as the illustration and proof of what I assert.

Henry I., at his coronation, issued a Charter of Liberties. It is, in fact, an amplification of the coronation oath, which runs as follows:

'In the name of Christ I promise to the Christian people subject to me these three things. First, that I will order, and according to my power will take care, that the Church of God and all Christian people shall enjoy true peace by our will at all times: secondly, that I will forbid rapacity and iniquity to all degrees of men: thirdly, that I will enjoin equity and mercy in all judgments, that God, who is pitiful and merciful, may grant to me His mercy.'[4]

This was the bond given by the King to his people, upon which he received the threefold sanction of election by the nation, unction by the Church, and homage from his vassals. This oath is also a limitation of the excesses of William I. and William Rufus. It is also a renunciation of the unlawful customs of the latter, and a restoration of the lawful freedom of the people. This, in fact, is what was intended by the 'laws of King Edward.' And in this outline we see exactly the causes of conflict, namely, the oppression of the Church by the royal power in the case of vacancies and elections, and the oppression of the Barons and tenants by exactions of money and taxation.[5]

The Charter of Henry I. runs as follows:

'In the year of the Incarnation of our Lord 1051, Henry, son of William the King, after the death of his brother William, by the grace of God King of the English, to all the faithful health.

1. Know ye that by the mercy of God, and common counsel of the Barons of the whole kingdom of England, I have been

[4] Stubbs' *Documents*, p. 99. [5] Ibid. p. 99.

crowned king of the same kingdom; and forasmuch as the kingdom has been oppressed by unjust exactions, I, in the fear of God, and in the love I bear towards you, first set free the Holy Church of God, so that I will not sell or pledge [its goods]. Nor on the death of Archbishop, Bishop, or Abbot will I receive anything of the domain of the Church, nor of its members, until a successor shall enter upon it. And all evil customs by which the kingdom of England was unjustly oppressed I will take away, which evil customs I here in part recite.'

Then follow the articles.

The second article relates to inheritance.

The third and fourth to widows.

The fifth to coinage and false money.

The sixth to pleas and debts; the six following to dues, and sureties, and murder, and forests, and the like.

The thirteenth is, 'The law of King Edward I restore to you, with the amendments by which my father, with the advice of his Barons, amended it.'[6]

I have given this outline of the Charter of Henry I. more fully because it is in germ the Magna Charta of Runnymede. In the following reign Stephen issued two Charters in the same express terms. The first, which is the shorter, runs as follows:

'Know ye that I have granted, and by this my present Charter have confirmed, to all my Barons and men in England, all the liberties and good laws which Henry, King of the English, my uncle, gave and granted to them; and I grant to them all good laws and good customs which they had in the time of King Edward.'

Nevertheless Stephen went to war with his Barons and his Bishops. Both parties fought with foreign mercenary troops, to the great misery of the English people.[7]

[6] Stubbs' *Documents*, p. 100. [7] Ibid. pp. 114, 119.

Henry II. swore, at his coronation, to respect the same laws and liberties. He also issued a Charter of Liberties; and in a parliament in London 'he renewed the peace and laws and customs which obtained from antient times throughout England.'[8] Through the whole of his reign Henry endeavoured to enforce his royal 'customs,' the 'avitas consuetudines' of his ancestors, as against the laws and liberties of England. On one occasion, when he swore by God's eyes that he would exact a certain payment from tenants of land, S. Thomas, to protect the people from an oppressive custom, withstood him, saying, 'By the eyes by which you have sworn, not a penny shall be paid from all my land.' The Constitutions of Clarendon were in direct violation of the laws and liberties to which the King had bound himself by oath and by Charter. They violated the liberties of the Church in its tribunals, appeals, elections.

In the reign of Henry II., the conflict was chiefly with S. Thomas and the Church. The Barons sided with the King. They were siding with the stronger, little knowing that they were preparing a scourge for their own back, and that their own turn would come next. In truth, the conflict is always one and the same—the King sometimes against the Barons, sometimes against the Bishops, sometimes against both: it is always the same in kind—that is, of the royal customs violating the laws and liberties, civil and ecclesiastical, of the English people.

We come now to the reign of John. Mr. Stubbs

[8] Stubbs' *Documents*, p. 129.

says that the reign of Richard had separated the interests of the Crown from the interests of the people. The reign of John brought the interests of the people and those of the Barons into the closest harmony.[9] Both alike suffered from arbitrary and excessive taxation, from delay of justice, exactions of military service out of England—that is, in France—outrages of every kind, both public and domestic. Before I go into detail, I will give the picture of King John from a recent historian.

Mr. Greene, in his *History of the English People*, a book of great value, but marred by some inaccuracies, like the historical writings of Lord Macaulay, quotes in English the line of the old chronicler:

'Sordida fœdatur, fœdante Johanne, Gehenna.'

'"Foul as it is, hell itself is defiled by the fouler presence of John." The terrible verdict of the King's contemporaries has passed into the sober judgment of history. In his inner soul, John was the worst outcome of the Angevins. He united into one mass of wickedness their insolence, their selfishness, their unbridled lust, their cruelty and tyranny, their shamelessness, their superstition, their cynical indifference to honour or truth. In mere boyhood, he had torn with brutal levity the beards of the Irish chieftains who came to own him as their lord. His ingratitude and perfidy had brought down his father's hairs with sorrow to the grave. To his brother he had been the worst of traitors. All Christendom believed him to be the murderer of his nephew, Arthur of Brittany. He had abandoned one wife and was faithless to another. His punishments were refinements of cruelty—the starvation of children, the crushing old men under copes of lead. His Court was a brothel, where no woman was safe from the royal lust, and where his cynicism loved to publish the news of his victims' shame. He was as craven in his superstition as he was daring in his impiety. He scoffed at priests, and turned his back on the Mass even amidst the solemnities of his corona-

[9] Stubbs' *Documents*, p. 129.

tion, but he never stirred on a journey without hanging relics round his neck.'[10]

At his coronation in 1199, John swore, in the hands of Hubert, Archbishop of Canterbury, to preserve the liberties of the Church and the laws of the land.[11]

In the year 1200, John began his career of tyranny by seizing all the possessions of the Archbishop of York.[12] The Archbishop excommunicated the officers who had seized his manors. John was enraged at this, but still more enraged because the Archbishop had forbidden the collection of a plough-tax in his diocese.

In the year 1203, the shameless vices of the King, and the loss of his castles in Normandy, caused the Barons who were with him in France to forsake the Court.[13] He then returned to England, and exacted of the Barons a seventh part of their goods: he committed also all manner of rapine by violence against the Church and convents.[14]

John had shown himself to be vicious, sensual, violent, false, tyrannical, and a violator of his coronation oath by infractions of the liberties of the Church and of the laws of the land. But hitherto the authority and statesmanship of Archbishop Hubert had in some degree restrained him. In 1205 the Archbishop died; and on hearing of his death, John said exultingly, 'Now for the first time I am King of England.'[15]

From this date opens a new chapter in John's history.

[10] Greene's *History of the English People*, p. 118.
[11] Matthew Paris, ed. Madden, London, 1866, vol. ii. p. 80.
[12] Ibid. p. 87.
[13] Ibid. pp. 96, 97.
[14] Ibid. p. 99.
[15] Ibid. p. 104.

In order to force his favourite, John de Gray, into the see of Canterbury, he overbore the freedom of the electors.

The Pope annulled the election, and chose Stephen Langton, who was already Cardinal Priest of S. Chrysogonus. This was in the year 1207. He was elected by the monks, and consecrated in Rome. John, in his fury, refused to receive the Archbishop, and drove the monks of Canterbury out of England. The Pope, after sending many envoys and writing many letters to the King without effect, threatened to lay an interdict upon the kingdom. John persisted in his obstinacy, and the interdict was promulgated on March 23, 1208. He then confiscated the property of the Bishops, abbots, priors, and clergy; and seized all their goods for his own use.[16] He inflicted all sorts of personal indignities and cruelties upon ecclesiastics. Being conscious that his enormities had alienated the Barons from him, he endeavoured to compel them to renew their homage. His despotism became minutely vexatious. He forbade the taking of birds throughout England; and commanded the hedges and ditches which protected the harvest-lands to be destroyed.[17] He exacted homage of all freeholders, even from boys of twelve years old; and compelled, for that purpose, the Welsh to come to Woodstock. He then turned his exactions and cruelties, which are well known, against the Jews, both men and women. In the year 1210 he exacted by violence, *vellent nollent*, a hundred thousand pounds sterling from the clergy, which Matthew Paris calls *exactio nefaria*.

[16] Matthew Paris, vol. ii. p. 114. [17] Ibid. p. 119.

At the same time he starved to death the wife and son of one of his nobles.[18] The rapine and violence of John on every class of his people steadily growing more intolerable, the Pope on their appeal absolved his subjects from their allegiance, and forbade them to consort with him *in mensa, consilio et colloquio*. Geoffry of Norwich, a judge of the Exchequer, therefore resigned his office. He was thrown into prison and laden with a cope of lead, under which he soon died.[19] Many nobles, prelates, and others fled from England and died in exile. By John's command twenty-eight youths, surrendered by the Welsh as hostages, were hanged at Nottingham before he would take his food. He was then warned of the defection of his Barons, from whom, by terror, he extorted sons, nephews, and kinsmen as hostages. I have simply taken the chief points of the narrative of Matthew Paris. But it is impossible to give an adequate idea of the misery of the people of England under the tyranny of John. A perpetual cry went up from the face of the whole land. It is said that there was hardly a noble family on which John had not inflicted the indelible stain of some moral outrage. I have briefly brought these things together in order to show that it was in the cause of the whole people that the Pope had throughout exerted his authority. He protected their liberties and their laws. The whole power of Innocent had been used to restrain the violence of the King. When, therefore, nothing availed, the Archbishop, with the Bishops of London and Ely, laid before the Pope John's manifold rebellions and enormities, '*multimodas*

[18] Matthew Paris, vol. ii. pp. 119-124. [19] Ibid. p. 126.

rebelliones et enormitates.' The Pope then, with the unanimous assent of the English people, save only the partisans of John, pronounced the sentence of deposition against him.[20] In the face of this, John exacted of all the religious houses a declaration that what he had extorted from them by violence had been given by them freely. In 1213 the Archbishop and Bishops, with the concurrence of Barons and people, promulgated the sentence of deposition, and the King of France was charged with its execution. Great military preparations were made for the purpose in France. John likewise collected numerous forces in Kent. Nevertheless he knew himself to be excommunicated and deposed, detested by his people, forsaken by his Barons, except a few partisans, and threatened with invasion by a powerful enemy. In this strait two Templars found him at Dover, and told him that a way of escape was yet open; that they were sent by Pandulph, who was on the coast of France, to propose an interview; that if he would submit and obey the Church, all might yet be averted. If not, they said the King of France was at hand, with the exiled Bishops and laymen of England; and that the King of France had letters from nearly all of the nobles of England, binding themselves by fidelity to him.[21]

Matthew Paris gives the following account of these events:

'When the King had heard these things, he was humbled, though against his will, and perturbed in mind, seeing that the peril of confusion hung over him on every side. Sunk therefore

[20] Matthew Paris, vol. ii. p. 130. [21] Ibid. p. 134.

in despair, he acquiesced, whether he would or no, in the persuasions of Pandulph, and made his peace in a form shameful to himself. . . . . The sum of which is that the King, laying aside rancour against every one, would recall all whom he had proscribed, and gave indemnity for all offences and losses.'[22]

At another interview at Dover, on May 15, 1213, John resigned his crown to the Pontiff, as a feudatory to the Holy See. At Michaelmas following, in the cathedral church of S. Paul, London, John renewed his submission to Nicholas, Cardinal Bishop of Tusculum. The words in which this act was done are as follows:

'We will that it be known, that since we have in many things offended God and our Holy Mother the Church, and therefore have great need of Divine mercy, and have nothing that we can worthily offer in satisfaction to God and the Church but ourselves and our kingdom:

We therefore being willing to humble ourselves for His sake (who for us humbled Himself even unto death), the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us, being neither led by force nor constrained by fear, but by our free good-will, and *by the common counsel of our Barons*, we offer and freely grant to God, and the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, and to the Holy Roman Church . . . . the kingdom of England and Ireland,' &c.[23]

Lingard not unreasonably calls this 'a disgraceful act.'[24] It was certainly disgraceful to John, for in doing it he was insincere. It was a bid for the help of the Pope against the Barons. They had invoked the authority of the Pope against him; but he, by making the Pope his feudal suzerain, endeavoured to protect himself against them. By the same act he thought to defeat also the hopes of the King of France. It was an act of cunning, simply out of interest and fear. In this sense it may well be called a disgraceful act. But was

[22] Matt. Paris, vol. ii. p. 135. [23] Rymer, *Fœd.* tom. i. p. 176.
[24] Vol. ii. 331, 332.

vassalage or feudal dependence upon the Head of the Christian world a disgrace to kings? If so, John was not alone in his shame. It was the condition of most of the princes of Christendom. Nay, they were vassals one to another. The King of Scotland was vassal to the King of England; and the King of England was vassal to the King of France. Both were often seen in public on their knees, swearing fealty and doing homage to their feudal lord. John was present when William of Scotland subjected his crown to the King of England; and nine years before, Peter of Arragon voluntarily made himself vassal of Innocent III., binding himself to pay yearly 250 ounces of gold to the Holy See. John's own father, Henry, was feudatory of Pope Alexander III. Henry II. acknowledges this in a letter written to the Pope, preserved by Peter of Blois, his own secretary. In the year after his absolution he wrote thus: 'Vestræ jurisdictionis est Regnum Angliæ, et quantum ad feudatarii juris obligationem vobis duntaxat obnoxius teneor et astringor.'[25] Richard, John's brother, resigned his crown to the Emperor of Germany, and held it on the payment of a yearly rent. John simply did what all these had done before him. But the sting to Englishmen is that the King of England became vassal to an Italian priest. And the nursery tales which pass for history in England have concealed the fact that the whole of the Christian empire of Europe was founded on the same principle. The supreme civil power of Christendom was dependent on the supreme spiritual authority. The Pontiffs

[25] Lingard, vol. ii. p. 19, note.

created the Empire of the West: they conferred the imperial dignity by coronation; they were the ultimate judges of the Emperor's acts, with power of deprivation and deposition. The Christian world at that day saw nothing disgraceful in this sacred imperial jurisprudence.

Let us, however, understand what the feudal dependence involved. It did not create the liability to deposition, for John had been deposed already. All Christian princes by the jurisprudence then in force were liable to deposition. But the feudal relation is expressed in the form of oath taken by John. He promises fidelity to his liege lord, and binds himself to defend him against all conspiracy and danger of life and limb; and to reveal to him all plots, and to defend the patrimony of Peter.[26]

A *feudum* is an immovable possession, held as to its *dominium utile*, or usufruct, of a superior, who has the *dominium supremum*, or suzeranity, with the condition of fidelity and personal service.

John therefore, by surrendering his crown, bound himself to exercise his royal power in conformity with law. The Head of the Christian world became security for this obligation. But all Christian princes were bound to use their power in conformity to law. The submission of John did not deprive his people of the power of legislation, but he thereby bound himself to the Pope to observe faithfully the laws of the land as made by them. His dependence upon the Pope was for the conservation of the liberties of the people. It is

[26] Rymer, *Fœd.* tom. i. p. 177.

acknowledged by all historians that, down to the surrender of the crown, the Pope had supported the Archbishop, the Barons, and the people against the King. He had *multipliciter et multoties*, in a multitude of ways and seasons, as Matthew Paris says, admonished, counselled, expostulated, threatened John, to bring him to law and reason. But John persisted in spoiling, robbing, harrying, afflicting, outraging his people by private wrongs and public wars. All remedies had failed. Excommunication, interdict, deposition, all had been tried in vain. At last John surrenders himself. Innocent for the first time prevailed. He thereby became the arbiter accepted by both contending parties. The Barons, through the Archbishop, and also directly in person, had long invoked his help. John would not listen. Now, at last, he submitted himself; and the Barons were counsellors and partakers of his act of submission. The great council of the Barons united in the act. The cession of the crown was made by their advice and with their consent.[27] They had suffered under John and his ancestors until England had been wounded and torn by domestic strife, and desolated by civil wars. At last they, and the Head of the Christian world, had brought John to submission to the law of Christendom. Their object was the salvation of England. It is clear as day that Innocent's motive was the protection of the people and of the laws and of the liberties of England against the tyranny, perfidy, and personal vices of the worst of kings. A thousand marks a year, or 6000*l.*—that is, 700 from England

[27] Lingard, vol. ii. p. 333.

and 300 from Ireland—was required in acknowledgment of feudal dependence. When this sum is compared with the sum awarded to the Bishops alone as indemnity, namely, 100,000 marks, or 600,000*l.*, it is a mere quit-rent.

And here it is of great importance that the action of the Barons in this surrender of the crown should be put beyond doubt. They were the national party: they represented the people of England: they have been in all histories, great and small, represented as the partisans of the liberties of England. In them, we are told, the liberties of England were condemned at least, if not cursed, by the Pope.

Now, as I have said, we have positive evidence that they were counsellors and partakers in the act of surrender.

First, we have the evidence of William Mauclerc, John's envoy to Rome, who writes to the King describing his interview with the Pope in the Lateran, and states that after his interview four envoys of the Barons came 'deferentes litteras Magnatum Angliæ.' The substance of the letters Mauclerc gives as follows, that all the Barons of the whole of England implored the Pope to admonish, and, if need be, to compel the King to preserve inviolate their ancient liberties, confirmed by the Charters of John's ancestors and by his own oath. He added further:

'They implore the Pope to aid them in this, as it was well known to him that they had boldly opposed the King in defence of the liberty of the Church, at the bidding of the Pope, and that the annual payment which the King had granted to the Pope and the Roman Church, and the other honours which he had

given to the Church of Rome, had been granted and given, not spontaneously, nor out of devotion, but even out of fear, *and by their coercion*.'[28]

The date of this is 1214, a year after the surrender of the crown.

The act of surrender is thus given by Matthew Paris: 'On the 13th of May 1213, the King, with Pandulph, *the Earls, the Barons, and a great multitude*, met at Dover, and *unanimously* agreed in the *forma pacis*, or the engagement of peace.'[29]

Again: 'The King of the English and Pandulph, *cum proceribus Regni*, with the chief men of the kingdom, met at the house of the Knights Templars at Dover on May 15th,' and surrendered the crown.[30]

We come now to a critical period, which, if rightly understood, gives the key to the action and intention of the Pope in the condemnation of the Great Charter.

John had made peace by submission, and by a promise to observe the laws and liberties of England. He had bound himself to make restitution for his exactions and spoliations. This peace was hardly concluded before John broke it. Manifestly he had never intended to keep it. His submission was simply to steal a march upon the Barons, and to renew his conflict with fresh advantage.

After his absolution he convened a jury at S. Albans, to assess the compensation due to the clergy; but he took care to be absent, so that nothing was done.

A second meeting was held at Westminster. John

[28] Rymer, *Fœd.* tom. i. pp. 184-5. [29] Matthew Paris, vol. ii. p. 135.
[30] Ibid. pp. 135-136.

was again absent; again they could do nothing. Then there came up a cry from the country, Barons and people together demanding the fulfilment of his engagements.

While the council was sitting, news came that the King was advancing with an armed force. He was on his way to levy war against the Barons of Northumberland for refusing to go with him to the wars in France. Archbishop Langton met him at Nottingham, and reminded him that to make war on his liegemen was a violation of his oath of peace. With shouts of passion he at last turned back. In September—that is, three months after the peace had been made—the Cardinal Bishop of Tusculum came to adjudicate the matter still in dispute between the King and the clergy. At Michaelmas, in a council held at London, the King pretended to issue a commission to estimate the sums extorted by his officers. But once more it came to nothing. He was visibly dissembling. He then tried to detach the Bishops from the clergy, by offering a restitution to each severally. They referred the proposal to Rome; which suggestion the King caught at, both because of the delay and because he hoped to make the Pope believe the Bishops and clergy to be greedy, grasping, and exorbitant. In this he succeeded. The Cardinal Legate was gained by the King, and began, by his own authority, to fill up the vacant benefices and churches. The Archbishop and his suffragans appealed to Rome; but the Legate persisting, in January 1214 both parties sent their envoys to Rome. On July 1, 1214, the

Legate removed the interdict, which had lasted six years, three months, and fourteen days. He had hardly left S. Paul's Church before a vast multitude of every condition came, laying before him all that they had suffered in limb and property by the exactions and violence of the King's officers. In truth, the peace was no peace, and the settlement settled nothing. The King was dissembling, levying war on the Barons, and oppressing the Church and the people as before.

The Barons therefore consulted for their common safety. At this critical moment the Archbishop produced the Charter of Henry I., and the Barons at once accepted it as the basis of their demands. Thus far they acted in perfect legality. At this moment the defeat of the King's army at Bovines left John without a party in France, and deserted by the Barons of England. He then surrounded himself with mercenaries. On January 7, he went to London; and at the New Temple the Barons came to him with an ostentatious display of military preparation, to demand of him the observance of the Charter of Henry I. He met this by a double trick: the one, a postponement till Easter; the other, the assumption of the Cross of the Crusade. Once more, with a view to separate the Bishops from the Barons, and the Church from the people, John granted a Charter of Liberties to the Church in England. This Charter was sent to Rome and confirmed. The Pope was thereby led to believe that John's intentions were sincere. The Barons persevered in their demands. The King was at Wood-

stock, and the Archbishop remained with him, trying to induce him to grant the demands of the Barons. Nearly the whole baronage of the realm rose in arms, and came with their retainers to Brackley. Here was their first false step. They demanded the Charter. John answered with scorn that he would never grant liberties which would make him a slave. But they were, with one or two exceptions, the liberties he had already sworn to observe. The Barons then appealed to force, defied the King, renounced their homage, and levied war upon him. Their army was led by Robert Fitzwalter, under the name of 'The Army of God and of the Holy Church.' They then came in haste to London. They summoned every man to join them, under pain of being treated as a public enemy. Excepting the King's foreign garrisons, the whole country north of the Thames was in open rebellion. The courts of justice ceased to sit; no man would pay any dues or acknowledge the King's authority. John yielded a second time, and demanded a day for interview with the Barons. On June 18, 1215, they met at Runnymede. The Magna Charta was accepted by the King; but on the spot he sent envoys to Rome to urge its nullity, as being extorted by rebellion, and in disregard of the suzerainty of the Holy See.

It is evident that John, seeing himself helpless in all other ways, determined to bring down the spiritual authority of Innocent upon the Barons. He therefore, with great skill, deceived the Pope, and roused his indignation against them. For this end he heaped together everything that could excite his anger. He

told Innocent that the Barons made light of his letters; that the Archbishops and Bishops neglected to put them in execution; that he had told them in vain that England was the patrimony of S. Peter, and that he held of the Roman Church; that he had taken the Cross; that as a Crusader he desired to treat with them in humility and meekness; that he had offered them the abolition of all evil customs and all griefs; that they were bent on troubling the kingdom; that he had dismissed his foreign troops, though in so doing he had deprived the Crusade of most important and powerful aids, &c.[31] It is impossible to carry diplomatic craft to a higher perfection.

John simply deceived the Pope into a belief that he was sincere, and that the Barons, and even the Bishops, were rebels to him, and contumacious to the Holy See. But he went even beyond this. He forged the seals of the Bishops, and wrote everywhere abroad in their name, saying that 'the English were detestable apostates, and that the King and the Pope would confirm their possessions to whomsoever would take up arms against them.'

Again, in the month of September, after the acceptance of the Charter in June, he wrote saying that the Barons were devoted to him before he submitted to the Holy See, and from that time turned against him, and 'especially, as they publicly said, for that cause they violently rose against him.'[32] It was no wonder that the Pope was offended and incensed.

In all this the dissimulation of John outdid itself.

[31] Rymer, *Fœd.* tom. i. p. 200. [32] Ibid. p. 207.

Innocent had no choice. On the 24th of August, the envoys received apostolic letters condemning the Barons.[33]

II. We have now traced the antecedents of the Great Charter, and we may estimate its condemnation, and the motives and extent of that condemnation.

1. The event is recorded by Matthew Paris in these words: 'Then the Pope, after deliberation at his will, by a definitive sentence condemned and annulled the oft-named Charter of Liberties of the kingdom of England, though it contained things pious and just, as a careful inspector may see.'[34] The Pope nowhere denies that it contained 'pia et justa;' but things pious and just may be demanded in a way contrary both to justice and to piety; and this is my contention.

2. The Pope here explicitly declares the cause of the condemnation, namely:

(1.) That the Barons had levied war against their sovereign.

(2.) That he was a feudal vassal of the Holy See.

(3.) That he had taken the Cross.

(4.) That their cause was already in appeal before the Holy See.

(5.) That they had taken the law into their own hands.

3. There is not here so much as a single word as to the contents of the Great Charter.

4. The first part of it was the Charter of Eccle-

[33] Rymer, tom. i. p. 208.

[34] Matthew Paris, vol. ii. p. 162.

siastical Liberties granted by John, and already confirmed by Innocent.

5. All other details, social, economical, and political, had been for centuries in use, and confirmed by successive sovereigns, in full peace and communion with the Holy See. It was in behalf of these same laws and liberties that the Pope had been for years admonishing and urging the King. They had been already embodied in successive Charters, on which no shadow of censure from Rome had ever fallen.

6. The very same laws and liberties, with only three or four exceptions, were, within a year of the condemnation of the Great Charter of John, confirmed by Gualio, Legate of the Pope, in the Charter of Henry III.; and these exceptions were not made by the Pope, but by the Barons themselves, into whose hands the government of the kingdom during the minority of the King had fallen.[35]

It would seem to me, therefore, to be proved even to demonstration, that the Pope condemned, not the Charter, but the Barons; not the laws and liberties set down in the Charter, but the way and action by which the Barons had wrung it from their sovereign. The Pope quashed and annulled the Charter as a contract, and forbade either side to plead or act upon

[35] Mr. Greene says that the articles omitted in the first Charter of Henry III. were re-inserted under the influence of Archbishop Langton. I do not find the evidence of this statement. Neither Matthew Paris nor Hovenden, so far as I can see, say so: and the *Annals of Dunstable*, quoted by Mr. Stubbs (*Documents*, &c., p. 323), expressly say that in the year 1225, when the King had attained majority: 'Libertates prius ab eo puero concessas, jam major factus, indulsit.' This does not indeed exclude, but it does not imply, any re-insertion of articles.

it; but not one word as to its contents is to be found.

The only argument that I can conceive to the contrary is that the Pope, in his letter of cassation, describes the Charter as '*turpis et vilis, illicita et iniqua.*'[36] But this, again, is evidently said of the whole action, by which the King was forced by his own liegemen into a submission and a humiliation second only to that of the surrender of his crown. There is not a shadow of evidence to show that these epithets apply to the laws or liberties as expressed in the Charter.

On all these grounds, therefore, I affirm once more that, in condemning the Charter, Innocent condemned the action of the Barons, and not the liberties of England.

In order to bring this out more clearly, we will sum up the chief contents of the Great Charter of Liberties.

It begins with a recital of the Charter of Liberties issued on January 15, 1215, and confirmed by the Pope, which begins 'Anglicana Ecclesia libera sit, et habeat jura sua integra, et libertates suas illæsas.'

This certainly was not condemned by Innocent.

Then follow sixty-two articles, relating to inheritance, taxation, common pleas, trial by peers, weights, measures, imprisonment, safe conducts, and the like.

A man must be not a little credulous who can believe that Innocent III. saw in these details the subject-matter of a Pontifical condemnation. They had been the laws and liberties of England for gene-

[36] Rymer, tom. i. p. 204.

rations; and no Pope had ever seen in them matter for his supreme cognisance. What Innocent was really dealing with was what I may call the constitutional law of Christian kingdoms, and of the jurisprudence of the Christian world. In this, authority and liberty are both sacred; despotism and rebellion both crimes against God and man. The Pope, as supreme judge, took cognisance of these *causæ majores*, these high causes of Christian civilisation; but that he should occupy himself about such matters as the details of Magna Charta could only come—as an Englishman, I take leave to say—into the head of an Englishman, and then only if he be either innocent of history or a scientific historian. The thirty-fifth article runs:

'Let there be one measure for wine throughout all our kingdom, and one measure for beer, and one measure for oats—that is, the London quartern; and one breadth for cloth, dyed russet, and hauberk—that is, two ells within the listings; and let it be with weights as with measures.'

The pastoral vigilance of Popes is great, but it hardly reaches to the weights and measures and quarterns and ells and gallons of Christendom.

Mr. Stubbs seems to me to confirm the view I have been maintaining. He says:

'In the ecclesiastical disputes, which are the next feature of the reign, John had to contend with the greatest of all the successors of Peter, and with a spirit in the National Church which was unquestionably maintained by the knowledge of the great power and success of the Pope in other parts of Christendom. The Barons refrained from taking advantage of those peculiar difficulties, nor did their overt opposition to the King begin, until his relations with the Papacy had changed. As soon as the Papal authority begins to back the royal tyranny the Barons determine to resist; and the Church having recovered, in Archbishop

Langton, its natural leader, resumes its ordinary attitude as the supporter of freedom.'[37]

And afterwards he adds :

'The country saw that the submission of John to Innocent placed its liberty, temporally and spiritually, at his mercy; and immediately demanded safeguards.'

That is, the Charter of Henry I. And again :

'The personal hatred which John had inspired . . . . was so strong . . . . that, had it not been for the King's death, England would have most probably carried out a change in dynasty.'[38]

I would venture to slightly differ in some points from this statement.

The ecclesiastical disputes did not rally the Barons to the support of the Church in the time of John, any more than in the time of Henry II. With few exceptions, the Barons sided with Henry against S. Thomas. On the other hand, Mr. Stubbs has truly discerned that the 'spiritual and devotional' Bishops, with certain exceptions, were always on the side of popular freedom. The Barons acted with the Pope so long as he endeavoured to bring the King to reason in their own interests; but they opposed both the King and the Pope when Innocent censured their rebellion. This shows that neither before nor afterwards were they acting in co-operation with any cause of law or liberty except their own. They had appealed to the Pope as much as, if not oftener than, the King. They not only accepted the Pontifical deposition of the King, but afterwards, when he had been absolved and re-

[37] Stubbs' *Documents*, p. 269. [38] Ibid. p. 270.

stored, they secretly transferred their allegiance to the King of France. Tyrant as John was, the Barons were guilty both of treason and rebellion. Their opposition to Innocent began when he told them so. The Pope gave support, not to John's tyranny, but to the King's right. He offered to hear both parties; but the Barons would not listen, and levied war. Innocent, before John's surrender, had not backed them in rebellion, but in their just demands; and he backed John afterwards, not in tyranny, but in his honour as a King. Nowhere did Innocent pronounce on the merits of either side. He expressly declared, in his condemnation of the Barons, that they had refused all proposals of judicial settlement. So much for the Barons in their relation to the Church. But, as Mr. Stubbs truly notes, 'the ordinary attitude' of the Church in England in that day, as everywhere and always, was as 'the supporter of freedom;' and the Archbishop was 'its natural leader,' a true successor of S. Anselm and S. Thomas, in its conflict for liberty. And with this notable difference from the Barons: they rarely, if ever, sided with the Church in its conflict for its own liberties. The Church always sided with them and with the people, in their conflict for the laws and liberties of England. This brings out more luminously than I could hope to do the thesis I have undertaken to defend.

Once more, it may be urged that so absolute was the condemnation of the Charter, that even Cardinal Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, was suspended *ab ingressu Ecclesiæ et a divinis* for the part he had in it.

Nothing, perhaps, will bring out more clearly the distinction I have drawn above, between the condemnation of the Barons and the condemnation of the matter of the Charter, than the suspension of the Archbishop.

Believing that the Legate had been gained over by the King and his adherents, and that the mind of the Pope had been biassed by partial informations laid before him by the Archbishop of Dublin and the Bishop of London, whom the King had sent to Rome, so as to be really deceived, the Archbishop decided on going in person to Rome. A Bull then arrived to excommunicate all the disturbers of the King and realm of England. The Archbishop was already on board ship when the Bishop of Winchester and Pandulph came and urged him to publish the Bull throughout the province of Canterbury. The Archbishop, believing the Bull to be obreptitious, and that, if he could lay before the Pope the full and true state of the case, it would be averted, would not publish it. The two commissioners then used their powers given in the Bull to suspend the Archbishop from his office. Without contention or remonstrance, he proceeded to Rome.

On his arrival he found the Pope greatly incensed, and on his petition to be released from suspension Innocent answered:

'Not so, brother; you will not so easily get absolution for all the harm you have done, not to the King of England only, but to the Roman Church. We will take full counsel with our brothers here what your punishment must be.'

The Fourth Council of Lateran was then sitting, and the Archbishop took his place in it; but he was

under suspension from November 12 to the Easter following.

On this it is to be said that there is not one word to show that the subject-matter of the Charter was condemned. The harm done to the King was the encouragement given to the Barons in their armed opposition; the harm done to the Roman Church was both the violation of the suzerainty of the Holy See and refusal to publish the excommunication. The cause of his suspension was not one of detail, but of the *alta politica* of the civil and ecclesiastical jurisprudence of Europe at that time. There is no doubt that John was a tyrant, and as little doubt that the Barons were rebels; and it cannot be denied that the Archbishop was in contumacy. Under the conditions of the law then existing, no other judgment could be formed. It is a simple stupidity to judge such questions by the laws of the nineteenth century. Before the merits of the Magna Charta could be tried, the rebellion of the Barons, and the contumacy of the Archbishop, must first be judged. And it is to this I have endeavoured to direct the attention of those who, in their endeavour to make men believe that the Catholic Church is the friend of despotism and the enemy of liberty, shut their eyes to history, and yet believe themselves to be scientific.

Let Innocent III. declare for himself the motives of his condemnation.

In his apostolic letters,[39] addressed to all whom they may concern, he first sets forth that John, King

[39] Rymer, *Fœd.* tom. i. pp. 203-4.

of England, had grievously offended against God and the Church; that therefore he had been excommunicated, and his kingdom laid under interdict; that at last, by God's grace returning to himself, he had repented, and made satisfaction humbly to God and the Church, recompense for losses, restitution for what he had seized, and had given full liberty to the Church in England. The Pope, therefore, absolved him, and received him to the oath of fidelity and feudal dependence. After this he took the Cross of the Crusade. The Pope then narrates how the Barons rose against him, and how, after many efforts of conciliation, he had written to annul all plots and conspiracies, and to exhort the Barons to respect the royal authority, and to prefer to him their demands, not insolently, but with humility. He states, further, that he had written to the King, enjoining him to treat the Barons and Nobles with gentleness, and to concede their just petitions.

The Barons, he adds, did not wait for his messenger, but in violation of their oath of fidelity, and making themselves judges and executors in their own cause, they, being vassals, publicly conspired against their lord — soldiers against their king — and united with his enemies to make war against him; laid waste his lands, and seized by treachery the city of London, the seat of the kingdom. The Pope then recounts the proposals of the King which they had rejected; and finally that they had, by force and fear, extorted from the King a convention which was vile and base, and

moreover illicit and wicked, in derogation and diminution of the right and honour of the King.

Innocent then annuls the Charter, and forbids either side to observe it, under pain of excommunication; quashing, he says, as well the Charter as its obligations and engagements, *whatsoever they be*, and altogether depriving them of all obliging force.

Now in all this there is not a word as to the subject-matter of the Charter itself.

In the same terms he wrote also to the Barons:

'Præsertim enim in causa vestra vos judices et executores feceritis: eodem Rege parato, in curia sua, vobis per pares vestros secundum consuetudines et leges Regni, justitiæ plenitudinem exhibere: vel coram nobis, ad quos hujus causæ judicium, ratione Domini, pertinebat.'

He then adds:

'Cum igitur illa compositio (since therefore the compact), qualis qualis (of whatever kind it be), to which by force and fear you constrained him, is not only vile and base, but unlawful and wicked, so as to be reprobated by all, chiefly because of the manner in which it was made, *maxime propter modum*, we therefore,' &c.

The Pope then annuls it as before. Innocent further says:

'As we will not that the King be deprived of his right, so we will that he desist from oppressing you, lest the kingdom of England be oppressed by evil customs or unjust exactions.'

He then bids them send envoys, that in the council, where the Bishops of England were present, the disputes might be treated and terminated, 'so that the King might be content with his right and honour, and

the clergy and people at large might enjoy due peace and liberty.'[40]

Now in these, which are the governing documents of the whole question, there is not so much as a word as to the contents of Magna Charta. Indeed it is expressly excluded—'Compositio illa, qualis qualis' (whatever its quality may be). Again, there is a distinct recognition of 'gravamina, pravæ consuetudines, iniquæ exactiones.' Finally, '*maxime propter modum*' declares the chief motive to be the manner in which the Barons had enacted the Charter by force and fear.

I have thus far examined the subject as if it were incumbent upon me to prove that Innocent did not condemn the contents of the Charter. But it is for those who say that he did so to give proof of their assertion. I have not to prove a negative, and may well wait till they bring evidence. Hitherto I have heard none. And I take leave to say that none has been brought because none can be found, and none can be found because no such evidence ever existed.

I am well aware that Mr. Freeman has said:

'In the latter days of John, and through the whole reign of Henry III., we find the Pope and the King in strict alliance against the English Church and nation. The last good deed done by a Pope towards England was when Innocent III. sent us Stephen Langton. Ever afterwards we find Pope and King leagued together to back up each other's oppressions and exactions. The Papal power was always ready to step in on behalf of the Crown, always ready to hurl spiritual censures against the champions of English freedom. The Great Charter was denounced at Rome: so was its author, the patriot Primate.'[41]

[40] Rymer, tom. i. p. 205.

[41] *The Growth of the English Constitution*, pp. 76, 77.

I hope that I have set this last sentence in its true light. The rest of this quotation needs a separate treatment. If Mr. Freeman and Mr. Bryce had mastered the history of the Catholic Church with the breadth of grasp with which they have treated the Holy Roman Empire, the work of Mr. Bryce, and the review of it by Mr. Freeman, would be two historical documents of unequalled value. It is the absence of this (which is the main element in mediæval history) that disturbs the balance of their judgment. The action of the Pontiffs in sustaining the sovereignties of the Christian world was prompted, not by despotic affinities, but by the words of Holy Writ, 'Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.'[42] But on this we cannot enter now.

[42] Rom. xiii. 1, 2.

VIII.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Delivered at the Academia of the Catholic Religion, Manchester, January 10, 1876.

When I received the invitation of the Bishop of Salford to deliver the inaugural address at the opening of this Academia I had a special motive which made me very gladly accept it. About eleven years ago, it fell to my lot, by command of my Bishop, the late Cardinal, during his last illness, to take a foremost part in founding the Academia of the Catholic religion in London. The Cardinal himself was unable to undertake the work, and he deputed me to fulfil it. According to the best of my power I executed the task. The Cardinal published at the time an invitation to those who would become members of the Academia, from which I will read a few words. 'Next to the exercise of its purest spiritual office, the Church has in all ages bestowed its special care on the cultivation of the intellect and the advancement of science, making the Word of God the interpretation of His works, and His works the illustration of His Word, and the science of God the centre and light of the manifold and various orders of human knowledge. For this cause the Church of God has

always given special encouragement to the studies which demonstrate the connection between science and revealed religion, thereby applying the truths and laws of the intellectual and natural world to the confirmation of the faith.'[1] Cardinal Wiseman then went on to say, that at the beginning of the present century, when the sceptical and infidel literature of Germany and France penetrated throughout Europe, there was formed an Academia in Rome for the purpose of cultivating this special aspect of science; and he next affirmed that the circumstances of our day seemed to demand in England an institution of the same kind; that 'the intellectual condition of England at that moment was such as to alarm the least anxious as to the divergence of sacred and secular science, and the unnatural position in which they seemed to stand; and that rationalistic tendencies of thought in an advanced form had explicitly shown themselves in the most educated centres of England.' Such was the purpose with which the Academia was founded in the diocese of Westminster. It has endured for eleven years, I am happy to say, without flagging. Its sessions have been maintained, papers have been read which have been printed and published in three volumes, of which two lie here before me. Of their quality you must judge for yourselves. I can say that the benefit of the Academia has been very great. It has, first of all, attracted and bound together a number of Catholics of all ages; men who desire to cultivate

[1] Preface to vol. i. *Essays on Religion and Literature* (Longmans, 1865).

science and literature in relation to faith. It has enabled them to correspond, and to co-operate together, and to form what I may call a Catholic opinion outside of faith. I have observed a very perceptible growth of a solid Catholic opinion resulting, in my belief, in no small degree from the action of the Academia. These, I believe, are the motives which have made you desire to transplant, as it were, the Academia to Manchester.

1. The late Cardinal, in the instructive passage from which I have already quoted, spoke pointedly of the visible tendency which exists in England to separate off science and to oppose it to faith. The other day there fell into my hands an example of this tendency. I do not refer to it in any spirit hostile to the writer. I am under no temptation to do so, for I know him personally, and can bear testimony to his highly amiable and excellent private character. He is a man endowed with a singular facility and beauty of imagination, a strange subtilty of thought, a poetic power which seems to tinge and to pervade even his science; and when he gambols in the world of light, which is his own, and floats in the azure amidst the beauties and the glories of the empyrean, no one is more ready than I am to admire and acknowledge the singular gifts of which he is possessed. But when a spirit so ethereal clothes itself in the buff jerkin of Cromwell's Ironsides, or in the mailed coat of a Lutheran trooper, it seems to me somewhat incongruous, and I trust I may be pardoned by my friend if I regard his masquerade with some little kindly amusement. Well, the other day a letter under the

title, 'The Vatican and Physics,' appeared in that broadsheet which flies over the whole world, and therefore I may freely use it. The writer quoted a passage of singular excellence from the Bishop of Montpellier, who, addressing the Dean and Professors of Montpellier, laid down what I may call the first principles which you, as members of the Academia, are bound stoutly to affirm. The Bishop said: 'Now, gentlemen, the whole Church holds herself to be invested with the absolute right to teach mankind. She holds herself to be the depository of the truth, not a fragmentary truth, not a mixture of certainty and hesitation, but the total truth, complete from a religious point of view. Much more; she is so sure of the infallibility conferred on her by the Divine Founder as the magnificent dowry of their indissoluble alliance, that even in the natural order of things, scientific or philosophical, moral or political, she will not admit that a system can be adopted and sustained by Christians if it contradicts definite dogmas. She considers that the voluntary and obstinate denial of a single point of her doctrine involves the crime of heresy, and she holds that all formal heresy, if it be not courageously rejected prior to appearing before God, carries with it the certain loss of grace and of eternity. As defined by Pope Leo X., at the Sixth Council of the Lateran, truth cannot contradict itself; consequently every assertion contrary to a revealed verity of faith is necessarily and absolutely false. It follows from this, without entering into the examination of this or that question of physiology, that solely

by the certitude of our dogmas we are able to pronounce judgment on any hypothesis which is an Anti-christian engine of war rather than a serious conquest over the secrets and mysteries of Nature.' Then follow the words of my friend in his letter to the *Times:* 'Liberty is a fine word, tyranny a hateful one, and both have been eloquently employed of late in reference to the dealings of the secular arm with the pretensions of the Vatican. But "liberty" has two mutually exclusive meanings—the liberty of Rome to teach mankind, and the liberty of the human race. Neither reconcilement nor compromise is possible here. One "liberty" or the other must go down. This in our day is the "conflict" so impressively described by Draper, in which every thoughtful man must take a part. There is no dimness in the eyes of Rome as regards her own aims; she sees with a clearness unapproached by others that the school will be either her stay or her ruin. Hence the supreme effort she is now making to obtain the control of education; hence the assertion made by the Bishop of Montpellier of her "absolute right" to teach mankind. She has, moreover, already tasted the fruits of this control in Bavaria, where the very liberality of an enlightened king led to the fatal mistake of confiding the schools of the kingdom to the "Doctors of Rome."' Now I must answer that if the Catholic Church has the liberty to teach all mankind, this does not necessarily deprive all mankind of the liberty which mankind seems to claim of disbelieving what she teaches. The Catholic Church puts no force or

strain upon mankind further than the jurisdiction which evident truth has over the intellect and over the conscience. There is nothing 'mutually exclusive' here, except that wheresoever truth manifests its light, and the reason of man is convinced, he is bound to believe it. This is, indeed, a jurisdiction of truth which a man of science would hardly reject. Professor Tyndall went on to say, 'There is no dimness in the eyes of Rome as regards its own aims; she sees with a clearness unapproached by others that the school will be either her stay or her ruin.' Well, I will be bold to say that the school has never been the ruin of the Catholic Church yet, and never will be. Whether the school was the stay of the Church I will not stop to pronounce; but I am sure of this, that the Church has been the creator of every school, and therefore it seems to me that we have no need to fear the multiplication of schools of science—if, indeed, they are schools of science, and not schools of perverted intellect. That, and that alone, is what we fear. In order that I may more clearly bring out what is the relation of the Church and of Faith to matters of science, I will read a passage from the great Doctor on whose philosophy we rest firmly to this day—S. Thomas Aquinas—who in his book, *Contra Gentes*, says: 'Falsehood alone is contrary to truth. Whatsoever arguments may be laid down as against the teachings of faith, they cannot proceed rightly from the first principles of Nature, which are known by themselves. Therefore they have not the force of demonstration, but are either probabilities or sophistries, and there

is a way of solving them still open' (lib. i. ch. vii.). The Vatican Council says: 'But though faith be above reason, yet no true variance can ever exist between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals mysteries and inspires faith implanted the light of reason in the mind of man. But God cannot contradict Himself; nor can truth ever contradict truth. Every assertion, therefore, contrary to the illumination of faith we define to be altogether false. Moreover the Church, which, together with the apostolic office of teaching, received commandment to guard the deposit of faith, has both the right and the duty of Divine commission to proscribe science falsely so called' (First Const., On Catholic Faith, chap. iv.). Once more, in the chapter on the relation of faith to reason, the Council says: 'Wherefore, so far from truth is it that the Church is opposed to the cultivation of human arts and knowledge that in many ways the Church helps and promotes that culture; for it neither ignores nor despises the benefits which flow into the life of men from such arts and knowledge, but it ever recognises them as coming from God the Lord of science, so that if rightly treated they lead by God's grace to Himself. Nor does it indeed forbid that all such arts and sciences should employ their own proper principles and their own proper method within their own limits; but, recognising this just liberty, it is carefully on its guard lest by conflicting with Divine teaching they receive error into themselves, or by going beyond their proper boundaries they invade and disturb the things which are of

faith' (ibid.). These are the principles which the Church has laid down on the relation in which it stands towards science and the physical world. I will endeavour to point out somewhat in detail what is the application of these principles, and bring it to bear upon the work of the Academia.

2. For the last three hundred years there has been an attempt continually going on to effect two things—first, to separate science and politics from revelation; and secondly, to oppose science and politics to the Church. For three hundred years this labour has been incessant. We have been told that the Church has no jurisdiction within the realms of science. We have been told that it ought to have nothing to do with politics. In fact, the world has tried to send the Church to Coventry. I am afraid that, as when the messenger came to Diogenes and told him that the Athenians had banished him, he said, 'Well, then, Diogenes banishes the Athenians,' so the Church, when she receives that courteous message from the men of science, must make a respectful bow, and say, 'We are afraid we must banish you.' But the Church does not banish science. It banishes only those who under the name of science would break up the unity of all knowledge, which, as it comes from one Source and one Author, may be distinguished, as Lord Bacon said, by rivers and boundaries like a continent, but cannot be parted; it is one indivisible whole. First of all, we have it from the Vatican Council that there is no opposition between reason, however cultivated and scientific, and faith; but that reason is made perfect by faith. For

reason is a Divine light in the order of Nature, whereby we can attain a knowledge of the world and of the physical sciences of the world by observation ; together with the knowledge which lies within the ken and reach of the senses and of the intellect: and also the knowledge of ourselves. If reason be a Divine light, faith also is a Divine light, of the supernatural order, illuminating and elevating reason to a more perfect knowledge, not only of God, but of man and of morals, that is, of the relations between God and man. Then certainly there can be no discord and no conflict between reason and faith. In truth, the wreck of the world came from intellectual error, and the beginning of intellectual error was a word which I am afraid the men of science will not forgive me if I say anything to discredit. We are told by Lord Bacon that science is a 'questioning of Nature.' Well, the word which first perverted the reason was 'Why.' 'Why hath God said?' and then the contradiction, 'God hath not said:' and then it suggested a motive, 'for God doth know,' and 'ye shall be as gods.' Out of these intellectual temptations came the first intellectual perversion, and after that perversion of the intellect came the perverted act of the will. In truth, there can be no act of the will which does not pass through the intellect. There cannot be an act of the will unless the reason have first proposed to itself a motive for its action. Intellect is said in philosophy to carry the light before the will, to show the path; and therefore right knowledge has a close relation to the will, and a perverted intellect is the destruction of

the will. The will is perverted at the same moment as the intellect, for the will conforms itself to the dictates of reason, or, to put it in the formula of a wise man who used to say, one error in principle is worse than a hundred errors in practice. A hundred errors in practice may be nothing more than occasional blundering, but one error in principle is the perpetual and inexhaustible source of an indefinite number of errors. There can be no act of the will which is not preceded by an act of reason. When once the reason is perverted the will follows in that perversion.

Let us go a little further. It follows from this that the rectification or sanctification of the intellect is a vital part of the commission of the Church. 'Go ye and teach all nations;' 'Go ye and make disciples of all nations,' is the full rendering of these words. This lays down a primary truth. The teaching begins in the intellect; and the rectification of the intellect, if the will obeys, rectifies the will; and in this great commission of the Church the rectification of the intellect of the world, and the restoration of it to the true knowledge of God, the true knowledge of man, and the true knowledge of morals,—all this is a vital condition of the restoration of mankind to the image to which he was created. The Church in the Vatican Council has defined its office of guarding the knowledge of science in all its contacts with revelation. It leaves to every science, as it has expressly declared, a full and just liberty to use its own principles and methods within its own limits. It only interposes when, exceeding those limits and trespassing upon the realm of revelation, science

invades that which is not its own, and perturbs the truths of faith—that is to say, whenever science comes in contact with revelation there revelation is supreme, and there, as S. Thomas Aquinas has laid it down in the words I have read, apparent demonstrations are not demonstrations. They may be plausible, and for a time they may be treated as probabilities, but they are sophistries, and in the end they will be solved and pass away. It follows again from this that it is not possible to send the Church to Coventry, because the commission of the Church pervades in some sort all the regions of science. As we say of sovereignty, its jurisdiction runs everywhere: so we say of revelation. For instance, what would seem further from revelation than the physical science of geology and the like? and yet the words, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,' enter into physical science. The creation of the world is an axiom, I may say, even in the physical science of the world, and an axiom derived from revelation. It was precisely this axiom which made the distinction between the heretics of old, who ascribed the existence of the world to the eternity of matter or to the creative power of an inferior or evil being. The creation, then, is an axiom of science, which from revelation runs into geology. Again, the descent of man from a single pair and the unity of mankind are also truths of revelation, against which a multitude of scientific men, if I may so call them, are at this moment contending, with every weapon and every instrument they can wield, to destroy our certainty. In this question revelation has its place, and no man who

believes in the revelation of God can yield a hair's breadth. Metaphysics, pure mental philosophy, would seem to lie outside of revelation, but the question arises, Is there such a thing as a soul? or does matter think? Here again revelation has something to say. Once more, is there such a thing as a moral sense, or are right and wrong mere conventional sensations arising out of the habit of attaching a sense of fear or shame to particular actions? Or again, are moral habits learnt, as I once heard a very notable and ready speaker maintain, like the tumbling of pigeons? Tumbling, he said, is only a skilful evolution which the parent bird teaches its young to make. The young ones learn to follow parental example, and under the training so acquired they form the habit of tumbling, and transmit it to posterity. So in like manner the notions of right and wrong are said to be acquired, and to have no foundation in the intrinsic distinction of things. Here again revelation has something to say. There is a soul, there is a conscience, there is a supreme Lawgiver. Thus revelation runs with its jurisdiction into mental philosophy and into metaphysics. We are told also that religion has nothing to do with politics. I would ask, what are politics but the collective morals of men living together in society? The moral laws which govern man as an individual govern him if he be the member of a community; be it the community of a household or the community of a State. I can find no distinction between morals and politics but this—that politics are morals upon a large scale, and that morals are politics upon a narrow scale. When I am told that morals and

politics are to be separated, or that politics and religion are to be separated, I answer: if you cannot separate politics from morals, and cannot separate morals from religion, then it will be very difficult to separate politics from religion. In fact they make one whole, and hence revelation and the Divine law enter into the whole range of political science. I do not mean to say that revelation has to do immediately with questions of excise or with the penalties for smuggling. I am not speaking of politics in that minute sense, but of the great constructive laws by which human society is held together.

3. If that be so, it is clear, and beyond doubt, that the Catholic Church has an all-important office in these matters, and that there is no power upon earth that can separate either science or society from revelation. The Church having a Divine liberty as the witness which God has constituted in the world to deliver His revelation, and being the sole fountain of that knowledge, has within its sphere a sovereignty, and that sovereignty is one which is exempt from all control of human authority. No authority on earth can intervene to dictate to the Church what it has to teach, or within what limits it shall teach. There is no authority to determine whether the Church shall teach or not this or that doctrine. It is therefore not only exempt, but supreme, and being supreme, there can be no appeal from it. It is the highest and final judge of what is the faith and what is the law of God, and when science and politics come into contact with that faith and that law it admits of no appeal from its own decision to any tribunal out of itself, to any judge of appeal in the past or in the future. It

stands as sole witness to the truth which God has planted in the world. If that be so, then it follows as a general conclusion that the attempt to separate theology from science and society is both contrary to faith and contrary to reason. I will go so far as to affirm that science has never yet demonstrated anything contrary to faith. When men talk of Galileo, I answer that Galileo did not demonstrate. He enunciated a hypothesis, and that hypothesis was not demonstrated for a century afterwards. Lord Bacon lived and died disbelieving the hypothesis. Sir Thomas Brown, one of the greatest literary men of the seventeenth century, also died disbelieving it. When Newton demonstrated the law of gravitation, he demonstrated nothing to touch the faith; but as soon as he proved it, the Church at once recognised it. It had carefully guarded the popular and visible interpretation of the historical words of Scripture, lest without cause the mind of man should be perturbed, and doubts should be insinuated without necessity or power of solution; but as soon as that demonstration was made the Church gave full scope to science to use its own method and its own principles within its own limits, as the Vatican Council has declared. The language of Holy Scripture in this matter is the language of men, as it is the language of sense, which we use to this very day. We still say 'the sun rises' and 'the sun sets,' in spite of Galileo and in spite of Newton. We use the language of sense, which is the only language that the mass of men can understand, and we do so because Scripture is not a revelation of science. The revelation which God has given us is in another

sphere and on another plane. It has no collision with physical science, because it is not a revelation of science. It has come into contact with the facts of the world in the points here spoken of, in the creation, in the nature of man, in his social and moral life, in his free will, in the law written upon the conscience, in his responsibility. These are matters of revelation in its proper province. The question whether or no the world moves round the sun or the sun moves round the world is a matter of science on which there is no revelation. I am bold enough to say that there never has been any demonstration of science which is in contradiction with any of the truths of revelation, and those who put that theory forward put it forward either from want of a clear knowledge of what revelation is, or from some mistaken opinion of their own which they suppose to be scientific. In like manner, I may say that society—the social and political orders of mankind—in the sense which I have been describing, has no doctrines or laws contrary to the faith. That must be self-evident, for what is society but the natural order and state of man in which he is placed by virtue of his birth and of the relations which are formed round about him? These are from God; and the authority and order and law and obedience which constitute domestic life expand into the civil order of politics. The order of Nature is from God, and is therefore Divine. The Church and revelation are likewise from Him, and the whole order and authority of the Church are in perfect harmony, the supernatural with the natural. There does not exist either a law or a truth in respect to politics which is out of harmony with the law of faith.

4. If that be so, I may obviously draw another very definite conclusion: I mean that the isolation of theology from science, simply impossible as it is, in no way affects the supremacy and sovereignty of revelation, which continues to discharge its own office undiminished in light and power. But such isolation has its effect on the other side. The isolation of faith in the world is the atheism of the world. If the world banishes the Church and the revelation of God from science and from itself, then society is without God, and that is political atheism. If theology be banished from morals, then man is without God. And that is the best definition that I know of heathenism. I know of no axiom surer than this, 'Without God no society,' and for this reason: without God there is no law, and without law society cannot be. If men were to combine together in a society without law to-day, they would be disintegrated and in ruin before sunrise to-morrow. Therefore, without God there is no political society, no social order, no domestic life, no human society.

5. I may draw another conclusion from the premises I have laid down, namely, that the unity of the faith gives unity to all knowledge. As Lord Bacon said, there is a hierarchy of sciences, but above all there is one, and that one is transcendent, and its jurisdiction is universal and its sovereignty pervades all. The queen of all science is theology or the revelation of God in its scientific form; or in other words, God is in all things, whether it be science or theology. God is the Creator, and His law pervades all fields of life and light. There is no part of God's works which is not seen in the light

of God's presence. All His works are seen in the light of the sun, whether men reflect on it or no; and as it is in the light of the sun that we make our scientific observations, so, whether we recognise it or not, all science is in God. All things are in God, and God in all things. In truth, the sunlight of revelation is like the sunlight of the noonday, and I know only two classes of creatures who have any reason to quarrel with it—owls and bats. I do not see what men gain in believing that there is no God. I do not believe that science will be advanced a step by a mere negation. The regenerated reason is lifted above itself, and being elevated by a higher light it has a wider horizon, and within the circuit of that horizon it sees new truths invisible before. By diligent self-culture the man who has two lights can see farther and more widely than the man who has one alone. If he has the light of reason a man may be an Aristotle, a Whewell, or a Tyndall in philosophy; but if he has also the light of faith it is certain that the light of Nature would not be diminished, but the light of the whole man would be doubled. As the Vatican Council declares, and the Holy Father has declared again and again, both philosophers and philosophy are subject to revelation, because God is the fountain of knowledge.

And now I ask you, what reason has the Church to be afraid of the school? Where was the first school founded? In the house of the bishop. Where did it go next? Into the monastery. Where did it go afterwards but into the university? and who founded the university? Who covered the whole face of the country with the first germs of our grammar schools? Who has

been labouring in these last ages, wherever it has not had its hands tied by royal prerogatives or by legislative statutes, to educate the poor? The mother of the poor —the Catholic Church. I believe I only speak your feelings when I say that if the Catholic Church in England had no fear of being ruined except from the school, it would live a long time. I know much more active powers of ruin which seem to be at work. I could find people of all sorts and kinds crying for the banishment of the Jesuits and the priests and the bishops. Even in the letter with which I began we are told that 'in Bavaria the liberality of an enlightened king led to the fatal mistake of confiding the schools of the kingdom to the Doctors of Rome.' I am afraid that there is no comfort for politicians so long as Catholics are allowed equal liberty with Englishmen. As long as they are left to the equal liberty of Englishmen they are in a fair race, and they will be content, and we shall see who will be foremost. The other day I read a remarkable passage from the writings of Mr. Carlyle. He was speaking of the first great French Revolution, which was a mixture of the three things—infidelity, paganism, and bloodshed. What do you think he calls it? If I had said it I should have been burned for impiety. He said it was the third and last act of the Protestant Reformation. I do not say that, but I will say that 300 years ago perverted reason attacked faith, and in the last century the Nemesis of Rationalism came to beat down perverted reason. We have come to a state on which I will add a word or two presently. It ought to make scientific men think twice before they again assail the connection of

revelation and faith. We have come to a strange pass. The mental philosophy of the day teaches that the senses are so liable to illusion that we cannot depend upon their reports. If so, the avenues of knowledge are shut up. We are further told that the reason is so liable to illusions arising from the senses that its judgment is not certain. Now God has created man with two chief criteria of knowledge in himself: the senses, whereby he can apprehend the external world; and the reason within him, whereby he passes a simultaneous judgment on the report of his senses. The common sense and common reason of mankind are infallible. Those whose senses misrepresent the objects with which they are in contact are in an abnormal and morbid state, and those who receive the reports of the senses and are not able to reason upon them are of unsound brain. The mental philosophy of the day, therefore, is reducing us to insanity and to idiotcy. This is verily a Nemesis, and I also will say that this subjective scepticism is indeed the third and last act of the Lutheran Reformation.

6. Wherefore, lastly, if there be a unity of all knowledge by reason of its consolidation round the unity of faith, I ask, what is the principle of the unity of faith? It is the infallibility of the light of Nature within its own sphere, and the infallibility of the light of faith under the guidance of the Church of God; and where there is that immutable truth as the central light of all, there is also the inflexible tradition whereby the truths of the natural order and the truths of the supernatural order, interwoven together in one whole, are handed down from age to age inviolate. All faith and science,

then, rest upon an indestructible centre, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail.

Let me now apply what I have said to the Academia. It is intended to be a witness to the great truths and laws and methods of which I have spoken, and it is also intended to be a cultivator—that is to say, that the various branches of literature and science will be brought before the members of the Academia for their own cultivation. It is a very humble work. We do not profess to be a school of philosophers, nor a school of scientific men. If we did we should be laughed at, and we should deserve it. The Academia is a very humble and a very homely thing. We do not intend to soar into the empyrean or to melt into the azure. I will tell you what the Academia really is—it is an earthwork. The walls of stone and the bastions of old fortifications are now swept off the face of the earth. They are useless against modern gunnery, but nothing can prevail over an earthwork—nothing can tear it to pieces. Well, the Academia will be an earthwork thrown up for the defence of the faith, for the defence of history, and for the examination and analysis of what I was castigated the other day for calling the nursery tales that Englishmen had been reading as histories of the Church. Above all, you will analyse and examine what are called scientific histories. For my part, I believe that there is no such thing. I can understand the term science when it is applied to knowledge which is definite and certain, and can be resolved into its first principles, which are self-evident. This I believe to be the true definition of science. I can also understand science when it signifies such ex-

perimental, and therefore such tested, knowledge as the results of chemistry and the like; for though it cannot be resolved into first principles, self-evident in themselves, nevertheless it arrives at ultimate certainty. But when men tell me that a history of the Popes is scientific, because through five hundred pages the Popes are called forgers, deceivers, vicious, covetous, and I know not what besides, when all that can be raked together of the garbage and sewage of their enemies in history is collected into a muck heap, as it is within the two boards of one book called *Janus*—when I am told that this is scientific history, I say that the man who says so does not know what science is, or else, knowing it, is imposing upon his readers. I know what true history is, and what adequate history is. It is history which is true and square to the documents upon which it is founded. But that is not science; and when any man comes and talks to you about scientific history, I advise you as soon as possible to change the subject. I have been reported—I do not know by whom—to have said that the Vatican Council has 'triumphed over history.' I do not think that I need contradict such a statement; but I will tell you what I did say, have said, and always shall say so long as I have the light of reason: that if there be in the world a Church divinely guided—if there be a Divine Person dwelling in that Church, whose office it is to preserve it from error—then, when that Church has decided, defined, or decreed, any man who appeals from that decision to any human history whatsoever is guilty of rejecting a Divine Teacher, and of the sin of unbelief, of

which our Divine Lord said: 'Whosoever believeth and is baptised shall be saved, and whosoever believeth not shall be damned.' I have said that the Vatican Council gave expression to the full revealed and Divine theology of the Church of God upon earth under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, and that therefore the definitions and decrees of the Council are the voice, not of man, but of God; for that reason, whosoever appeals from them to human history commits heresy in appealing from the Divine Teacher, and treason in appealing from the ultimate Sovereign Judge.

7. This evening the Bishop has told you that there are two branches in the Academia. You will have ordinary papers read to you as we have in London, and you will have that which we in London do not possess. You will have a course of lectures on English literature, followed by lectures upon the transit of Venus by one of the highest astronomical authorities; you will have lectures upon the Sacred Scriptures and on scientific subjects, so that the Academia will afford the means of cultivating many branches of knowledge in union with the supreme light of faith. If I may suggest some few subjects for discussion and study, I would recommend the First Constitution of the Vatican Council. I believe there is a special reason why this should be carefully studied by every Catholic. The first chapter is on the existence of God. Strange it may seem that in the nineteenth century it has been necessary for a General Council to declare that the existence of God can by reason be proved. The second chapter is on the nature of revelation, the third on the nature of faith,

and the fourth on the relation of faith to reason. Any man making himself master of that one Constitution in ten or fifteen pages will have more than the substance of what I have endeavoured imperfectly to draw in outline. I would also bid you to study the Syllabus, which has caused so great a storm and outcry, and kindled all kinds of animosity. I will venture to say this outcry was raised in nine instances out of ten by those who had never read what they professed to criticise. You may gather from the intensity of opposition it has excited that it is a contradiction of the great cloud of modern errors. It has directed its condemnation to those tendencies of perverted intellect which at the present moment are making havoc in the regions of truth, from the denial of the very existence of God to the lowest forms of heresy. Again, it will be well to study the bearing of political economy on the morals of the people. I believe that at the present moment political economy and commercial theories and the passion for money are making great havoc in the morals of the people. I would also ask you carefully to examine the application of free trade to drink as a politico-economic question, and also to the labour laws as bearing on the domestic life of our people. I hold this as a primary truth, that when the homes of the people are pure the commonwealth is safe; when the homes of the people are wrecked the commonwealth comes down. Next I would mention, merely in passing, the contacts of science and revelation; and lastly, a rigorous appreciation of 'scientific history.'

Therefore, to conclude, it seems to me that the

sanctification of the intellect is the proper work of those who have the light of faith, and of men who desire the welfare of their fellows. Every century has had its special aberrations, but those of the early and of the mediæval ages were moral and spiritual errors in the form of heresy, invented by men who believed in the Christian revelation. But the aberration of the nineteenth century is the intellectual perversion of those who have rejected all revelation, and all belief in a God, and all moral conception of the nature of man. It is to rectify and to restore the intellect of our day from this monstrous and perverse aberration that we are called to labour. I may therefore congratulate the Bishop of Salford that in the city of Manchester, in which, with a vigorous and a fervent authority, he has already welded together the spiritual organisation of the Church, he has successfully founded this intellectual agency, by which the young, perpetually rising from our schools, may receive such culture in literature and science that his flock shall be abreast, at least, with the highest cultivation of this great city.

IX.

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT ASSUMPTIONS.

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT ASSUMPTIONS.

Mr. Kirkman, who was already well known as a mathematician, and as a vigorous assailant of modern Materialism, has, in a recent work on *Philosophy without Assumptions*, fairly entered the lists, and hung up his shield against all comers. As yet no lance has made it ring; nor is there any answer to his challenge. A few critics in anonymous articles, the squires in philosophy, have made a show of answering, but no champion from the ranks of the Materialist philosophers, whom Mr. Kirkman has with no little *outrecuidance* defied, has accepted the combat. And yet assuredly it is not for want of provocation; for Mr. Kirkman, I will not say has 'cursed them by all his gods,' but he has bantered them with a Socratic irony, and mocked them with an irreverence which reads like the *Clouds* of Aristophanes.

With what success the skirmishers have attacked this book may be judged from one fact. Two of the chief critics begin with saying, 'Mr. Kirkman sets out from the dictum of Descartes, *Cogito ergo sum:*' which is like saying, 'Lord Bacon bases his *Novum Organum* upon the syllogism of Aristotle.' Mr. Kirkman begins by exposing the dictum of Descartes as a vicious circle. We are before we think; and our consciousness of our

own existence is not an inference, but a certainty anterior to all reasoning.

Mr. Kirkman's book has a twofold purpose. First, he has endeavoured to construct a philosophy on primary certainties which each man of sound mind may 'find for himself, and show others how to find.' He therefore assumes nothing, takes nothing for granted, and uses no postulates. So far it is synthetical and positive. And secondly, he has undertaken to destroy the modern Materialistic philosophers by analysing their methods, which he contends are based on unproved assumptions and arbitrary assertions. He further denies *in toto* our knowledge of *what* matter is, in which some place 'all the potency of terrestrial life.' So far his book is destructive. The destructive part of the book is so much more profuse than the constructive, though the constructive lines do indeed run through it, that the reader more easily follows the polemical than the positive part of the work. At first this leaves an indefinite conception of Mr. Kirkman's affirmative system on the reader's mind; but upon further examination this impression will be for the most part removed. In fact, the primary certainties and truths of philosophy in the order of natural reason are few; but the applications of them to error are manifold. There can only be one straight line, but curves may be almost without number.

We will endeavour (1) first, to get at a synopsis of Mr. Kirkman's positions; (2) secondly, to note what seems to be insufficiently worked out; (3) thirdly, to draw out the scholastic philosophy upon the same

points; and (4) lastly, to apply what has been said to the modern theories of Materialism.

The following summary of Mr. Kirkman's *Philosophy without Assumptions* is given in his own words. Lest I should misstate him, he shall speak for himself: I will therefore insert here an abstract of his book written by his own hand.

Statement of the Philosophical Propositions.

I. Mr. Kirkman begins by stating first what he declines to investigate. He will not inquire either What is? or What must be? The first question, What is?—*i.e.* What is, *per se?*—he considers to be beyond the reach of his human powers. For the second, What must be? as distinct from What must logically follow? he expresses a profound contempt. Thus we seem to have one novelty at least in philosophy—the exclusion of the *per-se-ity* and *must-be-ity*, which cut such a figure in what goes for metaphysics. He says:

'The question that I propose to myself at the beginning of philosophy is this: What do I find for myself without making unproved assumptions, and with demonstrations that I can write down, so that another thinker, if there be another who understands me, can find it, and demonstrate for himself without unproved assumptions?'[1] 'This rule of demanding proof, whenever proof may without evident absurdity be required, reduces my stock of propositions at the start of my philosophy to the fundamental one of Descartes, which I write thus: "I am, and know that I am, thinking."[2] I shall often write "I am" for the full proposition of Descartes.'[3]

He defines assumption thus:

'An *assumption* is the acceptance, without proof, of the truth

[1] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 4. [2] P. 5. [3] P. 6.

of a proposition, of which truth proof may, without a flat contradiction or a glaring absurdity, be demanded.'[4]

He defines demonstrated truth thus:

'First, the testimony of my present consciousness clear of all assumptions; or secondly, it is truth verifiable by me, the thinker, by facts in my consciousness, which I can repeat at my pleasure again and again without making any assumptions, or by logical inference from such facts.'[5]

Mr. Kirkman does not start from the *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes. The *ergo* is a mistake.

'I am making no assumption, nor taking anything for granted, when I affirm that I am, and that I know that I am, thinking. For if I am really making an assumption, I can scientifically affirm that I am making it, that is, that I am thinking either right or wrong; and if I am affirming scientifically that I think, I am not making any assumption under that affirmation. Nor can any man inform me that I am assuming my "I am" without conceding and affirming my being and thinking.'[6]

Under *thinking* he includes all that Descartes comprised in his definition of *cogitatio*, 'every state or change of consciousness, every sensation, every volition, every will-effort of which I may be conscious, so that "I am thinking" includes "I will," when will is in conscious act.'[7] But 'it is never a metaphysical proposition about being.' Nor does it include any affirmation 'about my body or other bodies or other thinkers.'

In Chapter II. he proposes his 'first clear question:'

'Can I find, without assumption and with demonstration, any other thing or being besides my thinking self?'

'Let me classify as well as I can the facts of my consciousness. They appear to fall into three compartments. The *first compartment* is that of my remembered *listless indolence*.'[8]

[4] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 4.
[5] P. 7. [6] P. 11. [7] P. 6. [8] P. 21.

This state can be both remembered and verified at pleasure.

'Its marked feature, by which it is clearly known to me, is the total inaction of my will.' 'From what I can recall of such a state, nothing can be logically affirmed but my changing self.' 'The *second compartment* of "I remember" I call that of my *ill-recorded will-effort*. [The will is here active, but only with trains of thought.] There is no conscious relation to a not-me-the-thinker, nor any conflict but with pure difficulties of thought. Because these difficulties occur and are overcome, at more or less mental cost, I call the found and remembered state *effort*. . . . . I call it will-effort or will-force, because I know by ten thousand experiences that it depends upon my will. . . . . I call it my ill-recorded will-force, because I find in memory no exact measures or comparisons of it.' 'I will not undertake to find in this second compartment, any more than in the first, the demonstration sought of finite being not my own.'[9]

In Chapter III., entitled 'The Solving Relation,' the writer says:

'In my "I am" *I will* is given; that is, my will-force—when will is making effort.'[10]

It is given in that second compartment, no not-self being posited or conceived in such will-effort.

'I am still in quest of being not myself. I think I remember once moving all my fingers at once, or fancying that I did it. I think I am doing it now. Yet it is certain that the desire to do it, and the idea of the apparent movement, do form one of the sequences of nature. But stop—how is this? I cannot do it now. The will-effort is clear enough, but there is bafflement. Do they call this a sequence? I affirm that it is a steady permanence in consciousness. My state is at one moment both active and passive. I am sure that this is a relation evident and abiding of my conscious will-force to a contemporaneous correlative. Neither of the terms of this relation is before or after the other. From this found measurable and abiding relation, and from the nature of a real measurable relation, which must in logic have two congruous terms, I infer that the contemporaneous correlative to my acting will-force is another acting force not my

[9] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 24. [10] P. 36.

own. From this logical law of a relation given I have demonstrated an external world of force, and I can verify every step of the demonstration at any moment. Thus my first question is answered.'[11]

What is the use of the demonstration?

'To refute the teachers who maintain that no truth at all can be shown to follow from the mere facts of consciousness; from which, if it were true, it would follow that it is impossible to have a philosophy without assumptions, and that we ought to leave the learned who know so much about matter and law to make the right ones for us all.'[12]

How do we know that the resistance which we infer from the relation found in consciousness is not purely ideal and imaginary?

'The reply is easy; from the law of a real relation, that both its terms are real, or both imaginary. My will-force I know to be as real as my own "I am."[13] I call my *related* will-force *well-recorded*, because it is well-measured and graduated in memory of repeated experiments, and in accurate consciousness of present power.[14] Go talk of your eternal conservation, invariabilities, and indestructibilities! I can confute you, and spoil them all, within a certain sphere, whenever I please. For this I can give you all the proof that reason can require; by prediction and fulfilment: fulfilment that no other prophet nor philosopher can foretell: prediction that no other finite agent can accomplish.'[15]

In the fourth chapter, entitled 'Dynamical Foundations,' the author establishes the three following propositions:

'1. The only force which is directly given and immediately known to me is my own will-force; and all my knowledge of other forces acting in the Cosmos is mediate, and found by me by logical inference.[16]

2. My will-force is my only force-finder.[17]

3. In my every train of reasoned thought about any force or forces found in action in the Cosmos, the fundamental proposition,

[11] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 44.
[12] P. 44. [13] P. 49. [14] P. 55.
[15] P. 55. [16] P. 59. [17] P. 61.

out of which all my other propositions flow, and on the certainty of which their truth to me depends, is this: in finding force, I will in act, and I know that I will; so that if all the steps of the reasoning be written down without omission in their order, this proposition must stand written at the head of all—In first finding force in this inquiry I willed in act, and I know that I willed.'[18]

By these theories Mr. Kirkman easily reduces to a vicious circle the pretences of Materialist biology and psychology to deduce will as a resultant of other forces in action in the Cosmos.

In Chapter V., 'On the Evidence of the Presence of so-called *Matter* in the Cosmos,' the author propounds his second question:

'Where and how can I find what they call *matter* without assumption and with demonstration, so that I can show others, if there be others, how to find it?

I believe with Boscovich that the smallest locus of force is a point without parts, and I agree with the thinkers who foretell that dynamical science will eventually begin where Geometry long ago began. The starting conceptions will perhaps be stated thus —in Geometry from points which have unchanging positions and no parts; in Dynamics, from points which have changing positions and no parts. In the definition that dynamical points change their positions (the changes being referred to an adequate cause which works at the positions by laws of action depending on the number and the distances of related points, and being for all finite observation and computation continuous changes), all that we mean by force and inertia is logically included, and would be stated in definition or axioms following.'[19]

In Chapter VI., 'Something about Boscovich, Berkeley, and Kant,' the author pursues his inquiry about matter, concluding with an attack on Kant's definitions, at the opening of his *Kritik*, of the matter and form of a phenomenon.

Chapter VII. is entitled 'Continuation of the Search

[18] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 70. [19] P. 77.

for so-called Matter, with the Help of its Assertors.' He here points out how unsatisfactory and inconsistent are the notions, so far as they are expounded by leading teachers, of Materialistic philosophy concerning matter and ether.

In Chapter VIII., 'On Maxima and Minima,' he propounds his third question: Can we find or affirm the existence of a minimum finite body or force-locus?

In Chapter IX., 'The Maximum Brain and Mr. Matthew Arnold,' he handles a fourth question concerning a highest finite intelligence:

'It is the craftsmen of atheism, not we, who are the grovelling, self-magnifying anthropomorphists. Do they deny that they affirm this highest finite intelligence above which there is absolutely none in being? I will compel them to confess it. They deny that there is an Infinite Mind; wherefore it must follow, and it does follow even to them, that there is somewhere either one supreme finite intelligence, absolutely above all, or else a round table of them, all of equal brain-power, unsurpassed in all existence.'[20] 'The conclusions from the train of thought in this and the preceding chapters, which to my faculties appear inevitable, are these. First, by the absurdities inherent in the dogma of an absolutely minimum body existing in space, called *atom*, the stuff spoken of as *matter* is exploded, and disappears to scientific thought. Secondly, by the absurdities in the atheistic dogma of a finite maximum intellect now supreme in the Cosmos, the Being of God Omniscient and Almighty is confirmed. I say not, is demonstrated; for the demonstrations of logic concerning the infinite are of little value, and my belief in God rests on foundations in my soul, which are deeper and nobler than those of logic.'[21]

In Chapter X. Mr. Kirkman propounds his fifth definite question:

'Can I find and demonstrate, without assumptions unproved, the existence of any finite conscious thinker besides myself? How can I prove thou art a thinker?'

[20] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 161. [21] P. 175.

A says of B, This B is a group of indications of intelligence, thought, and will; and draws the conclusion, *ergo* B is an intelligent thinker. But two propositions cannot build a demonstration. A major is wanted, which Mr. Kirkman endeavours to assign from his certain knowledge of the conclusion. He finds it in nothing less than the general theorem—All continued and consistent phenomenal indications to me of invisible consciousness, intelligence, and will are verily to me demonstrations of the unseen verities indicated.

'If next I am required to prove this most general theorem, I answer boldly that it is a fundamental truth of reason, the denial of which is utterly absurd. Beyond that point I shall not pretend to debate. I leave it there; for, wherever it is left, the appeal must be to the consciousness of rational thinkers. I do not here claim any formal logical triumph in this difficult topic over the men who consider this old inference from intelligent design and work to a conscious designer and worker as unphilosophical. I am familiar with the style in which they contrive to amuse themselves at my expense.'[22]

It is here evident that the author expected to hear from hostile critics exactly what they have uttered. Most of them have displayed their cleverness on the shortest of his chapters, leaving all the rest untouched. In the face of the writer's disclaimer of logical triumph, one says, 'He just postulates "a fundamental truth of reason," which assumes the whole thing to be proved, and thereupon triumphantly constructs his perfect syllogism.' Another remarks, 'The major premiss of his syllogism is as neat a *petitio principii* as we ever saw.'

The question on the proof of 'Thou art' has this

[22] *Philosophy without Assumptions*, p. 182.

peculiarity—that while it is not irrational for A, thinking alone, to ask of himself a demonstration that B is a conscious thinker, or to charge himself with an assumption if he has never demanded such proof, it is a flagrant absurdity for B to charge A with such assumption in serious debate. Mr. Kirkman's object is legitimate and useful. He says, 'It would be a useful exercise of scientific thought if they would try to construct a demonstration of this "Thou art," which will satisfy an exigent scepticism like that which they are elsewhere so forward to display.'

Mr. Kirkman might have remarked that *social instinct* gives the desire of fellowship, but it does not demonstrate it. It is easily cheated. We know one who, when in childhood he visited Madame Tussaud's exhibition, was led by his social instinct to ask a question of an old lady in a chair, the waxen double of her whom he had just seen below.

Mr. Kirkman takes the pains to inform us exactly what he means by an assumption, and has tried to do good service in insisting on the exclusion of assumptions from philosophy. To some of his critics this is an intolerable demand. They have diligently read the title-page. Some of them are evidently unable to make a distinction between an assumption and a truth, of which, from its simplicity, the demonstration cannot be written down. Such writers victoriously treat 'I am thinking' as an assumption, which makes Mr. Kirkman's title ridiculous. Others may be pardoned for fancying that he starts from the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum.* It surprised him, probably, to see it laid down:

'Correct and modify the Cartesian formula as we please, we never can vamp it up, as Mr. Kirkman seeks to do, into a true philosophic starting-point. It is an arbitrary assumption for an orthodox system of metaphysics or theology.'[23]

And again:

'Philosophy, rightly considered, is nothing else than the science of rejecting wrong assumptions and replacing them with right.'[24]

Then philosophy is impossible where there are no wrong assumptions!

One of the most useful and provoking of the theorems laid down in this book is this very simple one, that 'I am,' being the starting-point of every train of reasoned thought, can never be the conclusion of any one, for it can only complete a vicious circle. With this argument from the vicious circle the author makes havoc with the logic of the evolutionists and biologists. To his onslaughts on these philosophers none of the adverse critics have made any reply except one, whose courage is very commendable. His words are:

'He proceeds to demonstrate the absurdity of conceiving the individual consciousness as a result of material evolution. The argument is exceedingly curious. . . . . Its principal step is as follows: In the order of knowledge or thought, my own existence as thinker is the starting-point—*ergo*, in the temporal order of objective existence, I cannot follow as an effect from processes outside my consciousness.'[25]

This critic, in a distinguished weekly journal, agrees with our author that '*I am*' is the starting-point; also that 'I am' cannot follow in the order of knowledge or thought, because that would be a vicious circle beginning and ending with 'I am.' 'But,' says he, '"I

[23] *Literary World*, April 28, 1876. [24] Ibid.
[25] *Examiner*, June 3, 1876.

am" may follow and does follow in another order—namely, in the order of temporal objective existence, thus closing correctly the train of thought beginning with "I am."' The critic is talking of course about what he quite understands; but unfortunately he does not inform us at what point of his sequence of propositions and train of thought he steps out of the order of knowledge into that of objective existence, nor how he manages to get hold of the 'I' in this latter order, which is quite different from that of thought and knowledge. Well may our philosophical ladies and gentlemen glory in that noble instrument of philosophy, *objective!* What is there that you cannot accomplish with it? This critic goes on to say:

'It is hardly possible to give the reader an adequate conception of the philosophic ignorance, incompetence in argument, &c., which constitute Mr. Kirkman's "refutation" of modern philosophy and science. His competence for philosophical discussion may perhaps be judged by the fact that he cannot distinguish Mill's "unconditionalness" in causation, which is as much known from experience as sequence itself, from the "necessity" of the ontologist.'[26]

This is in reference to our author's criticism (p. 209) on the following words of J. S. Mill on causation:

'This is what writers mean when they say that the notion of a cause involves the idea of necessity. If there be any meaning which confessedly belongs to the term necessity, it is *unconditionalness*.'[27]

From these words of Mill, it is to be feared that he also could not distinguish, and must come, like Mr. Kirkman, under the critic's lash. There are many people who know sequence in the past from experience, and

[26] *Examiner*, June 3, 1876. [27] *Logic*, book iii. c. v. § 5.

some who think they know it certainly for the future; but a very choice few only can know with this deep critic unconditionalness, either in the past or in the future, from experience alone.

Such is Mr. Kirkman's abbreviation of his own book.

II. No one who has read anything either of the Scholastic or the modern metaphysics will fail to see that he has thought for himself. His method of philosophy is a vigorous creation of his own mind, upon the lines which natural reason or the light of Nature has traced upon us. It may be called the philosophy of common sense; for common sense is the witness of the human reason in its normal state as it is found in the race of mankind, save only in abnormal cases, which are exceptions, like the imperfect ear of wheat in a harvest-field.

1. First, it must not be supposed that Mr. Kirkman lays down his method as the way by which all men arrive at the knowledge of themselves or of others. His method is the way in which *we may prove the certainty of the truths which come to us by inheritance.* He does not suppose that we all have need to start like Peter the wild boy, in isolation from society and exiled from the common sense of mankind. He means, if I understand him rightly, 'that the intellectual system of the world may be verified and found by individuals for themselves, and shown to others by the method he has indicated.' Mr. Kirkman certainly does not mean that we all are required to attain the knowledge of our own existence, thought, will, and body, by dividing our

consciousness into three compartments, or that we find out the existence of others by the resistance of force-points, or the cumulus of indications of intelligence and will. In this way the greater part of men would be doomed to idiotcy. Our knowledge of our existence, thought, will, conscience, right and wrong, duty, moral relations to God and to man, comes to us as a heirloom. We inherit it, not as an assumption, though it be unproved by us, nor as a postulate, for we never ask it, but as a truth, or rather as an intellectual system of truths, known without discovery, needing no demonstration though capable of proof, learned with our mother-tongue from human society, which, as the mother and teacher of its children, guides the spontaneous processes of our intelligence *ex vi suâ* in the apprehension of truth.

Nevertheless Mr. Kirkman's method is of great value. It exists in the nature of things. To some individuals at all times, and to some nations at certain periods, it becomes a necessity. When men or nations have been disinherited of the truths of the natural order, it is the δεύτερος πλοῦς: if we cannot sail, we must row. It is the *tabula post naufragium*, like the Sacrament of Penance after the loss of baptismal innocence. In these last centuries men have thought, under Luther's guidance, to perfect their religion by breaking with the traditions of the Christian faith, and they have landed in rationalism. They have thought also, under the guidance of Descartes, to perfect their mental philosophy by departing from the intellectual system of the world, and they have ended in scepticism. We are now in a period of return and of verification:

men are forced to find 'a reason for the faith that is in them,' not only in the order of faith, but in the order of intellect.

By the intellectual system of the world I mean the unbroken tradition and lineage of truth which from the beginning has descended as the inheritance of mankind. In this inheritance are included the existence and moral character of God, the existence and immortality of the soul, the eternal distinction of good and evil, right and wrong; the conscience and responsibility of man to a moral Lawgiver and Judge in this life and after death. This group of truths has resided universally in the reason of man, varying in degree of clearness and completeness from its whole outline down to the verge of extinction in races and individuals: but in the lowest intellectual state it has everywhere been implicitly found. There has always been a notion of God to debase. Fetichism bears witness to natural theology. No one can read the Ethics of Aristotle, or the Tusculan Disputations of Cicero, without perceiving the outlines of this intellectual order. What they held by inheritance, with a kind of sceptical uncertainty as to the higher truths, we inherit with the confirmation and certainty of revelation. Nevertheless for them the logical analysis and demonstration was possible, and it is also possible to us. They who at this day have lapsed into Pyrrhonism and scepticism are bound to show cause why they reject the first lights of Nature, and it is for them that Mr. Kirkman writes.

2. It is a reasonable and healthy exercise of the intellect to analyse and to verify its own convictions.

There is no rationalism in a reflex examination of what we believe. It is well for us to find the limits and the outline of our natural reason, and to ask, 'What can I find or prove for myself of that group of truths which I have inherited from society and tradition?'

Now of my existence I have no need of logical proof. It is a consciousness antecedent to all other certainties. I know that I am; I know that I am myself; I know that I am the same identical being who has passed through a succession of times and states. I know that I am thinking, and I know that (putting out my will) I will or am willing. All these are facts of my internal consciousness, of a *sensus intimus* which, as even Hume declared, never deceives.[28] I do not infer my existence from my thoughts or from my will. 'Cogito ergo sum' is a 'therefore' outside of logic. There is no illation. One and the same consciousness at the same moment knows both. And yet my being and my thought are not one and the same. I cannot say, 'Ego sum cogitatio mea.' All that is in God is God, for God is His own being, His own intelligence, and His own will. But in man neither intelligence nor will is the soul, but faculties and powers of the soul. To affect to doubt whether I am thinking or willing is not reason, but unreason: it is not philosophy, but folly. There is no proof of my own existence higher than my consciousness of my own existence, and no proof of the facts of my intimate consciousness higher than the *sensus intimus* itself. S. Paul was philosophising in the order of Nature when

[28] Kirkman, p. 46.

he said, 'What man knoweth the things of man but the spirit of man that is in him?'[29] If this consciousness be not sufficient to convince any man of his own intellectual and moral nature, no logical argument *ab extra* will suffice. Such scepticism is a paralysis of the reason itself; and such appears to me to be the diagnosis of the scepticism which either denies the existence of the soul or professes Agnosticism about the existence of the soul, or, lastly and much more peremptorily, which affirms that we have no immaterial part in our composite nature, and therefore that matter thinks. I have no will to give offence; but I must say that this philosophy seems to be the result of an ossification of the highest parts of our human nature, or a loss of perception in the nerves of internal sense. If any man's intimate consciousness does not assure him of somewhat within him more subtil and lifeful than matter, a whole battery of reasons from without can hardly awaken it.

3. And here I am afraid I must part company with Mr. Kirkman, unless upon explanation we can find a solution of a difficulty he has raised in the following passage: 'Substance, substratum, matter, or *catter*, supposed finite realities to man distinct from found force arising in found locus, appear to be fictions of ignorance.'[30]

Mr. Kirkman does not deny the existence of *being*, and he affirms *being* to be *real;* but he rejects the notion of matter or stuff, and of substance in the sense of stuff or matter.

[29] 1 Cor. ii. 11.

[30] Kirkman, p. 75.

And yet he says that he does not deny the existence of matter, but he denies only that we can reach to the cognisance of matter, or that we can declare what it is.

Now, from what has been said, it would appear that we have a consciousness of our own existence distinct from our thought and from our will. Thinking and willing are actions of *Me-the-Thinker* and of *Me-the-Willer*, as Mr. Kirkman has it. That is, *I am* before *I think* or *I will*. And the *I* is distinct from both *thought* and *will*.

S. Thomas teaches that the soul is known to itself only through its own operations. But that does not say that the operations of the soul are the soul, or that the soul is only the *cumulus* of its own operations. It is the *radix* of all vital operations. And the soul bears them, not they it.

In this, then, we have the idea or notion of being as distinct from operations.

What I find in myself I predicate of others. By the grasp of a man's hand I know that I am in the presence of another having power, will, and intelligence like myself. The cumulus of intelligent and moral phenomena prove to me the presence of a nature like my own. But these phenomena are no more the being who is before me than the facts of my own internal consciousness are my own being.

I am compelled to predicate will, thought, and being of the other, who is so far ascertainably like myself. All these are facts of immediate consciousness in myself: in another they are mediately and logically inferred. Cicero anticipated the argument of Bishop Berkeley in

his *Alciphron* when he said, *Nos non sumus corpora nostra, nec hoc dico corpori tuo sed tibi.*

Now I am willing with Mr. Kirkman to say that this *tibi* is not *matter,* nor *catter,* nor *stuff;* but I cannot admit that it is not *being,* and I affirm that this being is *substance.* I am not unwilling to admit that it is not an object of sense, but only of the reason, and that except by knowing what it is not, that is, *per viam remotionis,* I cannot say what it is. I can indeed say that it is neither *matter* nor *stuff,* for the soul is immaterial. Yet it is real being. But this Mr. Kirkman does not deny.

Let us go further. If I grasp, not the hand of a man, but the horn of an ox, I am soon conscious both of power and action, and if not of thought or will, at least of a purpose to get rid of me bodily. Now the cumulus of these phenomena will not warrant my predicating either an intellectual or a moral nature. But they certainly prove a living being with spontaneous agency and self-originated motion and a fixed purpose. What this agent is I do not know, but I agree with Mr. Kirkman that it is not mere matter or stuff, and yet I cannot affirm that it is a being like myself. Nevertheless the phenomena prove that something more lifeful than matter with spontaneous agency and definite purpose is demanded by our reason to account for their manifestation.

But still further. Next time I grasp, not the horn of an ox, but the bars of an iron gate. A strength greater than my own resists me. I cannot predicate thought, will, or spontaneity, but assuredly I must

predicate the existence of something which hinders my advance. If you tell me that this is a cumulus of atoms or an array of force-points, I answer I have just as much and just as little conception of your atoms or your force-points as I have of matter or substance. Matter and substance have just as much meaning to me as force-points and atoms. We are all alike in the dark, and neither a more elaborate nor a more modern theory has yet rent the veil which hangs between my reason and the nature of substance or matter. If you tell me it is resistance, I answer that resistance is the sensible effect upon me. But what resists me? You say you do not know, but you cannot deny the existence of a cause or a reason of that resistance. I call that cause substance. My reason demands it. After all it may be your atoms or force-points, or it may be *catter* or *stuff;* but resistance is an action of something, and thing and being are one and the same.

And here I must confess that between *οὔσια* and *essentia* and *being* in the abstract I can find no difference; and that between *something* and *nothing* I can find no intermediate *except potentia*, which does not mean force, but *possibility*. Mr. Kirkman freely admits *reality;* but he hesitates at *substance*. And yet if the action of the ox or the resistance of the iron gate is not a mere phenomenon, each has a *ὑποκείμενον*, or a substance which is the *radix actionis*, as our will is the cause of our actions, but our being is the *radix* of all our operations. This analogy seems to me to be a strict process of reason; but if wrong I shall be happy to be corrected.

Mr. Kirkman does not believe the external world to be merely phenomenal. He affirms it to be real. But if the real is not an object of sense, it is 'objectum rationis' by a necessity of reason.

I must acknowledge that I do not feel the difficulty which Mr. Kirkman seems to find. No one has better proved than he has that our first and surest knowledge is anterior to the reports of sense, and independent of them, inasmuch as they are the facts of our internal consciousness. But when the reports of sense are received, the reason at once predicates about them. The sense and the reason act simultaneously in the judgments of a normal intelligence. No one supposes that we *find* substance by 'an inquiring touch.' But we find the phenomena, on which the reason is taught by its own internal consciousness of being, as distinct from operations, to predicate being of external objects, in like manner, as distinct from their operations.

I do not, however, suppose that Mr. Kirkman would deny this. All he seems to say is that he does not know *what* it is, and that he cannot affirm it. And yet it appears to me that in affirming 'forces,' 'loci,' 'repulsions,' 'attractions,' 'equilibriums,' 'films of indefinite tenuity,' &c., he is affirming much more about this unknown 'being' or 'reality' than any Scholastic would venture to assert. If Mr. Kirkman plays the sceptic to the Materialist, I must play the sceptic to him in turn. I will not here take upon me to deny that the theory of Dynamism may be true, but it is far more profuse in its assertions about the unknown and the conjectural than the Scholastic philo-

sophy, which contents itself with affirming without analysis chemical or dynamical that substance and matter exist.

Thus far I have endeavoured to point out where Mr. Kirkman's philosophy seems to me to be insufficient on its positive side; but on its destructive side, as against Materialism, it appears to be decisive.

1. First, it restores to its rightful place in philosophy the reason and its consciousness. When the philosophers of sense affirmed as the first axiom of human knowledge, 'Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu,' Leibnitz truly added, 'Nisi intellectus ipse.' These words are few; but they bring in a whole intellectual world with them. They contain all that Mr. Kirkman has affirmed of our consciousness of being, thought, and will, of our *sensus intimus* and all its operations and facts, which are antecedent to and independent of the reports of sense. If a Materialist tells me that this 'intellect' is only a function of matter, I would ask, how do you know that? You acknowledge that you do not know what matter is; you tell me that Berkeley has shown that matter beyond the phenomena does not exist; how then is intellect a function of matter? If you mean that it is only one of the phenomena of matter, I answer that if matter does not exist, it can have no phenomena. But, again, the phenomena of intellect and the phenomena of matter are as widely distinct as the phenomena of earth and the phenomena of light. It is a phenomenon and a function of earth to crush me. It is a phenomenon of light to touch all things with an imponderable agency.

It is a phenomenon of matter to be inert. It is a phenomenon or function of intellect to create the *Iliad*. Will you tell me that these two groups of phenomena or functions point to the same reality, or being, or entity, or that they have no entity or *radix operationum* whatsoever to which they are related?

There are harder things in this philosophy than in all the Schoolmen. This makes demand on my belief which passes my credulity. 'Incredulus odi.'

2. Next, it seems to me that Mr. Kirkman has vindicated the existence and power of an immaterial order of being and agency against the philosophy which would resolve all being and agency into 'matter and stuff.' He has turned Agnosticism against Materialism; and has shown that both they who deny the existence of an immaterial being which we call the soul, and they also who ascribe to matter the functions and agencies which we ascribe to the soul or immaterial being, are more positive and confident in their unproved assertions and their assumed knowledge than any who believe and speak in the language of ordinary men. If matter does not exist, how does it think? Even if it exist, why should thought be one of its functions? The existence of matter, if proved, does not disprove the existence of an immaterial being distinct from matter, which works in or by a material organisation. A musician is not a harp; take away the harp, the music ceases to be heard, but the musician does not cease to exist. The whole world of music which is in him is there still, and he can hear it with all its harmonies in his inward ear and write it with all its chords, though,

like Beethoven, his ear of sense be deprived of hearing. I must acknowledge that this Materialistic philosophy has always appeared to me to be at best raw thought with ragged edges, indistinct, incomplete, and inconsecutive. Mr. Kirkman throws unanswerably upon the Materialist the burden, I will not say of disproving, but even of doubting reasonably, the existence and the immortality of the immaterial being we call soul.

3. The eleventh chapter, on the will, is one of the ablest in the book. The author affirms:

'As a *scientific thinker* I know that I am, within certain limits of choice and action, absolutely free from all compulsion of the forces, vital, social, or dynamical, which I find at work in the Cosmos. As a *moral being* I know that I am justly accountable, within a sphere about whose limits I am sufficiently informed for my general duty and peace, to my Cause and Preserver (of whom more in the next chapter) for my use of my faculties of thought and action. The proof of all this I have in my verifications of "I can," "I will," and "I ought;" verifications from *consciousness and conscience*.' 'This "I am" and "I will," from which my only possible philosophy at every moment begins, is no quibble. It is a *fact* and a *force* of the Cosmos, the *first* of all given to me, and that with a *certainty transcending all deductions from it*.'

The italics are mine. Here is nothing more than the *sensus intimus* which is the source of our first knowledge, and a primary certainty of the highest kind. Modern metaphysicians or psychologists despise these simple elements of knowledge and certainty. They account for what we call the will by theories of which the terms appear to me to have no corresponding intellectual equivalents. When Mr. Kirkman says, 'My free volition can never be known or imagined by me either as an effect without a cause, or a fact without a reason. *I* there and then am both the *cause* and the

reason of it,' I understand him at once, and my consciousness responds to and confirms his assertion. My will is the cause of my own action, and my determinate thought is the reason why I so will. But when I am told by Mr. Herbert Spencer that my will is 'a group of psychical states,' and that I am led into error if I suppose that there is something distinct from the 'impulse' given by these 'psychical states' which determines my action,—when, I say, Mr. Herbert Spencer tells me this, I confess that I do not understand him. And I believe that I do not understand him through no fault of mine, but because no intellectual equivalent can be found for his terms. Are these 'psychical states' the desires or dispositions antecedent to my action? They are not myself; and I am conscious of sometimes going against them by a deliberate antagonism of my free will. Do they contain the *finis intentus* or the final cause of my actions? How does this necessitate my will if the end of my action is freely chosen? Am I deceived in thinking that my choice is free? The consciousness that I have a power to go against my strongest desires, and, under the dictate of my reason, that is, of my conscience, to select the end which is the least attractive, or rather the most repulsive, to my desire or appetite, remains both a primary and an ultimate consciousness which cannot be denied nor explained away, nor squared with 'the impulse of psychical states.' In the action of the will the strongest appetites are freely but absolutely under control of the reason. I have the strongest repugnance to pain, but I willingly go to the rack rather than turn Mussulman. Why? Because my reason tells

me that pain is to be chosen rather than apostasy. The will is accurately defined to be *appetitus rationalis*. Our desires pass under the cognisance of the reason, and by the guidance of the reason the end most opposed to natural appetite is often freely chosen. Such was the will of the martyrs; such is the risking of life by fire or water to save the life of another of whom we know nothing but his peril. Such was the will of the prisoner condemned to death who, to escape hanging, starved himself in prison. It is no answer to say these were their dominant appetites. They were not so *as appetites*, but as deliberate decisions of reason controlling the appetite by an act of the will. That there is a power of determination which is not a 'psychical state,' but a deliberate choice followed by a decisive action, is as certain as my consciousness of existence. 'I am' and 'I will' are certainties of which I have an immediate knowledge in myself. If Mr. Spencer includes all this in the 'psychical state,' why not say so? To tell me that 'I myself am only a group of psychical states which are always changing,' is contradicted by my immanent and permanent consciousness of my own identity. To tell me that my own identity is an illusion, and is only a psychical state, or a group of such states, and then to tell me that such states are always changing, while my consciousness of personal identity never changes, but is always permanent, is to me not philosophy, but a contradiction in terms. If I break my leg I have a group of psychical states arising from the pain and terror of the accident; they may pass, or vary, or return, but my consciousness that I am the

ego who broke his leg remains always without variation. To tell me that I am a group of variable psychical states is to tell me that I have no permanent or conscious identity or *ego;* and to tell me this is, I think, to try to talk me blind. I can hardly believe that any metaphysician has ever intended to hold or to say this. But to me they seem to say it, whatever they may hold. This is the only meaning I could attach to Mr. Buckle's words on personal identity and free will in his first volume on *Civilisation*, and the only sense I can attach to Mr. Herbert Spencer's words now. If this be not his meaning, I can find no intellectual equivalent to his terms. But I shall rejoice to find that I am mistaken.

4. From this we may next proceed to Cause. It is certain that I am here, and that I did not cause my own existence. How came I here? It is no answer to say that I am a consequent upon an antecedent or a group of antecedents, which only went before, but did not cause me to be here. This is to beg the question, and to dogmatise in the most arbitrary tone. If I merely follow on antecedents which are not causes, then I am uncaused. Then the whole race of man is uncaused. All existence, the whole Cosmos, is uncaused. That is, either the whole Cosmos follows after antecedents that have no productive power or efficient relation to its existence, or the Cosmos is self-existing—that is, self-caused. What we call cause Mr. Mill is pleased to call invariable sequence. This seems to me to be like changing a name to conceal identity. It is an *alias* in philosophy to hide an equivocation. Now I can conceive no antecedent to my existence, thought,

and will, but an *I am, I think, I will*, adequate to go before my I am, I think, I will. In the world around me I find others like myself in these three things; but none of them, nor all of them together, will account to me for my being here, and for my being what I am. I am certainly not eternal, nor self-caused, nor uncaused. The conclusion is inevitable by a necessity of reason, and my reason is a spontaneous act of my consciousness, which in this primary certainty cannot err. Mr. Kirkman says, 'I live, I think, I know, I work, I love: and there is a cause out of which all this springs.' Mr. Martineau, in an article on 'Modern Materialism,' has shown with peremptory reasoning that materialistic Agnosticism either deifies man, or compels the belief of an intelligence and will transcending all intelligence and will of man, which is in one word God. Mr. Kirkman appears to me to expand this argument with great amplitude and force of reason:

> 'Through the Infinite I cannot think; but upwards, still upwards, towards it my soul can soar, scorning the finite. That Infinite *scientifically* I cannot know; but the Infinite is my cause. Believing and adoring, I affirm Him with a boldness and a conviction surpassing all that I can feel or utter on my themes of finite science. My Cause lives—the infinite Life. My Cause thinks, knows, and works—the infinite intuition, counsel, and energy works in the full harmony of victorious science in every point and line of force, in every throb of consciousness—never absent nor forgetting, never pausing nor weary. And my Cause loves—the Infinite Love.'[31]

Mr. Kirkman expands this proof of the existence of God 'per ea quæ facta sunt'—that is, by the Cosmos around—in the following passage, which, to be appreciated, must be read entire:

[31] Kirkman, p. 262.

'*B.* Let me ask you one question more. Have you formed any clear notion what these *forces*, of whose constant presence and action you are convinced, really are in themselves?

A. Your inquiry is to me a very solemn one. What these dread forces are, I know not for certain. But I will confess to you what, every moment that I live under their untiring, unchanging, and beneficent teaching, they more and more appear to me to be. I meet them not, I have never met them, nor have been able to conceive them, but under one form, as equivalents or multiples of my own will-force. These forces never clearly speak to me, nor verify themselves to my intellect, but at the challenge of my wakeful, active will. If I had never put forth the question of my will, I should never have been able to conceive of their action as either real or possible. They play with the sportive child; they wrestle, like the veiled Seraph of Peniel, with the strenuous man; but by neither are they observed or remembered as acting, except as equivalents of will; yet every encounter of the will of either with them leaves him richer in the lore of exquisite science, and gifted with a bolder prophetic power. Now if the child, when he becomes a man, should ask himself, "What are those wondrous workings?" may he not be pardoned if, despising the dogmas of mock science, and reasoning only from what he knows, he compares these energies with the only force of which he is master—his own will-force? If this balances them here, overcomes them there, and wherever it yields to them, in lessons that are safe and profitable, can measure them on its own scale with unerring accuracy, and predict them from its own experience, and, what is more, combine itself with them in ways innumerable into one homogeneous and foretold result, is he to be blamed for superstition and unphilosophical spirit if he says, "What can balance will but will? What can be measured by will but will? What can combine and harmonise with will but will? What can have equivalence and real relation in thought and act to will but will?" When a man has dared to doubt, and, doubting, to think boldly up to this point, you might as well beseech this stone, falling freely, not to rush towards the earth's centre, as try to prevent that soul from bursting out, like the smitten unbeliever in Bethel, "Surely God is in this place, and I knew it not!" I glory in believing that all these forces are manifestations of the conscious present working will of the God in whom I live and move and have my being. F-O-R-C-E spells WILL.'[32]

[32] Kirkman, pp. 262, 263.

He adds:

'And if you try to tell them the inspiring truth, the atheist cries out, "Anthropomorphism;" whereupon a number of knowing ones reply, "Ha! ha! Anthropomorphism!" and, pleased with that long word, they find themselves philosophers.

A. Yes, truly: anthropomorphism is next akin to anthropophagy. It is unscientific to anthropomorphise. We are forbidden to imagine behind the mysterious veil of phenomena the presence and action of what has kindred with our own consciousness. And yet it is perfectly philosophical—nay, it is my bounden duty—when that queer bundle of phenomena which I call Atheist is before me, to conceive that I am verily in the presence of an invisible thinker, of a mind very like my own, but differing from mine by its superior wisdom. But in the name of all proportion and modesty have I not ten thousand million times more pregnant evidence, in this daily course of life and mercy, and in all these convincing voices within and without me, that the living God is here in the plenitude of love and wisdom, than I have that, inside that incongruous heap and patchwork of appearances yclept Atheist, there is a mind and conscience like my own?'[33]

I do not see what modern Materialism or Agnosticism has to say in reply to all this. Polemically and destructively, it seems to be complete. It is certainly the most formidable assault that has been delivered of late along the whole line of sceptical and materialistic philosophy. I only hope that the authorities so unrelentingly summoned to combat will not decline the passage of arms because of the jaunty defiance of Mr. Kirkman's trumpet. His gibes go at times undeniably as far as the courtesy of chivalry admits; but his blows are knightly, and cannot be declined without loss of victory and of honour.

III. I have thus far endeavoured to give an outline of the results of *Philosophy without Assumptions*, and

[33] Kirkman, pp. 266, 267.

to show its destructive force as against the sceptical and materialistic philosophy of this day. It would be out of place to attempt here a constructive statement of Mr. Kirkman's system, or to point out where it is incomplete. In a Catholic philosophy we should desiderate not a few points, and a more positive and confident tone on others.

1. The first certain truth in human knowledge is that of our own existence.[34] It is not a conclusion, but a consciousness, which Rothenflue calls 'spontaneitas supra proprias suas operationes quasi replicata.'[35] This spontaneous reflex action perceives simultaneously our thought, will, and existence. But this is not a perception of the essence of the soul, but of its operations, that is, of the internal facts of our intelligence and will by the *sensus intimus*, the action of which is not logical, but intuitive, and independent of all external sense. S. Thomas says:

'As to our first knowledge (of the existence of the soul) we must distinguish, because anything may be known by a *habit* or by an *act*. As to *actual* knowledge, by which a man knows that he has a soul, I say that the soul is known by its acts. For in this he perceives that he has a soul, that he lives, and that he is, because he perceives that he feels, and understands, and exercises other vital operations of this kind, as Aristotle says (*Ethics*, t. i. ix. c. ix.), "We perceive that we perceive, and know that we know: and because we perceive and know this, we know that we are." But as for the *habitual* knowledge I say that the soul sees itself by its own essence, that is, because its essence is present to itself.' 'For this the essence of the soul alone, which is present in the mind, is sufficient: for out of it proceed the acts by which it is actually perceived.'[36]

[34] Maurus, tom. iii. p. 282.
[35] *Psychologia Empirica*, tom. i. p. 1.
[36] Kleutgen, *La Philosophie Scholastique*, tom. i. pp. 211, 215.

2. From this flows the knowledge of the phenomena of an interior world so continuous, multitudinous, and self-evident, that the materialistic philosophy has always seemed to me to be the result of a privation of inward sight. They who believe thought to be a function of matter for the most part reject metaphysics as an intellectual illusion, and ethics as a conventional superstition. Nor is this unnatural; for the laws of the intellect and the laws of morals are phenomena of the soul, which is an intelligent and moral nature. The objects of our reason and conscience are truth and falsehood, right and wrong, and these are the subject-matter of action and of responsibility. Matter is not responsible unless it be an intelligent and moral nature. If any man would affirm it to be moral and intellectual, he is denying, not the existence of the soul, but the immateriality of the soul. Nevertheless this denial is fraught with consequences destructive of the intellectual and moral order of the world.

3. Mr. Kirkman has seemed in one place to make a concession, which I am sure he does not intend. After arguing with great force for the existence of God from the idea of will and cause, he adds, 'The answer cannot be scientific.'[37] But the answer is at least certain, and excludes all doubt.

An objector might take advantage of this, and say that he removes the proof of the existence of God from the sphere of intellect to the region of faith or of religious feeling. No doubt he meant to say that the proof of the existence of God is by the whole soul in all

[37] Kirkman, p. 262.

its intellectual, moral, spiritual powers and faculties, and is corroborated and consolidated by all the affections, aspirations, and instincts of love and experience. This is most true; but it is of vital necessity to maintain that the existence of God is a truth which may be proved by reasoning within the sphere of intellect. If this were not so, then they who know not God would not be, as the Apostle declares, 'inexcusable.'[38] The Sovereign Pontiff, in 1840, defined—'Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam cum certitudine probare valet;'[39] and the Vatican Council, in 1870, decreed—that the existence of God 'can with certainty be known by the natural light of human reason through the things that are made.'[40]

The Scholastic philosophy teaches, with a rigorous logic which has never been answered, that the existence of God may be demonstrated—first, under the conception of the First Cause; secondly, under the conception of the First Power of Motion, itself immovable; thirdly, under the conception of a Necessary Existence; and lastly, that this First Cause, First Mover, and First Necessary Existence is an Intelligence separate from all creation.[41]

The ethical arguments, and the testimony of common sense and of mankind, are distinct from this intellectual demonstration. I do not doubt that the author of *Philosophy without Assumptions* was fully conscious

[38] Rom. i. 20.

[39] Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, p. 441.

[40] Prima Constitutio, De Fide Cath. Canones, 11.

[41] S. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentes*, lib. i. cap. xiii. Maurus, *Quæst. Philosophiæ*, tom. iii. pp. 29-33.

of this, and it is to be wished that he would complete his argument in another volume of clearness and power like that now before us.

I will endeavour to draw out very briefly what the Scholastic philosophy holds and hands down on the much-disputed but indisputable reality of matter.

As to the existence of matter, I am glad to repeat that Mr. Kirkman does not deny that it exists; as to its physical nature, or *what* it is, all philosophers are more or less in the same plight.

As to its existence, I can hardly understand how any man can deny or doubt that in the metaphysical or hyper-physical order the existence of matter or substance is present to our mind by a necessity of the reason. Whether a man believe in its existence or not, this is certain, that in the physical order, if he fall upon its phenomena, he is broken; and if its phenomena fall upon him, they grind him to powder. If he be pleased to say that he was pulverised by phenomena which had no substratum, or by forces which were points having position and no parts, I will not contend with him. It would be a refined mode of extinction, worthy of heroes and philosophers—a noble scientific euthanasia. When the Scholastics describe substance or matter as *ens rationis tantum*, they intend only that it is beyond the jurisdiction of sense. They affirm it to be *ens reale*, though not cognisant by sense. When the author of *Philosophy without Assumptions* says that he 'cannot find it nor show any one else how to find it,' he seems to have slipped from the order of reason into the order of sense; for though matter eludes the

sense, it is present by an intellectual necessity to the reason.

It would seem, also, that in our modern controversies the distinction between metaphysical and physical matter has been for the most part overlooked. The existence of matter belongs primarily to metaphysics. Reason affirms that matter exists. The question, what is it? belongs to Physics.

We are told that physically it consists of atoms or of forces. Such are the theories of Atomists and Dynamists. The Atomic theory, besides other intrinsic difficulties, gives no sufficient account of the unity, cohesion, specification, and action of bodies; nevertheless Atomism affirms the existence of matter. The Dynamical theory gives an account of the action of bodies, but no reason why the force-points should aggregate themselves into species. It either reduces all things to phenomenal forces without specific laws or forms, or it supposes the Will of God to be the Force present in all forces. Nevertheless Dynamism acknowledges the presence of an active principle.

The Scholastic philosophy combines both the active principle of Dynamism in the *form* and the passive principle of Atomism in the *matter* which unite in the specific existence of all things.

I hardly know where to class those who tell us that matter thinks, or those who find in it all the promise and potency of life. But the length of this article warns me to make an end, and I cannot better do so than by adding a brief statement of the Scholastic philosophy on the points we have been treating.

The following will be, I believe, a correct statement of the Scholastic teaching:

1. By strict process of reason we demonstrate a First Existence, a First Cause, a First Mover; and that this Existence, Cause, and Mover is Intelligence and Power.

2. This Power is eternal, and from all eternity has been in its fullest amplitude; nothing in it is latent, dormant, or in germ: but its whole existence is *in actu*, that is, in actual perfection, and in complete expansion or actuality. In other words God is *Actus Purus*, in whose being nothing is potential, *in potentiâ*, but in Him all things potentially exist.

3. In the power of God, therefore, exists the original matter (*prima materia*) of all material things; but that *prima materia* is *pura potentia*, a *nihilo distincta*, a mere potentiality or possibility; nevertheless it is not a nothing, but a possible existence. When it is said that the *prima materia* of all things exists in the power of God, it does not mean that it is of the existence of God, which would involve Pantheism, but that its actual existence is possible.

4. Of things possible by the power of God, some come into actual existence, and their existence is determined by the impression of a *form* upon this *materia prima*. The form is the first act which determines the existence and the species of each, and this act is wrought by the will and power of God. By this union of form with the *materia prima*, the *materia secunda* or the *materia signata* is constituted.

5. This form is called *forma substantialis* because

it determines the being of each existence, and is the root of all its properties, and the cause of all its operations.

6. And yet the *materia prima* has no actual existence before the form is impressed. They come into existence simultaneously;[42] as the voice and articulation, to use S. Augustin's illustration, are simultaneous in speech.

7. In all existing things there are, therefore, two principles — the one active, which is the form; the other passive, which is the matter; but when united, they have a unity which determines the existence of the species. The form is that by which each is what it is.

8. It is the form that gives to each its unity of cohesion, its law, and its specific nature.[43]

When, therefore, we are asked whether matter exists

[42] Kleutgen, p. 294.

[43] The following quotations will show the definitions of S. Thomas as to Matter, Existence, Act, Potentia, Form, substantial and accidental:

'Genuina notio materiæ primæ, eam scilicet esse quidem quidpiam reale et positivum, non esse tamen actu substantiam sed solum potentiam realem in omnium substantiarum species, quæ generatione fieri possunt.'—Goudin, *Philosophia Divi. Thomæ*, tom. ii. p. 45.

'Concludamus igitur cum D. Thoma, 2 *Contra Gentes*, cap. xlv., in rebus tres gradus reperiri. Invenitur enim aliqua res quæ est Actus tantum, scilicet Deus Optimus Maximus: et alia res quæ est potentia tantum, scilicet *materia prima:* et demum alia res, quæ miscetur ex actis et potentiâ, cujus modi sunt omnes creaturæ inter Deum et materiam primam positæ.'—*Ibid.* p. 82.

'Existentia est extra nihilum et causas sistentia. . . . Quia vero res censetur sisti extra causas et nihilum, cum nihil ei deesse requisitum ad rationem entis, ideo metaphysici definiunt existentiam, *ultimam entis actualitatem*.'—*Ibid.* p. 89.

'Secunda sententia materiæ omnem prorsus existentiam propriam abnegat, eamque censet meram potentiam realem et positivam existentiæ capacem. Ita Thomistæ omnes plerique alii.'—*Ibid.* p. 89.

'Conclusio. Materia prima nullam ex se habet existentiam, sed

or no, we answer, It is as certain that matter exists as that form exists; but all the phenomena which fall under sense prove the existence of the unity, cohesion, species, that is, of the form of each, and this is a proof that what was once in mere possibility is now in actual existence. It *is*, and that is both form and matter.

When we are further asked *what* is matter, we answer readily, It is not God, nor the substance of God; nor the presence of God arrayed in phenomena; nor the uncreated will of God veiled in a world of illusions, deluding us with shadows into the belief of substance: much less is it *catter*, and still less is it *nothing*. It is a reality, the physical kind or nature of which is as unknown in its *quiddity* or *quality* as its existence is certainly known to the reason of man.

This may be the place to show in what way the Scholastic philosophy rejects both the Atomic and the Dynamic theories of matter as inadequate to explain the phenomena cognisable by sense, and at the same time combines both these theories in a larger and more

---

existit per existentiam totius compositi quo illi competit per formam.'—*Ibid.*

'Forma substantialis recte definitur *Actus primus materiæ*. Dicitur in primis *Actus* ad differentiam materiæ, quæ est pura potentia. Dicitur *primus* ad differentiam existentiæ, quæ est *actus ultimus entis*: et ad differentiam formarum accidentalium, quæ sunt solum *actus secundarii*, præsupponentes *actum substantialem*. Additur *materiæ* ad differentiam formarum per se subsistentium, quales sunt angeli, quæ sunt actus sed non recipiuntur in materiâ.'—*Ibid.* p. 112.

'Forma informans dividitur in substantialem, et accidentalem. Substantialis est quæ dat *esse* simpliciter. . . . Sic *anima rationalis* est forma substantialis, quia dat esse humanum: . . . . at vero *scientia* est forma accidentalis quia dat solum esse secundarium et addititium esse humano.' That is to say, the rational soul constitutes man: science a learned man. But the former is the substance of humanity, the latter an accidental excellence.

adequate conception. I will draw out the treatment of this subject by Kleutgen in his *Philosophie Scholastique*, and Sanseverino in his *Filosofia Speculativa*.

Kleutgen, after stating the doctrines of Atomism and Dynamism, points out that neither can give any adequate account of the phenomena of matter determined in forms or species. He then compares these two systems with the Scholastic philosophy as follows:

'De nouvelles difficultés viennent s'ajouter à ces arguments, si l'on considère l'essence des corps; c'est que, si l'atomisme n'explique pas, mais présuppose la matière comme une substance étendue, le dynamisme cherche bien à en trouver l'explication, mais il s'entortille en tant de difficultés qu'il menace de faire disparaître la réalité de la substance même aussi bien que celle de l'extension.'—*La Philosophie Scholastique*, tom. iii. p. 335.

'Dans la Philosophie panthéistique, les êtres individuels de la nature ne sont plus que des phénomènes de la substance qui est tout, tandis que dans le système des atomes ou de monades ils ne sont plus que des phénomènes de ces éléments.'—*Ibid.* p. 337.

'Si maintenant nous dirigeons notre regard sur la théorie de la Scholastique nous avons à remarquer avant tout que, soutenant l'unité substantielle, et la substance propre des êtres individuels qui compose la nature, elle rejette aussi bien la multiplicité infinie de substances élémentaires (atomes ou monades) que la substance unique qui se fractionne elle-même pour se recueillir ou se rassembler de nouveau telle que l'admettent les Panthéistes.'—*Ibid.*

'Il prétend (dynamisme) qu'en définissant l'essence du corps on ne doit pas se contenter d'admettre simplement l'extension ou la masse étendue, mais qu'il faut chercher à concevoir cette masse et son étendue, comme dérivant d'un principe actif. Or, qu'est-ce que la forme dont parlent les Scholastiques, si ce n'est un principe sans lequel la matière n'aurait ni quantité ni extension? Toutefois, si certains Dynamistes font consister toute l'essence du corps dans les forces élémentaires aussi exclusivement que les Atomistes la cherchent dans la masse inerte, les Scholastiques la découvrent dans l'union de la matière et de la forme.'—*Ibid.* p. 338.

'L'atomisme purement mécanique considérait le corps comme

une masse étendue, sans aucune force immanente, et par conséquent sans aucune activité propre ; tandis que, au contraire, le dynamisme extrême ne découvrait l'essence du corps que dans la seule force, excluant ainsi de la substance du corps la matière comme étant un simple phénomène.

Mais comment devons-nous concevoir la relation qui existe dans le corps entre la force et la matière ?

Nous aurions ainsi à faire consister le sujet des forces dans la matière déterminée par la forme à être une essence propre, spécifique. Or, voilà ce qui forme précisement la doctrine de l'antiquité. Suivant cette doctrine, il est vrai ce n'est pas la matière mais le corps qui est ce dont les parties sont dans l'espace, les unes dehors des autres, et ce n'est pas la forme mais bien le corps qui est doué de force ; toutefois le corps est étendu parcequ'il est matériel, et il possède la force et l'activité en vertu de sa forme.'—*Ibid.* p. 339.

Kleutgen sums up his argument in these words :

'Si nous parvenions, dans cette étude, à prouver suffisamment la vérité de la théorie scholastique, il nous serait permis de dire, qu'elle réunissait en elle ce que l'atomisme et le dynamisme contiennent de vrai, mais en évitant également les erreurs et les exagérations de l'un et de l'autre système.'—*Ibid.* p. 343.

Sanseverino states very tersely in the following passage the inadequacy both of Atomism and of Dynamism :

'I dinamici dimostrano che la materia per esistere ha bisogno di un vero principio di unità e di azione, senza del quale le parti si disgregherebbero, e l'individualita e la sustanza stessa dello essere svanirebbero. Gli atomisti poi oppongono, che il principio di unita e di azione per se solo non basta per dare origine ad un esteso, che sia una vera realta, e non una ingannevole apparenza. Adunque per cansare gli assurdi dei primi e dei secondi è giocoforza ammettare che è corpi costano di un principio passivo e di un principio attivo, del multiplo e del uno, del determinabile e del determinante ; in altri termini della materia e della forma.'—*Filos. Specul.* vol. ii. pp. 214, 215.

Mr. Kirkman repeats again and again in his book his rejection of matter as 'stuff filling space.' But the Scholastic philosophy does not speak of *matter* as *filling*

space. It teaches that *bodies having extension fill space*. But it affirms that bodies consist of form and matter, and that neither can the form exist without matter, nor the matter without form; and therefore neither matter nor form as such or separately can fill space. S. Thomas teaches that it is impossible even to the omnipotence of God that matter should exist without form, much more that it should fill space. But when united they compose a body which has extension, and an extended body fills space, and yet so that extension is not a *constituent part of the essence* of a body, but a *necessary consequence of its existence*. But extension is a phenomenon cognisable and measurable by sense, and is therefore no assumption.[44]

IV. Let us turn now for a moment to modern philosophies, which teach either that matter does not exist or that we cannot know its existence. If they said only that we do not know *what* it is, we should have no contention with them. But to deny its existence is to contradict a law of our reason: to doubt of its existence is to doubt of the certainty of our reason.

But I fear the cause lies deeper. We have already seen that the Scholastic philosophy passes at once from the immediate certainty of our own existence to the intellectual and logical certainty of the existence of God, and from that beginning it descends through all orders of existences. The modern philosophies not

[44] Kleutgen says: 'L'étendue, à la vérité, est essentielle au corps en ce sens qu'il est de sa nature d'être étendu: mais nous ne pouvons pas dire pour cela qu'elle appartienne à l'essence même du corps, car elle en est une conséquence nécessaire, mais non une partie constitutive.'—*La Philosophie Scholastique*, tom. iii. p. 315.

only invert this method, which might be legitimately done, but they fail or refuse to ascend to the First Existence and the First Cause. They begin their work by sense in the midst of phenomena. All beyond this veil to them has no cognisable existence. Is not this an abdication of reason in its highest prerogatives? Is it not a suppression of one-half of the knowledge which sense and reason, acting simultaneously, convey to us? When the sense reports from without, the reason pronounces within. We are not sense only, nor reason only; both act together in every normal process of our rational nature. When the senses report phenomena the reason predicates existence, and in that existence substance, or matter, or *catter*, or *stuff*, or what you will, a being and a reality are there of which the sense can only report the apparel and the appearance. And yet the physical sciences, by anatomy and analysis and chemistry, report a great deal more than appearances. They test and superinduce changes and corruptions and transformations — of what, and into what? Of phenomena only, or atoms, or force-loci, or points having position and no parts? My sceptical mind finds this hard of digestion. When I am told that atoms or force-points, by cohesion, or attraction, or repulsion, or equilibrium, can account for all diversities of species and kinds and proportions, and operations and qualities, and extensions and dimensions, in all the unities which we call bodies, my reason demands a mind and a cause, a law and a plastic power, in which all second causes are enveloped, and from which they all come. Unless the Atomists and Dynam-

ists ascend to the Creator, and see Him in all atoms and forces and points as the sole intelligible reason of the Cosmos, they speak but half truths, which the reason rejects as inadequate.

Mr. Kirkman, as a champion of Dynamism, has challenged single-handed all Atomists and Materialists, and the victory is decisively with him in so far as neither Atomism nor Materialism can give any rational account of the unity of every several existence, nor of their action, power, or force, nor of their life and vital operations of will and thought. When they deny the freedom and power of the will they sign their own sentence of death. Not to be able to account for the will is ruin to a philosophy; to deny the self-determining power of the will is to commit a philosophical suicide. The freedom of the will is a fact of consciousness, and consciousness, as Hume affirms, never errs. In this he was still restrained by the old Philosophy, and by common sense. Sanseverino, treating of consciousness, says:

'L' uomo non solo ha le conoscenze sensitive ed intelletive, ma *sa* ed *avverte* ancora di averle. Questa consapevolezza che l' anima ha degli atti suoi è dai filosofi odierni detta *senso intimo* avvero coscienza. Noi preferiamo la seconda denominazione.'—*Filosofia Speculativa*, vol. i. p. 248.

He further defines this consciousness, 'l' avvertenza che l' anima ha degli atti suoi.'[45]

'Evidens est, quod homo est animal rationale, sentiens nimirum et intelligens: unusquisque enim experitur se sentire, videre, audire, intelligere, velle,' &c.[46]

[45] *Filosofia Speculativa*, vol. i. p. 250.
[46] *Mauri Quæst. Philosophiæ*, tom. iii. p. 282.

Deny this, and you really deny that man is a rational being; deny the certainty of this inward consciousness, and there is no certainty left even for sceptics to affirm that we can be certain of nothing.

One of Mr. Kirkman's critics says: 'It has been long ago seen that to assume the fact of consciousness —a highly complex one, and the result of a mixed state of sense-perception and inward reflection—as the starting-point of all philosophy, is to begin at the wrong end. It is to make the goal our starting-point. The man who has reached consciousness—in other words, who knows that he knows—has made a very great advance.' The primordial fact of human nature is not 'I know,' but 'I want.' But who wants? Here, even in the infant crying for food, are all the elements of consciousness in full action. The infant wants food, and knows whence to derive it. It knows when it obtains it, and when its want is satisfied. To say that this is only sense would not be true even of a calf. Instinct and sense are there together. In the child the 'I' is sentient, and the sentient 'I' is intelligent in the measure of infancy. It is not a reflective act, but a direct act. So also is consciousness. Its first intuitions precede all acts of reflection upon ourselves. There may be consciousness without reflection, but there cannot be reflection without consciousness. Consciousness knows the personal self, reflection knows that it knows. I am conscious that I am awake without reflection. To pinch myself to prove that I am awake would indeed be a reflex act. But consciousness precedes all such needless torments.

The author of *Philosophy without Assumptions*, trusting too implicitly to Boscovich, too confidingly adopts the Dynamical Philosophy, which in the last analysis can be resolved only into one of two theories —either that all existences are only forces, activities without an agent; or that the agent behind them all is God, which may be verbally, but cannot be logically, distinguished from Pantheism. Mr. Kirkman affirms the existence of God, and does not deny the existence of matter; but in page 277 he, with less than his usual precision of thought, makes light of the word and idea of *person* as applicable to God. But an impersonal God sustaining the activities of the world is hardly to be distinguished from the *Anima Mundi*, or from a cultured Pantheism. I am sure that nothing was further from Mr. Kirkman's mind, and that he would promptly show that I have not fully understood him.

I cannot close this hasty treatment of the largest subject except Theology without expressing my sorrow to see minds so great and varied and subtil and fertile as those Mr. Kirkman has criticised, describing almost every imaginable curve and deviation from the traditional philosophy and the intellectual system of the world. These are bold words, but I believe them to be true. I ascribe this lamentable waste of great gifts and powers to the complete forgetfulness and desuetude into which the old philosophies and their scientific terminology have fallen. If they had been known it would have been impossible for any mind of far less subtilty than Professor Tyndall's to have uttered the words :

'By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundary of experience, and discern in that matter which we in our ignorance of its latent powers, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of all terrestrial life.'[47]

If the meaning of this proposition be that all things are potentially in the *materia prima* of the Schoolmen, it is true enough, but inadequate: if it be not this, it seems to be either a deification of matter, or an inaccurate and inadequate expression of the agency of second causes; or, if it be none of these, it is, I believe, a phrase without an intellectual equivalent.

[47] *Address at Belfast*, p. 55 (Longmans, 1874).

X.

FREDERIC OZANAM.

FREDERIC OZANAM.

PERE GRATRY has said somewhere in his writings that one difference between the society of the Middle Ages and of these later centuries consists in this, 'Society then was Catholic, and sustained men above themselves; but now society is Catholic no longer, and drags men downwards with itself.' The truth of this is to be seen perhaps more clearly in France and in this century than in any other period or country. The first French Revolution decatholicised the society of France. Its Catholicism has survived in individuals, and yet they have, with exceptions indeed, shown the depressing and distorting power of the society into which they were born, and by which they were nurtured. What the Germans call the 'Time-Spirit' is powerful everywhere, but it has shown its subtilty and its supremacy nowhere more visibly than in the noble and chivalrous race of Catholics who have so powerfully urged onward the reaction towards faith in France since the year 1830.

M. de Broglie has truly said that the principles of 1789 were formulated and published, not only as a charter for France, but as a Gospel for mankind. M. Thiers said to a Bishop on his way to the Council, 'Do not attack the principles of 1789; whoso touches them touches the marrow of Frenchmen.' They have penetrated into

the intelligence and created a public opinion which affects even those who resist them. To this fact we may ascribe two phenomena strange and sad in the Catholic action of France for the last forty years: namely, that those who were labouring in the Catholic reaction to restore faith, piety, and fidelity to the Holy See were divided, and opposed to each other; and that one band of men, for whose devotion, piety, intellectual elevation, and chivalrous fidelity to the Catholic Church, every Catholic must have admiration, should have been so perceptibly, though, we believe, unconsciously, affected by the Time-Spirit created by the principles of 1789.

Frederic Ozanam was one of the most brilliant of the brilliant band of Catholic writers in whom this can be traced. We are, therefore, desirous of making unmistakably clear our judgment on these points before we go on to express our profound admiration and affectionate sympathy with him, and many of those who were associated with him, in this noble conflict for the Catholic Faith against the infidel politics and Voltairean society of Paris and of France.

The youth of France were the offspring of the infidel university of the first Napoleon. Neither under the Restoration, nor under the reign of Louis Philippe, was its destructive influence counteracted. Society was either infidel and indifferent, or Voltairean, that is, infidel and scoffing. Such a society pulled down all its members; and into such a society Frederic Ozanam was born. It might be divided into three classes. First came the non-Catholics, who believed nothing; secondly,

the Catholics who gave splendid examples of a perfect fidelity to the Church; and thirdly, those who may be called Catholics *juxta modum;* that is to say, they were in some particulars and details affected by the Time-Spirit of their age and country. Nevertheless among these were some of the noblest and most chivalrous sons of the Church, and some also of the most ardent and loving Christians and true soldiers of Jesus Christ. It seems to us that we ought to render justice to all such men. And we feel that we can do so without incurring a suspicion of our being 'liberal Catholics.' We have had our *baptismus opprobriorum* as Ultramontanes, and even as ultra-Catholic and ultra-Ultramontane. Our chief mission has been to learn of the living voice of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, and to repeat his utterances with a perfect fidelity. We therefore claim to ourselves the freedom of speaking generously of those who in our judgment may not in some things have followed the guidance of the Holy See, for we have bought that freedom with the great price of no little odium and no sparing censure for our extreme Ultramontanism.

It seems to us to be the duty of justice, not to speak of charity, that while we remain inflexible in our own attitude we should endeavour, as far as possible, to appreciate at its full all that is high, noble, truthful, and Catholic in them; and while we note the points in which we believe them to have come short, to render to their lives, characters, and memories the fullest recognition of what they were. We say their memories, because of those of whom we have to speak hardly one survives.

Between the years 1830 and 1850 there arose in

France a group of men whose lives have left an indelible mark upon their country. The period of De Maistre and Chateaubriand was followed by that of Lamennais, De Bonald, De Salignis, Gerbet, Lacordaire, Montalembert, Ozanam, Rio, Combalot, Cochin, and, in its later time, Gratry; and we must add, as a youthful disciple called away before he had inscribed his name by toil, Henry Perreyve.[1]

While conscious of divergencies and deviations in certain things, it was impossible not to see and to love the noble character of these men. Endowed with great natural gifts, and with wide and various cultivation, there was one thing in common with them all—a great mental beauty, and a great breadth of heart. No one can have read the writings of Gerbet, Rio, Ozanam, Montalembert, and Gratry, nobody can have known Henry Perreyve, without seeing and feeling the singular beauty of their intelligence, and the generous impulses of their character.

We have no fear in rendering this just and affectionate tribute to their memory; and if in anything we have at times strongly opposed their way of judging and speaking, we never forgot, and never shall cease to declare, that they were noble sons of France, which had marked them for its own with some of the best tokens of its less stable age. There is also another truth to be borne in mind. If we were to try the language of some of the Antenicene Fathers by the terminology fixed by

[1] With the exception of Lamennais, De Bonald, and Ozanam, it was the good fortune of the writer to know all the others, and some of them with much intimacy.

the Council of Nicæa, we should find matter for criticism. In like manner, if we were to try the writings of some of the noblest and most fervent defenders of the Catholic Faith and of the Holy See in France by the later tests of the Syllabus and of the Vatican Council, we should commit an injustice. At that period we might have been as they were, without an exact terminology, and with questions as yet undecided.

With these few words of precaution, we will give a slight sketch of the life of Frederic Ozanam, of his character, and of the work he has left behind him. But first we must very warmly commend the work of Miss O'Meara, which is written with great fulness, but with no prolixity. It would have been impossible to set before us any adequate notion of Ozanam's singularly great and fertile mind in a smaller compass. While the author sympathises with an affectionate reverence with the subject of her biography, she skilfully surrounds certain periods of it with just explanations which show a perception of what an adverse critic might incline to say.

Frederic Ozanam was born at Milan in 1813. He died at Marseilles in 1853. His whole career was therefore contained in forty years. The Ozanam family was, it appears, of Jewish origin, and of great antiquity. The name of Hozannam is said to be found in the thirty-eighth Roman legion; and a Jewish colony seems to have been planted at Bellignum, or Bouliginceux, near Lyons. They were baptised by S. Didier, and thenceforward the Christian name took the place of the old Jewish name. Benedict, the grandfather of Fre-

deric, was the first who changed the orthography to Ozanam. Antoine, father of Frederic, served four years as a conscript under the first Napoleon. But to avoid the political changes in France, he went from Lyons to Milan. Frederic was his second son. The family returned to Lyons soon after his birth. At the age of sixteen Frederic wrote a letter to a friend, which is a wonderful evidence of precocity. It is an autobiography, moral, intellectual, and spiritual, which implies an extraordinary self-knowledge, self-observation, and self-discipline. At the age of seventeen he describes his first religious doubts and his intense sufferings, which, however, ended in a complete faith. He says, 'I believed henceforward, with an assured faith, and, touched by this mercy, vowed to consecrate my days to the service of that truth which had given me peace.' He studied at Paris under Abbé Noirot, and soon reached and retained the head of his class. He was destined for the law; but, being so young, his father recalled him for two years to Lyons, where he studied in an actuary's office, but spent his pastime in learning English, German, Hebrew, and Sanscrit. At the age of eighteen he wrote a work against the Saint-Simonians. His letters at this time show a maturity and thoughtfulness more like eight-and-twenty than eighteen. He then began his legal studies in Paris; and found himself in the midst of infidels, scoffers, and blasphemers. Professors and students in this were all alike. At this date he had an interview with Chateaubriand, who asked him whether he had been to the theatre. He said no; Chateaubriand asked him whether

he intended to go. Ozanam had promised his mother, who was a fervent Catholic, that he never would; and after some hesitation, he said he had resolved not to go to a theatre. Chateaubriand said very earnestly, 'I implore you to be true to that promise to your mother. You would gain nothing at the theatre; and you might lose a great deal.'[2]

The biographer gives an interesting sketch of the state of the University of France, its schools, lycées, and of the Sorbonne, in which infidelity reigned with an absolute sway. Slowly and by chance, one or two Catholic youths found each other out in this atmosphere of unbelief, and joined themselves together for mutual support. They then began to controvert the sceptical and infidel teaching of the professors. They wrote answers, which were publicly read out. At last Professor Jouffroy[3] openly attacked revelation, and was answered by a protest, drawn up by Ozanam, and signed by fifteen Catholic students, which the Professor had to read out to a school of 200, and to declare that he never meant to ill-treat Christianity. Ozanam was then under twenty years of age. 'Let us cheer up,' he wrote to a friend; 'the work of God is advancing, and will be accomplished by the youth of this very day; who knows, perhaps, even by you and me?'[4] This knot of young men then resolved on having an organ or paper. It so happened that some of them lodged in

[2] *Life*, p. 28.

[3] M. Jouffroy died a Christian death in the unity of the faith, and with the ministrations of the Church. Who can say how much Ozanam may have contributed to this happy end?

[4] Vol. i. p. 56.

the house of a M. Bailly, who was proprietor of a printing establishment and a newspaper called the *Tribune Catholique*. A debating society was founded in his house. It was here that Ozanam first found his power of speech. He was continually harassed by the taunts that faith must be shown by good works; and out of this came the conferences of S. Vincent of Paul, of which he was the real founder at the age of twenty, though he always refused to be so regarded. They had as counsellor in their work of charity Sœur Rosalie. These conferences began in 1833, and at this time are spread throughout the Church. In 1834, Lamennais' fall had come, and Lacordaire had begun his conferences at the Collége Stanislas. Ozanam and he became intimate friends, and it was through Ozanam that Lacordaire was admitted to give his conferences in Notre Dame. Ozanam had by this time completed his legal studies, and entered on his duties as a barrister. But his drawings were strongly to literature; and at that moment the municipality of Lyons petitioned that he should be appointed to a chair of Commercial Law about to be founded in Lyons. Ozanam was then only twenty-four. He was, at that age, nominated to the chair of Commercial Law at Lyons, and at the same date M. Cousin offered to him the chair of Philosophy at Orleans. In the year 1841 he accepted the office of Assistant Professor of Foreign Literature in the Sorbonne; shortly afterwards the chair of Literature in the University of Lyons was offered to him. He had by this time only reached his twenty-eighth year. We have brought these facts together as the best way of

showing in what estimation he was held by the public men and public authorities of France. His office of Assistant Professor at the Sorbonne gave him the first full occasion of putting his powers to the proof. His biographer says:

'Ozanam possessed all the elements of the purest eloquence, a ready and retentive memory, a clear conception, a facility for rigidly sketching the outline of his subject, and filling it up in strong, brilliant, and delicate colours' (i. p. 196).

'Early next morning he would resume the interrupted chain of thought, and then, when the time came, after invoking on his knees the light and aid of the Holy Spirit, he went forth to deliver his message' (p. 197).

'His manner of lecturing was full of charm; he dispensed his vast erudition with the simplicity of a boy, and with a prodigality that belongs only to inexhaustible abundance. Every one of his lectures was a book condensed into a chapter, and he frequently compressed into a sentence an amount of thought and information which a mind less magnificently replenished would have diluted into a chapter, telling away in an hour, like the intellectual spendthrift that he was, the treasure it had taken years to accumulate. He stripped knowledge of half its difficulties by his way of imparting it. Knowledge with him was not so much an intellectual system as a mental habit, which had become a part of his being; he did not divest himself of it, as some men do, taking it up and laying it down at stated times; when the signal came for him to impart it officially, he did not seem to stand up and perform the functions of a professor so much as to avail himself of an opportunity for revealing the rich deposit of thought, scientific analysis, and observation which life-long study had left in his mind; he gave it out naturally, spontaneously, and with the real enthusiasm of a devout scholar,—devout in the sense of devoted; his devotion to science, and to his own particular branch of it—history—partook of the nature of his religion; it was to his mind what faith was to his soul. It was the spontaneity of his method, united to its finished art, which exercised such fascination on all, and possessed such an unrivalled power of attraction for the young. They were interested and enchanted even before they were convinced. If they arrived at the lecture-hall ignorant of the subject, or indifferent to it, they were quickly excited to a curiosity which put an end to indifference, and stimu-

lated to inquiry and investigation. Few minds ever possessed in a higher degree the faculty of kindling the minds of others with his own—a faculty which may be taken as the supreme test of mental and moral power. Ozanam followed the Socratic method, of which he had learned the secret from M. Noirot. Taking hold of the mind on every side, by sympathy, by the reason and the imagination, he compelled the student to work with his own brains while following the working of another's. M. Cousin once exclaimed, on coming out from a lecture of Ozanam's, "The lyceums and colleges send us distinguished professors, but the Abbé Noirot sends us men"' (p. 197).

We cannot wonder that his power over his hearers was irresistible, and that their attachment to him was a kind of devotion. But all this he used for the end to which at seventeen he had vowed his life:

'It was nearly half a century since the voice of a Christian teacher—a teacher identified with the Christian faith—had been heard in the Sorbonne, while, on the other hand, its walls had echoed unceasingly to every false and fantastic doctrine of the Voltairean and Rationalistic schools; and this absence of talent, or at least this silence amongst the Catholic men in the great seat of learning, went far to sanction the popular idea that talent, not to say genius, had utterly disappeared from the Catholic ranks. But now a new era had begun. At the age of twenty-seven Ozanam took his seat amongst the veterans of the proud old university, and electrified young and old by the splendour of his gifts and the burning ardour of his faith. It was a strange coincidence that the same audience which so lately had listened with delight while Villemain and Cousin exposed their favourite theses, should now hear, with no less favour, those same theses energetically denounced from the same rostrum by the daring new-comer. It was a rash experiment on his part. The State, as yet, held the monopoly of the university, and looked with an evil eye on the men who were leading the war against it in behalf of the rights of the Church. It was natural enough, too, that an assembly of young men, all enlisted in warm partisanship on one side or the other, but amongst whom the opponents of the Church largely predominated, should form a dangerous audience for a professor of Ozanam's ardent religious convictions. But he did not stop to calculate risks; and Fortune, who sides mostly with the brave, stood by the young champion of the Gospel. Here

was no sophist, no subtil philosopher striving to palliate hard sayings, or smooth down unpalatable propositions, but a dauntless knight, who rode into the lists with his drawn sword flashing in the sunlight, and, flinging down his gauntlet, dared all comers to pick it up. He dealt in no compromise, he made no concessions to the hostile susceptibilities of his hearers. The sceptics heard him in astonished admiration, the Catholics applauded with a sense of victory' (pp. 193-195).

M. Lenormant, a professor of the Sorbonne, had the courage to follow Ozanam's example; but his hearers rose in revolt with hisses and yells, with blasphemous cries. Ozanam was present, and,

'Unable to contain his indignation, leaped up beside the lecturer, and stood for a moment surveying the tumult with proud defiance. The courageous action drew forth an instantaneous salvo of applause; but Ozanam, with a scornful gesture, commanded silence, and proceeded to tell the assembly what he thought of their behaviour, and what value he set on their plaudits; he spoke with a fiery vehemence that startled all into attention; he adjured them in the name of liberty, which they so loudly invoked, to respect liberty in others, and to allow every man the freedom of his conscience. The effect of the harangue was magical; the tumult ceased, and M. Lenormant continued, or rather began, his lecture, and finished it without interruption. The next day, however, the *cours* was closed by order of the Government: authority thus yielding to violence, when by a little firmness it might so easily have taken the upper hand, and constituted itself the guardian of social peace, and the bulwark of social principles. This cowardly and cruel precedent did not daunt Ozanam, or induce him to abate one iota of his independence; he continued his lectures without mitigating in the slightest degree the out-and-out Christian tone of his teaching. The boldness of this conduct, while it heightened his prestige with his own party, increased his general popularity. His name became a power in its sphere, and was cited everywhere as an example of the energy and growing strength of the Catholics. It once happened during the noisy days of the Lenormant riots, when the learned Sorbonne was transformed into a battlefield, that some person, meaning to be witty, scratched out the words "littérature étrangère," after Ozanam's name on the door, and wrote over them "théologie."

He was informed of this as he was entering the hall. He said nothing until he had finished his lecture, and then, as he was about to descend from his chair, he observed, in a tone of great dignity, "I have not the *honour* to be a theologian, gentlemen; but I have the happiness to believe, and the ambition to place my whole soul with all my might at the service of truth." The courageous profession of faith was greeted by loud and general cheers' (pp. 220, 221).

It is not wonderful that such courageous fidelity should have the reward of popularity. Even his enemies were at peace with him:

'A man who represents the most unpopular conviction, who serves it and stands by it through thick and thin, is sure to gain influence in the long-run: undying devotion to a cause eventually conquers the respect of its enemies, though it may not make its champion popular. The qualities of the man himself must do this. He must have a heart, or he must pass for having one. Ozanam was essentially a man of heart. His genius excited admiration, his piety commanded respect, but it was his kindness that made him loved. Lacordaire says that he had a charm, "which, added to his other gifts, completed in his person the artisan of a predestined enchantment. He was gentle to all men, and just towards error"' (p. 224).

In 1844 his principal, M. Fauviel, died, and Ozanam was nominated professor for life. In the year 1846—his health and strength had been always frail, and severely taxed by incessant work—he began to give way; but he would not relax his labours. A malignant fever, however, compelled him to submit, and he was sent on a literary mission into Italy. He passed the winter of 1846-1847 in Rome. In 1848 came the Revolution, and the martyrdom, as it may well be called, of the Archbishop of Paris; for he was slain *in odium Christi*, by a spontaneous acceptance of death, for the *bonum commune Reipublicæ et Eccle-*

sicæ. It is not commonly known that the Archbishop went on this errand of self-oblation at the request of Ozanam and two others. But, before they had suggested it, the Archbishop had already pondered it in his heart, as if by an inspiration. The whole event is touchingly narrated in the book before us.

In 1850 Ozanam's health again began to fail. He went in search of health to Brittany, and came over to England. Lacordaire has given a characteristic account of his visit to Westminster Abbey:

'"He went in with the crowd of strangers and foreigners, and found himself presently behind the choir, in front of the tomb of S. Edward. The sight of this monument, mutilated by Protestantism, filled him with anguish, and falling on his knees before the relics, such as they are, he prayed there alone in expiation for that people that no longer knows its saints, to the great contempt, doubtless, of the lookers-on, who took him for an idolater, if not for a madman." We are not surprised to learn that the indignant beadle hunted him out of the church' (p. 352).

But these intervals of rest and change were of little avail. The intensity of his mind gave no respite to his failing frame, and in 1852 he was again dangerously ill. Then came his last appearance at the Sorbonne:

'He was still confined to his bed, suffering great pain, and consumed with fever, when one day he heard that the public were clamouring for him at the Sorbonne, accusing him of self-indulgence and neglect of duty in being so long absent from his *cours*, when he was paid by the State for giving it. The news stung him to the quick. "I will show them it is not true. I will do honour to my profession!" he cried. And, in spite of the tears of his wife, and the entreaties of his brother and another medical attendant, he had himself dressed, and drove straight to the Sorbonne, where he found the crowd still collected outside his class. When the professor, leaning on the arm of a friend, pale, worn, more like a spectre than a living man, advanced through their midst, the rioters were smitten with horror and remorse: as he ascended the chair that had witnessed so many of his triumphs,

and that he was never to ascend again, their applause broke forth, rising and falling like waves around him. He stood for some minutes gazing in silence on the thoughtless, cruel young crowd, his black dazzling eyes shining with the terrible light of fever, his long hair hanging, his whole appearance that of a man who was nearer to death than to life. When at last the tumult subsided, he spoke. His voice rang out clear as silver, more piercing from its very weakness, like a spirit imprisoned in a body too frail to bear the shock of its inspiration. "Gentlemen," he said, "our age is accused of being an age of egotism; we professors, it is said, are tainted with the general epidemic, and yet it is here that we use up our health; it is here that we wear ourselves out. I do not complain of it; our life belongs to you; we owe it to you to our last breath, and you shall have it. For my part, if I die, it will be in your service." He said truly; this last effort killed him' (p. 363).

What remains is soon told. Ozanam went to Eaux Bonnes, and into Spain, and finally into Italy. We follow him to Pisa, Genoa, Sienna, Antignano, and finally to Marseilles; and here came the end:

'His arrival at Marseilles was quickly known, and the brotherhood of S. Vincent de Paul hastened to his door with every testimony of sorrow and respect. He was too ill to see any of them, but he was greatly touched to hear of their constant visits. Nothing could surpass the serenity that his soul now enjoyed; every trace of fear, of apprehension, had vanished; all bodily suffering had likewise ceased, and he appeared like one already dwelling in the sensible presence of God; he seldom spoke, but communed still with his beloved ones by a pressure of the hand, a sign, and that smile that lay like a halo on the wasted face, touching it already with the peace that passeth all understanding. Feeling that the end was near, he himself asked for the last Sacraments, and received them with great fervour and the liveliest consciousness. When all was over, his brother, remembering how keenly he had feared the Divine judgments, urged him gently to have confidence in the great mercy of God; but Ozanam, as if he understood not the allusion, answered, with a look of sweet surprise, "Why should I fear Him? I love Him so much!" On the evening of the 8th of September, the feast of our Lady's Nativity, the summons came. His wife was beside him, and his brothers, and a few near relatives. The adjoining room was crowded with those other brothers,

the members of the Society of S. Vincent de Paul, who knelt in silence, joining in the prayers that were speeding their founder into the presence of his Judge. He had fallen into a gentle slumber, waking up at intervals to murmur a blessing, a word of love, an invocation. Suddenly, opening his dark eyes in a wide startled gaze, he lifted up his hands, and cried out in a loud voice, "My God! my God! have mercy on me." They were his last words' (pp. 453, 454).

We have thus briefly traced the dates of time in order to show in how few years a great life was lived. Ozanam's studies were completed by the age of twenty-two; and in eighteen years he accomplished all that he has left behind of finished writings, and all that he wrought into the hearts and lives of the youth of France in the widespread revival of faith, which is expanding to this day. They were eighteen years of great intellectual and spiritual intensity. One word spoken by a mind raised to the pitch of its powers does more than a thousand scattered from an unimpassioned mind. We have rarely seen clearer evidence of mental intensity than in Frederic Ozanam. It may be well believed that it was not only the energy of a mind inflamed with the love of God, but that the keen energy of a nervous system which daily consumed itself added to the intensity of the will. There can be no doubt that he accomplished the vow of his youth by spending and being spent to the last beat of his pulse for 'the truth which had given him peace.'

A kindly critic the other day closed a notice of his biography with the words, 'Dying at the age of forty, he left behind him a brilliant and a beautiful memory.'

To estimate either the character or the works of Frederic Ozanam would require more than one article.

The copious and sympathetic biography before us brings out many beautiful traits of the filial tenderness and veneration he bore to his mother, which may always be taken as the sure test of a manly and Christian heart. He had great cause to love her, for it was her fervent piety that formed his character from his earliest consciousness. He fully understood this inestimable blessing. Just after her death he writes:

'Alas, what havoc this death has made in my mind, as well as in my heart! No, I am wrong: what so crushed me was the long illness that I beheld day by day destroying her, and which—shall I say it?—seemed as if it were going to dishonour the sacrifice before consuming it, by quenching the intellectual faculties, and blunting the moral feelings. This thought was horrible, and haunted me constantly; I seemed to see her soul dying with her body! Mercifully the trial was shortened; just at the end the energy of her soul revived, and Christ, in descending into the heart of His beloved servant, left there strength for the supreme struggle. She remained for three days, calm, serene, murmuring prayers, or acknowledging our caresses and services by a few words of ineffable sweetness. At last the fatal night came; it was I who was watching. I suggested to my dear mother the acts of faith, hope, and charity, the same that she had taught me to lisp after her as a little child' (p. 161).

'Happy the man to whom God gives a holy mother! This dear memory will never forsake us. Often in my solitude now, in the midst of the anguish that weighs down my soul, the remembrance of that august scene returns to sustain and uplift me. I think of how short life is, how soon we shall be reunited with those from whom death has parted us, and then I feel all temptations of self-love, all the unworthy instincts of my nature, fade away, and my desires are concentrated in the single one of dying like my mother! O, how I rejoice now that I did not abandon that blessed deathbed to run after the vague promises of university honours! If at this trifling sacrifice I should only have earned the privilege of passing a few more months near her, of being there on that last night, I am more than paid for it' (p. 162).

And two years after her death, when less loving and

sensitive natures would have lost the vividness of their perceptions, he wrote:

'Nothing is so appalling as the growing solitude, the void that death creates around us. I have gone through it all; but this state did not last long. Then followed quickly another, when I began to feel that I was not alone, when I was conscious of something infinitely sweet in the depths of my soul; it was like an assurance that I had not been left alone; it was a benign though invisible neighbourhood; it was as if a cherished soul, passing close by, touched me with its wings. And just as formerly I used to recognise the step, the voice, the breath of my mother, so now, when a fresh breeze revived my strength, when a virtuous thought entered my mind, when a salutary impulse stirred my will, I could not but think it was still my mother. After a lapse of two years, when time might have dispelled what was merely the effect of an over-wrought imagination, I still experience the same thing. There are moments when a sudden thrill passes through me, as if she were there by my side; above all, when I most stand in need of it, there are hours of maternal and filial intercourse, and then I shed more abundant tears, perhaps, than in the first months of my bereavement, but an ineffable peace is mingled with their sadness. When I am good, when I have done anything for the poor, whom she loved so tenderly, when I am at peace with God, whom she served so well, I see her smiling on me in the distance. Sometimes, when I am praying, I fancy I hear her voice praying with me, as we used to do together at the foot of the crucifix every night' (p. 163).

The same tenderness of heart is visible in his friendships. His letters to M. Falconnet, and his grief at the death of a mutual friend, breathe an affection which can be found only in those who have grown up in the full play of filial and brotherly love. The same also is to be seen in all the notices of his domestic life. At the age of twenty-eight he married Mdlle. Soulacroix, daughter of the Rector of the Academy. She was in every way a worthy companion of his gentle and ardent mind. Her intelligence appreciated his intellectual culture and aspirations; and she had elevation of soul

to second him in enterprises in which self gives way to duty. In 1848, when the barricades were in the streets of Paris, Ozanam was under arms in the National Guard. 'Personally,' says the biography, 'he did not know what fear was. This courage was shared by his wife. "Thank God! Amélie is courageous," he says to more than one friend, whom he keeps informed of their position during the outbreak; and he constantly congratulates himself on finding a support instead of a hindrance in her presence throughout' (pp. 312, 313).

The same love and largeness of heart pervades his writings and his life whensoever he speaks of the poor. But this will fall more naturally into its place when we come to speak of his politics, or rather of his efforts as a social reformer in their behalf.

It is impossible for us to give any adequate representation of Ozanam's literary works. For eighteen years, distracted by the state of France both before and after the Revolution of 1848, with health always frail, and for the last five years sensibly giving way, it is wonderful how Ozanam could have accomplished so much. The amount of writing contributed by him to the *Tribune Catholique*, the *Ere Nouvelle*, the *Moniteur Religieux*, journals which were striving to rally the youth of France to the Catholic reaction against infidelity, or to stir up charity and zeal for the amelioration of the poor, must have demanded the time and thought and energy of any ordinary man. But with him these accessory writings never suspended his serious and systematic literary work. Even his journeys for health and rest gave rise to one or more volumes.

His journey to Italy produced *Les Poètes Franciscans*, and his short excursion into Spain *A Pilgrimage to the Land of the Cid*.

He had formed for himself an outline of a work to which he purposed to devote his life, *A History of Civilisation among the Germans*. He has left a record of what he intended to demonstrate in the following passage in a letter to M. Lallier:

'It was only at the close of my lectures that the serious interest of the subject revealed itself to me distinctly. It is a case of proving that Germany owes her genius and her whole civilisation to the Christian education she received; that her greatness was in proportion to her union with Christendom; that she drew her power, her light, her poetry from her fraternal connections with the other nations of Europe; that for her, as for others, there is, there can be, no real destiny except through Roman unity, the depository of the temporal traditions of humanity, as well as of the eternal designs of Providence. All this looks simple, natural, almost trivial in its self-evident truth this side of the Rhine; but, on the other hand, the national pride plumes itself in dreams of an autochthonous civilisation from which Christianity has, by the way, caused them to decline; in a literature which, without contact with the Latin, would have developed into unexampled splendour; in a future, in fact, which promises to be magnificent, provided it steeps itself in unmixed and unalloyed Teutonism. The German type is no longer Charlemagne, but Arminius. These doctrines pierce in divers forms through the various philosophical, historical, and literary schools, from Hegel to Goethe, from Goethe to Strauss. It seems to me advisable to attack them at home, on their own ground; to show how *alone* they were simply barbarians; how, thanks to their Bishops, their monks, to the Roman faith, the Roman language, the Roman law, they entered into possession of the religious, scientific, and political inheritance of modern nations; how, in repudiating it, they fell back gradually into barbarism. An introduction which will precede and conclusions that will follow the history of the literature of German chivalry, the principal object of my task, will, I hope, bring out this idea in strong relief' (pp. 205, 206).

Of this work two volumes exist, of which Montalem-

bert says, in a letter to Madame Ozanam, after her husband's death, 'I have a volume of the *Etudes Germaniques* always open before me.' The best known of Ozanam's works is probably *Dantè et la Philosophie Catholique au Treizième Siècle,* in which the full beauty of his mind and all the tenderness of his fervent faith were especially manifest. During the greater part of his career he would not allow his lectures at the Sorbonne to be taken down. It was not until the year 1846 that he consented. They were found to be so fit for publication that he regretted, as we must also regret, that he had not consented sooner. This has given to us two volumes called *La Civilisation au Cinquième Siècle.* To this, his last work, he prefixed an Introduction, which gives the outline of the work to which he proposed to give himself for life. He says:

'I purpose writing the literary history of the Middle Ages, from the fifth century to the close of the thirteenth, up to Dante, where I shall stop as at the point most worthy of representing that great epoch. But in the history of letters I shall make civilisation, of which they are the flower, my chief study, and in civilisation I recognise the chief work of Christianity. . . . As a layman I have no mission to deal with theological subjects, and God, moreover, who loves to be served by the eloquence of man, finds plenty in our day to vindicate our dogmas. But while Catholics were absorbed with the defence of doctrine, the unbelieving seized upon history. They laid hands upon the Middle Ages, they sat in judgment upon the Church, judging her sometimes with enmity, sometimes with the respect due to a fine ruin, often with a levity they would not have used in treating profane subjects. We must reconquer this territory, which belongs to us, since we find it cleared by the hands of our monks, our Benedictines, and our Bollandists,—those men who did not think their life ill spent in growing pale over parchments and legends. Gibbon, the historian, went to visit Rome in his youth. One day, while wandering through the Capitol, the

sound of hymns broke suddenly on his ear; he saw the doors of the basilica of the Ara Cœli open, and a long procession of Franciscan monks come forth, brushing with their sandals the pavement traversed by so many triumphs. It was then that indignation inspired him; he formed the design of avenging antiquity, outraged by Christian barbarism; he conceived the plan of the *Decline of the Roman Empire*. And I, too, have beheld the monks of Ara Cœli treading on the venerable pavement of Jupiter Capitolinus; I saw it, and I rejoiced at the victory of love over strength, and I resolved to write the history of the progress of that period where the English philosopher saw nothing but decay; the history of civilisation in the barbarous ages, the history of the human mind escaping from the shipwreck of the empire of letters, and traversing the flood of the invasions, as the Hebrews crossed the Red Sea, and under the same guidance: "forti tegente brachio." I know nothing more supernatural, nothing that proves more clearly the divinity of Christianity, than to have saved the human mind' (pp. 382-384).

Although Ozanam chose literature for his calling in life, and although he refused again and again the proposal to enter the Legislature, or to be called a politician, and that, too, with a declared purpose of working out social reforms in distinction from political, nevertheless he avowed himself explicitly to be a Republican. This we have no doubt has caused him to incur the censure of Legitimists, Royalists, Imperialists, and even to lose the perfect confidence of loyal Catholics, who associate order and obedience with monarchy, and if not anarchy, at least instability of both public and private morals with Republicanism. This was especially true in France, where the name of Republic and the reality were identified with 1793 and the Phrygian cap of revolution. We shall not be suspected of Republicanism, and our loyalty to the great English monarchy of a thousand years, founded broad and deep in the natural order of prudence and justice by our Catholic

forefathers, and subsisting to this day, the only commonwealth against which revolutions have broken themselves in vain,—we say we shall not be suspected of Republicanism, or of any uncatholic tendency in politics, if we clear Frederic Ozanam also from any such suspicion.

We have heard it said that no Republican can be a good Catholic. We would commend this dictum to the conscience of Cardinal M'Closkey and to the pastors and people of the Catholic Church of the United States; or, to come nearer home, we would commend it to the deliberation of Mgr. Mermillod, who would, we imagine, distinguish between the Helvetian republic and the gang of infidels and persecutors who now tyrannise over Geneva. But we may even go further, and remind those who censure Ozanam's politics of the republics of Venice, Florence, Pisa, and Genoa, of the Catholic chivalry which issued from them, and of the Saints who sprung from them.

Now it was precisely the mediæval Christian and Catholic republic which fascinated and filled Ozanam's mind. In it he saw the check and balance which would have saved France from the excesses of its later kings, and, therefore, from the sanguinary and anarchical reaction called the Revolution. His indignant lamentations over the state of the people of Paris; his burning zeal for the poor, whose degradation in poverty, ignorance, and depravity he, as a Brother of S. Vincent of Paul, saw with his own eyes, and relieved with his own hands,—all this made him pray and toil for a Christian equality of brotherhood such as he had read

of in the commonwealth of Israel. Perhaps the instinct of a theocratic commonwealth ran in the blood of a Hozannam by direct inheritance.

But we can find for Ozanam another plea. In the years when he was entering into the studies of his manhood there appeared in France a book which has more than almost any other, moulded and directed the political thought of the nineteenth century; we mean De Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*.[5] We shall better convey our own meaning by simply letting De Tocqueville express his. In his Introduction to his work he writes as follows:

'The more I studied American society the more I perceived that the equality of conditions is the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived, and the central point at which all my observations constantly terminated. I then turned my thoughts to our own hemisphere, where I imagined that I discerned something analogous to the spectacle which the New World presented to me. I observed that the equality of conditions is daily progressing towards those extreme limits which it seems to have reached in the United States; and that the democracy which governs the American communities appears to be rapidly rising into power in Europe' (p. xiii.).

He ascribes this equality chiefly to the action of the Catholic Church:

'Soon [he says] the political power of the clergy was founded, and began to exert itself; the clergy opened its ranks to all classes,—to the poor and to the rich, the villain and the lord; equality penetrated into the government through the Church, and the being who, as a serf, must have vegetated in perpetual bondage, took his place as a priest in the midst of nobles, and not unfrequently above the heads of kings' (p. xv.).

After saying that every fifty years has levelled

[5] *Democracy in America*, Reeves's translation (London, 1865).

France more and more nearly after the model of America, he continues :

'Nor is this phenomenon at all peculiar to France. Whithersoever we turn our eyes, we shall witness the same continual revolution throughout the whole of Christendom. The various occurrences of national existence have everywhere turned to the advantage of democracy. All men have aided it by their exertions; those who have intentionally laboured in its cause, and those who have served it unwittingly; those who have fought for it, and those who have declared themselves its opponents,—have all been driven along in the same track, have all laboured to one end, some ignorantly and some unwillingly; all have been blind instruments in the hands of God. The gradual development of the equality of conditions is therefore a providential fact, and it possesses all the characteristics of a Divine decree: it is universal, it is durable, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress' (pp. xix. xx.).

'The whole book which is here offered to the public has been written under the impression of a kind of religious dread produced on the author's mind by the contemplation of so irresistible a revolution, which has advanced for centuries in spite of such amazing obstacles, and which is still proceeding in the midst of the ruins it has made' (p. xxi.).

'The Christian nations of our age seem to me to present a most alarming spectacle; the impulse which is bearing them along is so strong that it cannot be stopped, but it is not yet so rapid that it cannot be guided: their fate is in their hands; yet a little while and it may be so no longer. The first duty which is at this time imposed upon those who direct our affairs is to educate the democracy; to warm its faith, if that be possible; to purify its morals; to direct its energies; to substitute a knowledge of business for its inexperience, and an acquaintance with its true interests for its blind propensities; to adapt its government to time and place, and to modify it in compliance with the occurrences and the actors of the age. A new science of politics is indispensable to a new world' (p. xxii.).

'Zealous Christians may be found amongst us, whose minds are nurtured in the love and knowledge of a future life, and who readily espouse the cause of human liberty as the source of all moral greatness. Christianity, which has declared that all men are equal in the sight of God, will not refuse to acknowledge

that all citizens are equal in the sight of the law. But, by a singular concourse of events, religion is entangled in those institutions which democracy assails, and it is not unfrequently brought to reject the equality it loves, and to curse that cause of liberty as a foe, which it might hallow by its alliance' (pp. xxxi. xxxii.).

He then sums up the saddest feature of our times —the unnatural and fratricidal conflicts of those who have common interests, and are combining for the same ends. It is as if Até had come between men :

'The religionists are the enemies of liberty, and the friends of liberty attack religion; the high-minded and the noble advocate subjection, and the meanest and most servile minds preach independence; honest and enlightened citizens are opposed to all progress, whilst men without patriotism and without principles are the apostles of civilisation and of intelligence' (pp. xxxiii. xxxiv.).

We cannot leave De Tocqueville's name without adding that he was born of a fervent Catholic Breton family; that, like too many Frenchmen, he became practically indifferent; but that he ended his days at Cannes with the pastoral care of the curé and the watchful service of a Sister of Charity.

Now we can hardly believe that Ozanam had not become familiar with De Tocqueville's thesis, and we might venture to assert with De Tocqueville's writings. If so, we have the key to the passages which we now add, in which Ozanam pours out his whole political creed.

His biographer, who evidently has studied all his works, has summed up his mind as follows :

'The philosophy of history, as he interpreted it, had led him to believe that there is no real meaning or character in the movement of human society unless through all its changes and con-

vulsions we can discern a steady and continual progress through Christianity to the dignity of freedom. This condition of freedom, which he held as essential to the welfare and happiness of communities, he considered equally indispensable to the Church. He was consequently intolerant of the least bondage for her, and impatient that a Christian people should tolerate it, when at the same time they were, perhaps, fighting manfully for the emancipation of their country. If the Church were free, free in the fullest sense of the word,—free to guide, to rule, and to teach mankind,—then all legitimate freedom would follow' (pp. 272, 273).

'"A struggle is preparing," he says, "between the classes, and it threatens to be terrible; let us precipitate ourselves between these hostile ranks, so as to deaden the shock, if we cannot prevent it." In 1836 he wrote to his friend Lallier: "The question which agitates the world to-day is not a question of *political forms*, but a *social* question. If it be the struggle of those who have nothing with those who have too much, if it be the violent shock of opulence and poverty which is making the ground tremble under our feet, our duty, as Christians, is to throw ourselves between these irreconcilable enemies, and to induce one side to give, in order to fulfil the law, and the other to receive, as a benefit; to make one side cease to exact, and the other to refuse; to render equality as general as it is possible amongst men; to make voluntary community of possession replace taxation and forced loans; to make charity accomplish what justice and law alone can never do." He adhered to this political creed all his life. Twelve years later, on the eve of the "violent shock" which his far-seeing sagacity foretold, he repeats, as in his student days, "It is a social question; do away with misery, Christianise the people, and you will make an end of revolutions"' (pp. 294, 295).

'The first duty of Christians now is not to be frightened; and the second is not to frighten others: but, on the contrary, to reassure the timorous, and to make them understand that the present crisis is like a storm that cannot last' (p. 308).

'Here we are in this great and opulent metropolis for the last seven weeks without a government or a regular police force, and yet we hear of no more murders, robberies, or other misdemeanours than before. Don't believe those evil-minded persons who go about spreading absurd stories; there is not a word of truth in them, and nothing is more contrary to the dispositions of the population of Paris, who on every occasion seek to show respect to religion and sympathy to the clergy. My friend, the Abbé Cherduel, who has blessed thirteen trees of liberty, has been quite

affected by the proofs of faith which he found amidst this people, where, since 1815, the priest has been taught to see only enemies of God and of the Church. Occupy yourself as much with servants as with masters, with workmen as much as with employers. This is henceforth the *only* means of salvation for the Church of France. The curés must set aside their pious parish congregations, little flocks of good sheep in the midst of an enormous population to whom the parish priest is a stranger. He must henceforth occupy himself, not only with the indigent, but with that immense class of poor who do not ask for alms, but who are, nevertheless, attracted by special preaching, by charitable associations, by the affection that is shown to them, and which teaches them more than we think. Now, more than ever, we ought to meditate on a beautiful passage in the second chapter of the Epistle of St. James, which seems as if it had been written expressly for these times' (pp. 308, 309).

Once more, in a passage which we reluctantly abridge, he brings out the profound conviction of his mind that the infidel revolution is the rotting and malaria of a land where the 'salt has lost its savour :'

'"It is within, not without, that we must seek for the sources of men's happiness and its principal enemies," he declares; "and we shall have done nothing, absolutely nothing, so long as we have not carried light and reform into those internal disorders which time does not right, which are more incurable than diseases, which last longer than the *chômage*, and go on multiplying pauperism long after the grass of the graveyard has effaced the last traces of civil war. God did not make the poor; He sends no human creatures into the chances of this world without providing them with those two sources of riches, which are the fountain of all others—intelligence and will. . . . Why should we hide from the people what they know, and flatter them like bad kings? It is human liberty that makes the poor; it is it that dries up those two primitive fountains of wealth, by allowing intelligence to be quenched in ignorance, and will to be weakened by misconduct. The working men know it better than we do. . . . God forbid that we should calumniate the poor whom the Gospel blesses, or render the suffering classes responsible for their misery; thus pandering to the hardness of those bad hearts that fancy themselves exonerated from helping the poor man when they have proved his

wrong-doing. . . . But while we have put crushing taxes on salt, meat, and all necessaries of life, we have not yet discovered in the arsenal of our fiscal laws the secret of arresting the multiplication of distilleries, of raising the price of alcoholic liquors, of restricting the sale of those detestable, adulterated, poisonous drinks that cause more sickness than all the rigours of the seasons, and make more criminals than all the injustice of men combined. What reforms have you introduced into the public amusements of this Parisian population, so infatuated about pleasure, so ready to let itself be led to the ends of the earth, not with bread, as it has been said, but with amusement? Last winter the Prefecture of Police delivered *four thousand licenses for night balls*. The State puts no limit to those unhealthy diversions, which the good sense of our fathers contracted within the six weeks of the Carnival. Every year it authorises the opening of a new theatre in some wretched haunt of the Faubourgs, where the sons and daughters of the people are fed nightly upon the scum of a literature whose cynicism would revolt the chastity of the opera pit. And when, for six months of the year, the youth of the working classes have spent their evenings and their nights in these horrible dens, where their health runs as much danger as their morals, you are surprised to see them turn out miserable puny creatures, incapable of supplying the military contingent, but supplying innumerable recruits every year to the prisons and the hospitals! Let us not imagine we have done our duty by the people when we have taught them to read and write and count. . . . When it was a question of crushing out the last embers of the insurrection, there was no need of delays and formalities to pitch twenty camps in the Boulevards of Paris, and up to the very doors of the Hôtel de Ville; and here we are, after four months, when in the 12th arrondissement alone there are 4000 children without shelter—here we are still struggling amidst adjournments, motions, and debates, fighting to overcome I know not what scruples of committees, boards, administrations, and the rest of it, who are terrified that the State will be ruined and overturned if the education of the young *ouvriers* is confided to Sisters and Brothers, to teachers capable, that is, of teaching them something more than how to spell out the syllables of the newspaper, and to scrawl the *ordre de jour* of the barricades on the walls with a piece of coal"' (pp. 323-325).

'"The poor devils," he said, "who are beguiled to the barricades, but who are Christians at heart, are ready to melt at a word of kindness"' (p. 267).

In all this we see a profound faith in the words of the Holy Scriptures, 'Sanabiles fecit Deus nationes super terras.' He believed the nations to be sick because their faith had almost given way under the spiritual, moral, and physical conditions of their life. But he profoundly believed in the healing power of God through the Church and the ever-renewing health of the generations of man. France, it is said, had once two-and-twenty thousand leprosy hospitals, but they have disappeared together with the leprosy which called them into existence. So he believed that the social evils of France were to be healed by the power of Christianity upon the heart of man. 'Christianise the masses:' this was his gospel and his political creed—a creed which has a higher sanction from S. Gregory the Great to Pius IX.

And the mention of this august name reminds us that we cannot better close this hearty tribute to a beautiful mind and a noble life than by the words in which Ozanam professed his filial and loving obedience to the Vicar of Jesus Christ. The winter of 1846-1847 Ozanam passed in Rome. It was at the beginning of the Pontificate of Pius IX. On Easter Sunday he wrote thus:

> 'This is the moment to speak to you of the Papacy, now that I have just assisted at its most solemn pageants, and am still under the spell of the emotion called up by that most thrilling spectacle which is to be seen on earth, the Papal Mass and the benediction of the *Urbi et orbi*' (p. 255).

Ozanam was received by the Holy Father with the most fatherly affection, and it was returned by a filial love which inspired his whole soul with the loyalty of a

chivalrous Catholic. He says, speaking of the Holy Father:

'He has resumed, one by one, all the active functions of the Episcopacy—preaching, giving Confirmation, visiting *incognito* schools and hospitals and the poor in their garrets, going to say Mass in any obscure chapel, and distributing Communion to all who are present, as my wife and I had the happiness of receiving it from him. And, with all this, a purity of life that was the admiration of those who knew him as a young priest, and a charity so boundless that when he set out to come to the conclave he was obliged to borrow six hundred crowns for his journey. . . . But what strikes one above everything else in him are those two sentiments that have made the greatness of all great Popes,—an immovable faith in the Divine authority vested in him, and a profound conviction of his unworthiness; a trust in God that enables him to undertake everything, and a contempt for himself that enables him to suffer everything; hence the *aureola* of sanctity which illuminates his countenance, and that burning accent which pervades his discourse' (p. 259).

At a public meeting, on his return from Rome, he said:

'I believe the future has serious troubles in store for Pius IX. I believe it is for his greater glory. God does not raise up such men for ordinary difficulties. If this great Pontiff had only to cope with the over-enthusiasm, the eagerness of his people—a thing that so few princes have to complain of—his mission would be an easy one; it would fill too small a place in history; his bark would glide over tranquil waters. We must look out for the tempest. But let us not fear, like the disciples of little faith; Christ is in the boat, and He is not sleeping; never has He been more wakeful than in these present days' (pp. 269, 276).

Such was Frederic Ozanam, a pure and noble soul, on fire with charity to all men, especially to the poor; consumed by zeal in the service of truth; pious, with a filial tenderness; exemplary in every path of life; more eloquent in the supernatural beauty of his thoughts than in the loving words which fell from his

lips; more illuminated with the ardour of Christian faith than with the manifold lights of literary cultivation: such a man bore in him a Catholic heart full of all instinctive loyalty, as ready to give his life for a jot or tittle of the faith, or for a definition of the Divine authority of the Church, as he was to counsel the Archbishop of Paris to tread in the steps of the Good Shepherd, and to lay down his life for his sheep. May God raise up on every side laymen like Frederic Ozanam.

THE END.

LONDON:
ROBSON AND SONS, PRINTERS, PANCRAS ROAD, N.W.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

GLORIES OF THE SACRED HEART. Third edition, 6s. (Burns & Oates.)

THE TEMPORAL MISSION OF THE HOLY GHOST; or Reason and Revelation. Third edition, 8vo, 8s. 6d. (Longmans & Co.)

THE INTERNAL MISSION OF THE HOLY GHOST. Second edition, 8s. 6d. (Burns & Oates.)

ENGLAND AND CHRISTENDOM. 8vo, 10s. 6d. (Longmans & Co.)

THE CENTENARY OF SAINT PETER AND THE GENERAL COUNCIL: a Pastoral Letter to the Clergy, &c. 8vo, 2s. 6d. (Longmans & Co.)

THE ŒCUMENICAL COUNCIL AND THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE ROMAN PONTIFF: a Pastoral Letter. 2s. 6d. (Longmans & Co.)

THE VATICAN COUNCIL AND ITS DEFINITIONS. 5s. (Longmans & Co.)

PETRI PRIVILEGIUM. The three preceding Works bound in one volume. 10s. 6d. (Longmans & Co.)

SERMONS ON ECCLESIASTICAL SUBJECTS. First, Second, and Third Series. 8vo, 6s. each. (Burns & Oates.)

THE LOVE OF JESUS TO PENITENTS. Third edition, 2s. (Burns & Oates.)

THE TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPE. Second edition, 5s. (Burns & Oates.)

THE TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPE IN ITS POLITICAL ASPECT. 1s. (Longmans, and Burns.)

ROME AND THE REVOLUTION. 1s. (Longmans & Co.)

CHRIST AND ANTICHRIST. 1s. (Longmans & Co.)

ROME THE CAPITAL OF CHRISTENDOM. 1s. (Longmans & Co.)

THE FOUR GREAT EVILS OF THE DAY. Third edition, 2s. 6d.; cloth, 3s. 6d. (Burns & Oates.)

THE FOURFOLD SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD. Second edition, 2s. 6d.; cloth, 3s. 6d. (Burns & Oates.)

SIN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. Third edition, 6s. (Burns & Oates.)

DOMINUS ILLUMINATIO MEA. Sermon preached at Oxford. 1s. (Longmans & Co.)

CONFIDENCE IN GOD. Third edition, 1s. (Burns & Oates.)

GROUNDS OF FAITH. Fifth edition, paper, 1s.; cloth, 1s. 6d. (Burns & Oates.)